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Download "The REAL story About the Crash that Killed Concorde! | Air France flight 4590"

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Table of contents
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Table of contents

0:00
Intro
0:36
A Marvel of Engineering
3:36
The Fuel System
4:41
Performance Penalty
6:13
Cockpit Inspections
7:11
Engines Start
8:28
The DC-10
10:40
The Taxi to 26-R
13:51
The Line Up
15:05
121 Seconds
19:03
Watch Out!
23:08
Airborne
25:33
Uncommanded Roll
27:13
Too Late
30:00
Offset Landing Gear?
31:55
The DC-10 / Continental Airlines
32:58
Crew Performance
34:30
Conclusions
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air france 4590 footage
air france 4590 cockpit voice recorder
air france 4590 crash animation
air france 4590 air crash investigation
air crash investigation full episodes
crash concorde paris
crash concorde gonesse 2000
concorde crash
concorde flight
concorde crash footage
concorde documentary
Mentour Pilot
Mentour Pilot concorde
Fear of flying
nervous flyer
Paris Charles de Gaulle
Air France
DC 10
Continental
Subtitles
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Subtitles

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00:00:00
it took 121 seconds
00:00:03
a more than 30-year long almost spotless
00:00:06
safety record a race within minutes as
00:00:09
the aerospace ale bac concord crashed
00:00:12
into a hotel just west of charles de
00:00:14
gaulle airport in paris but what exactly
00:00:17
happened and during the time leading up
00:00:19
to the flight using the final report i
00:00:21
will now tell you the story of the
00:00:23
beginning of the end of the concord stay
00:00:25
tuned
00:00:31
a huge thank you to curiositystream for
00:00:33
sponsoring this video
00:00:34
air france flight 4590 was actually a
00:00:37
shorter flight it was scheduled to fly
00:00:39
from charles de gaulle airport in paris
00:00:42
france over towards jfk international in
00:00:45
new york united states
00:00:47
once they landed in new york the
00:00:49
passengers who were mainly german but
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other nationalities as well were
00:00:52
supposed to get onto a cruise ship that
00:00:54
would take them down to ecuador in south
00:00:57
america making this probably a one in a
00:00:59
lifetime trip
00:01:01
there was 100 passengers scheduled for
00:01:03
the flight and six cabin crew and three
00:01:06
pilots
00:01:07
the aircraft being flown was the
00:01:08
legendary aerospace bac concorde one of
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the most beautiful aircraft ever
00:01:14
constructed and a feat of engineering
00:01:17
the concord first flew on the 2nd of
00:01:18
march 1969 and during its more than
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30-year tenure it had never suffered a
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fatal accident
00:01:26
there are a couple of things that you
00:01:27
need to understand technically about the
00:01:29
concorde in order for this story to make
00:01:31
sense if we start with the wing design
00:01:34
we've all seen these beautiful pictures
00:01:37
of the concord flying with their
00:01:38
fantastic delta wing now the reason that
00:01:41
the engineers use the delta wing for the
00:01:43
concord is because a delta wing will
00:01:45
work well both in the subsonic transonic
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and supersonic speed ranges
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the issue with the delta window is that
00:01:53
in order for it to provide enough lift
00:01:55
for takeoff and landing you need to have
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both a very high speed
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and also a quite high angle of attack
00:02:04
just to give you an example a boeing 737
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would generally take off at the speed of
00:02:09
around
00:02:11
140-150 knots
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the concorde on the other hand needed
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about 200 knots and this is really
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important because those type of speeds
00:02:18
would put an enormous stress on the
00:02:21
tires being used on the aircraft in fact
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the concorde during its 30 years of
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operation had had 57 tire bursts 12 of
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those had caused structural issues with
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the aircraft as pieces of tire had been
00:02:35
thrown up towards the underside of the
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wing and in six cases the wing tanks had
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actually been penetrated the most
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serious of those incidents happened back
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in 1979 where a concord taking off from
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washington in the united states had a
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tire burst during takeoff pieces of the
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tire penetrated the uh the lower part of
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the wing and one of the wing tanks
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causing a small fuel leak and also it
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brought damages to the hydraulic system
00:03:02
making it impossible to retract the gear
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after that incident a major
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investigation was launched into the
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airworthiness of the concorde and a lot
00:03:09
of recommendations were made mainly
00:03:11
towards strengthening of the tires being
00:03:13
used and the protection of the hydraulic
00:03:16
systems in the landing gear but there
00:03:17
was also
00:03:19
some evaluations about the risk of fire
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but the investigation team felt that the
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amount of fuel that could escape from a
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fuel leak caused by
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entire debris was relatively small and
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hence the risk of fire was very small as
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well another thing that you need to
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understand about the concord is that it
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has a quite complicated fuel system
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consisting of 13 tanks 12 of which is
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housed in the wings and the body of the
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aircraft and the 13th tank that is
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situated towards the very back of the
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body and that tank is used as a trim
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tank where the pilots can transfer fuel
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into or out of depending on where they
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want the center of gravity of the
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aircraft to be which is really important
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especially during takeoff the engines on
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the concorde were four olympus twin
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spool turbo jet engines that was
00:04:09
situated towards the back of the delta
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wing just outside and slightly behind
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the main landing gear they had variable
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air intakes in order to be able to fly
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in supersonic flight and they also had
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secondary air intakes on the lower side
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slightly behind the main air intakes and
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those air intakes are actually going to
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play a quite important role in this
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story all of the four engines also were
00:04:32
equipped with full reheat or afterburner
00:04:35
capability giving the aircraft a further
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18 of trust during the takeoff
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the flight departed on the 25th of july
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2000 and already from the start there
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were some problems
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originally another concorde was
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scheduled to do the flight but they
00:04:51
changed over to this individual during
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the night and when the dispatcher
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started doing the planning for the
00:04:58
flight he realized that there was a
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technical issue with this concorde
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specifically to one of the thrust
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traverses
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now it was not a problem that would keep
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the aircraft on the ground but it had a
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performance penalty and that performance
00:05:13
penalty would potentially lead to a need
00:05:16
for a fuel stop on route on top of that
00:05:20
most of the passengers were german
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citizens and i had flown in from germany
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earlier and there had been some kind of
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problem in the air france system when it
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came to checking in both the passengers
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and the bags so a lot of the passengers
00:05:34
in the bag were actually not on the
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passenger manifest when the dispatcher
00:05:38
started to do the load sheet he went
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with this information to the flight
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group when they arrived and the flight
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crew said that they would take care of
00:05:45
the flight planning from that point the
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way they did this was they they
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contacted engineering department at air
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france asked them if they could possibly
00:05:52
fix the trust reverser they got a
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positive response on that and then they
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proceeded with the pre-flight eventually
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the passenger discrepancy was thought to
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be fixed but they ended up with 19 more
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bags on board than what the
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load manifest would show
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giving them a little bit more weight
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around 1400 utcs that's 1600 local time
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in paris the flight crew started to do
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their pre-flight inspections inside of
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the cockpit now the crew flying
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consisted of a captain who was a 54 year
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old male with 13
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477 hours of total time on which 317 was
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flown on the concorde the captain was
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scheduled to be the pilot flying for
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this flight and the pilot monitoring was
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going to be the first officer
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he was a 50 year old male with 10 035
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hours and
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2698 hours on the concorde and he was
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also a simulator instructor on the
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concorde joining them on the flight tech
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was also a very experienced flight
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engineer who's 58 years old male with 12
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532 hours of total time and 937 hours on
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the concord so this was a very
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experienced flight crew which was
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typical for the air france concord
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cruise which was a very tight little
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group consisting of only about 30 pilots
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as the flight crew starts preparing the
00:07:12
aircraft for flight the engineer comes
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back up to them informing the captain
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that the trust reverse is now fully
00:07:19
functional which means that they can
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upload as much fuel as they need in
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order to fly directly towards new york
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and they settle on a final fuel figure
00:07:25
of 95 tons
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the crew starts discussing that this is
00:07:30
going to bring the aircraft up to a
00:07:32
weight which is very close to their
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maximum structural weight for departure
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and when they do the calculation of
00:07:39
their performance figures they settle on
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a v1 speed of 150 knots
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v rotation speed of 198 knots and a v2
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which is the endian out speed of 220
00:07:51
knots the dispatcher comes in with the
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final figures for departure and he tells
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the crew that he has calculated on a
00:07:57
taxi fuel burn of about two tons this is
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later going to turn out to be way too
00:08:03
much but we'll get to that in a second
00:08:04
at time 1425 everything is ready for
00:08:07
departure the cabin crew has given cabin
00:08:09
secure all of the passengers are sitting
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down
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and the flight crew receives their
00:08:14
startup clearance they start up the
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concord engines in sequence
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three two
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and then four and one
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and once the startup sequence is
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complete they ask for taxi clearance the
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runway used in this day is runway 2-6
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right which is one of the longest
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runways in shelder gold so the air
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traffic controller asks the concorde if
00:08:36
they are able to take an intersection
00:08:38
takeoff
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but given their very high weight the
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captain instead asks to get full length
00:08:43
departure runway 2-6 right they received
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their tax clearance to start taxing down
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tax away romeo to holding point runway
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26 right and at time 1435 utc
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the aircraft starts moving down towards
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the holding point as they're taxiing out
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now the crew continues with their
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pre-departure preparation
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as part of that the first officer
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realizes that one of the electrical
00:09:07
control systems for the rudder keeps
00:09:09
jumping out of its primary control
00:09:11
system into its backup control system he
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comments this to the flight engineer he
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says hey you got the indicators going
00:09:19
into green all the time and the flight
00:09:21
engineer responds back to that that yeah
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that's true they discussed this a little
00:09:25
bit they decide to go back into the
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primary control system anyway and the
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flight engineer says that if this
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problem continues or happens during the
00:09:33
takeover well then we'll just ignore it
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because this is a dispatchable fault and
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it's not going to have any impact on the
00:09:39
flight during this taxi out as well
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about four minutes prior to departure
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they initiate a fuel transfer from fuel
00:09:45
tank 11 which is at the very back of the
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aircraft towards the feeder tanks in
00:09:49
order to get the center of gravity of
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the aircraft to 54
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which is the sweet spot for takeoff at
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maximum takeoff weight this fuel
00:09:57
transfer was successfully completed a
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few minutes prior to departure at the
00:10:01
same time as this is happening a dc-10
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from continental airlines is lining up
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and taking off runway 26 right the same
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runway that the concorde is just about
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to take off from during the takeoff roll
00:10:12
a short metal strip about 43 centimeters
00:10:15
falls off the right-hand engine of the
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dc-10
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there are no indications in the cockpit
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about this there's no warnings and the
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crew just continues to fly towards the
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destination
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because this happens only a few minutes
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prior to the concord departure there are
00:10:31
no runway inspections that could have
00:10:33
picked this up in fact in france at the
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time there was only mandated two runway
00:10:37
inspections per day
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the concorde is now taxing and getting
00:10:41
closer to the holding position on romeo
00:10:44
from with 2-6 right and the captain does
00:10:46
a take-off briefing now this is
00:10:48
something that we always tend to do
00:10:49
where we do a little bit of a quick
00:10:51
summary of the most important points
00:10:54
before we depart
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and the captain says
00:10:57
so the takeoff is at maximum takeoff
00:10:59
weight 180 tons 100 which means 4
00:11:03
reheats with maximum n2 of 103 and a
00:11:06
failure n2 of 98 between 0 and 100 knots
00:11:10
i stopped for any oral warning and the
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tire flash and the tire flash and the
00:11:14
call out is coming from you right
00:11:17
between 100 knots and v1 i ignore the
00:11:19
gong i stopped for an engine fire a tire
00:11:22
flash and a failure call out after we
00:11:24
won we will continue on the standard
00:11:26
instrument departure as we just talked
00:11:28
about and will land back on runway 2 6
00:11:30
right so this is a pretty standard
00:11:32
take-off briefing from a captain it
00:11:34
outlines what the crew are expected to
00:11:37
do in case of a rejected takeoff in the
00:11:39
low speed regime which in this case in
00:11:41
the concorde is between 0 knots and 100
00:11:43
knots they basically stop for anything
00:11:45
the gong that they're referring to is
00:11:47
what would be equivalent to a master
00:11:49
caution warning in a boeing it's just a
00:11:51
oral warning that some kind of failure
00:11:54
has occurred it might not be a
00:11:57
critical failure
00:11:58
and then from 100 knots up to v1 they're
00:12:01
a little bit more restrictive because
00:12:02
they're now in the high speed regime of
00:12:04
the takeoff so from that point they only
00:12:06
stop before
00:12:08
and your fire warning a failure warning
00:12:10
in this case also what they call a tire
00:12:12
flash a tire flash is a warning light
00:12:15
that comes on if the system feels a
00:12:17
sudden loss of pressure in one of the
00:12:19
tires now in the boeing that i fly we do
00:12:23
not stop for a burst tire above 80 knots
00:12:27
but in the concord case it has proven to
00:12:29
be a much bigger problem so it's
00:12:31
included in one of those critical
00:12:32
failures that they will stop for in the
00:12:34
high speed regime and above v1 they are
00:12:37
committed to the takeoff so all pilots
00:12:40
are trained that off the v1 if you would
00:12:42
reject at that point you will do a
00:12:43
potential catastrophic runway excursion
00:12:45
so instead we bring the aircraft into
00:12:48
the air sort out any problem and in this
00:12:50
case the discussion coming back to land
00:12:52
at the very long runway 26 right again
00:12:55
in paris but as we're about to learn the
00:12:57
failure that these pilots are about to
00:12:59
experience is going to be much more
00:13:02
complicated than that the captain now
00:13:04
also asks the flight engineer how much
00:13:06
fuel they've used during the taxi
00:13:07
because remember in the load sheet they
00:13:09
had two tons calculated
00:13:11
the flight engineer responds with um
00:13:14
we've got 800 kilos there
00:13:16
so this would indicate that they're
00:13:18
actually using about a ton less of taxi
00:13:21
fuel and since they were already at the
00:13:23
maximum takeoff weight using the two-ton
00:13:26
of taxi fuel that they were supposed to
00:13:27
use
00:13:28
if they have used a ton less it means
00:13:30
that they're now about 800 kilos above
00:13:32
maximum takeoff weight the flight
00:13:34
engineer at this point also says brake
00:13:36
temperature is checked at 150 and the
00:13:38
captain asks
00:13:40
is it hotter on the left or the right
00:13:42
side flight engineer says that it's
00:13:44
about the same and that's going to turn
00:13:46
out to be a really important statement
00:13:48
for the investigation later on that time
00:13:50
1442 utc the concorde was cleared to
00:13:53
line up and clear for takeoff from a 2-6
00:13:55
right
00:13:56
air traffic control gave them the
00:13:58
surface wind of 090 degrees at 8 knots
00:14:00
and the pilot had not calculated with
00:14:02
that much tailwind in their performance
00:14:05
calculations if they would have they
00:14:06
would have seen that their maximum
00:14:08
takeoff weight had now been reduced to
00:14:10
180 tons rather than just above 185 tons
00:14:14
the limiting factor here would have been
00:14:16
the concorde's tire speed
00:14:18
because if you take off with tailwind
00:14:21
it's going to bring you up into higher
00:14:23
ground speed before you get enough air
00:14:26
speed to rotate the aircraft and in this
00:14:29
case the tire speed would have been too
00:14:31
high later investigation would show that
00:14:33
this didn't have a real impact on what
00:14:35
happened to this flight and i also kind
00:14:37
of understand it being a pilot myself
00:14:39
when you line up there's a lot of things
00:14:41
that's happening at the same time and if
00:14:43
you suddenly get a different wind than
00:14:44
what you've calculated would for it's
00:14:46
easy to miss that right but if you're a
00:14:49
pilot out there it is really important
00:14:51
actually to take the time and to really
00:14:53
think about the wind that you're getting
00:14:54
before you start your takeoff rule from
00:14:56
this point onwards things are going to
00:14:58
happen really really quickly and this is
00:15:00
where the 121 seconds start at time 14
00:15:05
42 and 30 seconds the captain advances
00:15:08
the four trust levels in the cockpit
00:15:10
towards off trust
00:15:12
this causes the four mighty olympus
00:15:14
engines to roar in the full tech of
00:15:16
thrust with full reheat engaged and the
00:15:19
aircraft starts accelerating down the
00:15:20
runway
00:15:22
24 seconds later the first officer
00:15:24
called out 100 which is then followed by
00:15:27
the flight engineer saying four greens
00:15:30
this is indicating that each of the four
00:15:33
goal lights that is associated with each
00:15:35
engine showing that the engine is
00:15:36
working normally and that the four
00:15:38
reheats are engaged six seconds later
00:15:42
the first of the calls out v1 and
00:15:45
there's now no return from this take-off
00:15:48
this is about 35 seconds into this
00:15:50
flight at time 14 43 and 9 seconds a
00:15:53
slight yaw to the left is noted on the
00:15:56
flight data recorder this yaw was not
00:15:59
caused by any rudder movement and at
00:16:01
this point when the aircraft passed
00:16:03
about 1700 meters of the runway they
00:16:06
also found pieces of the water deflector
00:16:09
from the left hand main gear so this
00:16:12
probably represented the time when the
00:16:14
concorde roll over that metal strip that
00:16:16
was left behind by the dc-10 that had
00:16:19
departed earlier within half a second
00:16:22
noise is recorded in the cockpit voice
00:16:23
recorder and that's likely coming from
00:16:25
the explosion of one of the tires on the
00:16:28
left main gear boogie the reason that
00:16:31
the investigators thought so was because
00:16:32
at this point on the runway they could
00:16:34
find the metal strip and also pieces of
00:16:38
tire debris one second later the
00:16:40
aircraft has accelerated to a speed of
00:16:42
178 knots and at this point that's about
00:16:45
1810 meters into the takeoff
00:16:48
a change of noise is heard in the
00:16:50
cockpit what has probably happened here
00:16:52
is that pieces of the exploded tire have
00:16:55
been thrown up towards the underside of
00:16:57
the left hand wing in the area of where
00:16:59
fuel tank number five is situated
00:17:02
now those pieces have impacted the wing
00:17:04
with such a force that it actually
00:17:06
buckled the underside of the wing
00:17:08
inwards and the area around that buckle
00:17:11
a little bit outwards
00:17:13
causing a enormous pressure wave inside
00:17:16
of the tank and since this tank was at
00:17:19
this moment completely full that
00:17:21
pressure wave didn't have anywhere to go
00:17:23
except pushing further on the area of
00:17:25
the tank next to where this piece
00:17:28
impacted causing a rupture outwards of
00:17:31
the fuel tank
00:17:32
and the reason that investigators think
00:17:34
that this is what happened is because
00:17:36
they found pieces of the number five
00:17:37
fuel tanks at this position on the
00:17:40
runway but the pieces indicated that the
00:17:42
ruptured has happened from inside of the
00:17:45
fuel tank and not from the outside the
00:17:47
change of noise that can be heard on the
00:17:48
voice recorder it's most likely coming
00:17:50
from the fact that several
00:17:52
dozens liters of fuel is now gushing out
00:17:56
through this hole from the number five
00:17:58
fuel tank and it has gotten into contact
00:18:01
with something that caused it to ignite
00:18:04
what caused the fire to ignite and
00:18:06
actually sustain itself is something
00:18:08
that was greatly discussed in the
00:18:10
subsequent investigation as well but
00:18:12
most likely the tire when it exploded
00:18:15
caused a breakage of some electrical
00:18:17
wires in the left gear strut now those
00:18:21
broken wires then caused arcing that
00:18:23
ignited the flame and the fact that the
00:18:25
landing gear was still extended meant
00:18:27
that behind the landing gear there was a
00:18:30
turbulent zone that allowed the flame to
00:18:32
stabilize and maintain itself without
00:18:34
being blown out by the airstream what
00:18:36
happens now is that the aircraft start
00:18:38
veering towards the left of the runway
00:18:41
the captain counteracts with right
00:18:43
rudder to maintain the cent line and
00:18:44
this is not because the engines are
00:18:47
starting to fail at least not at this
00:18:48
point instead it is likely that this
00:18:51
veering movement is coming from the
00:18:53
damage made to the left-hand tires and
00:18:56
also because of the aerodynamic drag
00:18:58
that the flame is producing behind the
00:19:00
aircraft
00:19:02
two seconds later the aircraft is
00:19:03
starting to lose thrust on both engine
00:19:05
number one and two so both engines on
00:19:07
the left-hand side in the case of the
00:19:09
number one engine it's because it's
00:19:10
ingesting a lot of debris from the
00:19:13
broken tires so rubber things like that
00:19:16
and also quite a bit of hot gases and in
00:19:19
the case of engine number two which is
00:19:21
the engine that's closest to the landing
00:19:23
gear it is because of ingestion of hot
00:19:25
gases as an engine ingests these gases
00:19:28
it changes the
00:19:30
pressure inside of the compressor and it
00:19:33
can lead the compressor stalls which is
00:19:35
what's happening here so the engine is
00:19:36
basically choking on the gases
00:19:39
the first officer now called out watch
00:19:42
out quickly followed by the flight engineer
00:19:44
calling the exact same thing watch out
00:19:46
and this is likely because the two goal
00:19:48
lights so engine one and two would have
00:19:50
extinguished at this point as they are
00:19:53
stalling and not producing the trust
00:19:55
that they're supposed to do
00:19:56
the aircraft is now at a speed of 187
00:19:59
knots still eight knots below the
00:20:00
rotation speed but because both engine
00:20:04
one and two have essentially failed at
00:20:06
this point and the number one is slowly
00:20:08
recovering but engine number two is back
00:20:11
at idle trust the aircraft is starting
00:20:13
to
00:20:14
jaw
00:20:15
very very hard towards the left the
00:20:17
captain is counteracting this but the
00:20:20
aircraft is still starting to slightly
00:20:22
veer off the center line we don't know
00:20:25
why the captain decides to start
00:20:27
rotating at this point maybe it is
00:20:30
because he feels that he is about to
00:20:32
exit the runway maybe it is to avoid
00:20:35
other traffic that he sees further down
00:20:37
on the taxiway we don't know this but
00:20:40
the fact is that he does start to rotate
00:20:43
the aircraft and he rotates slower than
00:20:45
he would normally probably indicating
00:20:48
that he's aware that the speed is not
00:20:50
high enough
00:20:52
as the aircraft is rotating the flight
00:20:54
engineer calls out something that sounds
00:20:56
like stop but it wasn't clear on the
00:20:59
voice recorder but only a second later
00:21:02
he calls out engine failure engine
00:21:04
number two and he's calling only engine
00:21:07
failure on engine number two because
00:21:09
indian number one is actually starting
00:21:11
to recover from those initial stalls but
00:21:14
as the aircraft continues to rotate and
00:21:16
the angle of the nose comes up higher
00:21:18
and higher the airflow changes around
00:21:21
the wings probably causing these hot
00:21:23
gases once again to be ingested into
00:21:26
both engine number one and engine number
00:21:28
two probably using those secondary
00:21:31
engine inlets that we talked about
00:21:32
before and this causes further stalls
00:21:35
which once again reduces the trust back
00:21:37
to near idle on both of these engines
00:21:40
at this point the first engine fire
00:21:42
alarm also can be heard in the cockpit
00:21:44
and the flight engineer responds to that
00:21:46
with calling shutdown ending number two
00:21:49
and the captain responds with engine
00:21:51
fire procedure as this is happening the
00:21:54
air traffic controller can see this all
00:21:55
happening out from his viewpoint in the
00:21:57
control tower and he calls out
00:22:00
airfrance4590 you have flames
00:22:03
you have flames trailing behind you the
00:22:05
first officer reads this back the flight
00:22:08
engineer is now doing the engine fire
00:22:10
procedure which means that he is
00:22:12
reducing the trust level back to idle on
00:22:14
engine number two and he is also pulling
00:22:17
and rotating the engine fire handle this
00:22:20
momentarily removes the fire alarm as
00:22:23
the extinguisher is likely cooling down
00:22:26
the engine but it's soon coming back
00:22:28
again because of the fact that the fire
00:22:30
is not actually in the engine it's
00:22:32
outside and the engine fire
00:22:34
circuit is just feeling the increase in
00:22:37
temperature from the immense fire that
00:22:39
is burning outside
00:22:41
while this is happening and remember
00:22:43
everything that we've covered so far has
00:22:44
only taken a few seconds
00:22:46
there's another radio call from
00:22:49
an unknown aircraft somewhere on the
00:22:51
airport
00:22:52
and the pilot there says on the radio
00:22:55
uh it's really burning eh and
00:22:58
uh it's burning and
00:23:00
i'm not sure it's coming from the engine
00:23:03
which is going to be very helpful
00:23:04
evidence later on to the investigators
00:23:07
the concorde is now finally airborne and
00:23:10
just before it became airborne it ran
00:23:11
over a few edge lights on the left hand
00:23:14
side of the runway
00:23:15
and the crew now faces the next problem
00:23:18
which is their airspeed
00:23:20
because they rotated at a slightly lower
00:23:22
speed than they normally should have
00:23:23
rotated with they're now maintaining a
00:23:25
speed of 200 knots while their engine
00:23:28
out climb speed is 220
00:23:31
this means that with that airspeed they
00:23:34
won't be able to climb or even maintain
00:23:36
altitude and the first officer points it
00:23:38
out by calling speed speed several times
00:23:42
engine number one is now recovering
00:23:44
slightly but it's heavily damaged and
00:23:45
will never get back up to full thrust
00:23:47
again engine number two has been shut
00:23:49
down through the engine fire procedure
00:23:51
that the flight engineer have just
00:23:53
completed and engine number three and
00:23:55
four has gone into something called a
00:23:56
contingency mode which is where they are
00:23:58
producing as much trust as they possibly
00:24:01
can in order to counteract the loss of
00:24:03
trust on one or two of the other engines
00:24:06
the concorde is at an altitude of 100
00:24:09
feet radio with a speed of 200 knots and
00:24:12
they're climbing with about 750 feet per
00:24:14
minute and at this point air traffic
00:24:16
control calls them and says air france
00:24:19
4590 you have large flames trailing
00:24:22
behind you and you have priority to
00:24:23
return back to the airfield
00:24:25
the first officer reads this back and as
00:24:27
he's done so the flight engineer reminds
00:24:30
him to take the gear up now
00:24:33
the first officer responds initially no
00:24:35
to that and that's likely because he
00:24:37
knows that as a procedure if there's an
00:24:39
indication of a damage to the landing
00:24:41
gear the concorde is not supposed to
00:24:43
retract the gear but then the captain
00:24:45
breaks in and gives a direct order to
00:24:47
retract the gear the first officer tries
00:24:50
but it is evident from the corpus voice
00:24:52
recorder that he is unable to do so he
00:24:55
just cannot seem to get the gear up the
00:24:57
reason for this is likely because of the
00:25:00
damage that has been caused by the tire
00:25:03
explosion it might have damaged the
00:25:05
landing gear door on the left hand side
00:25:06
and because of the sequence that the
00:25:08
landing gear retraction is supposed to
00:25:10
follow if the landing gear door does not
00:25:13
move when it's being commanded to do so
00:25:15
the landing gear will stay out the
00:25:17
captain now turns over to the flight
00:25:19
engineer and asks him are you shutting
00:25:20
down engine number two and the flight
00:25:22
engineer responds with yes it is shut
00:25:25
down the first officer again calls out
00:25:27
airspeed speed and then the gear is not
00:25:31
retracting
00:25:33
at time 14 43 and 55 seconds the first
00:25:37
indications of an uncommanded rule can
00:25:40
be seen on the flight data recorder this
00:25:41
role likely is caused by the fact that
00:25:44
the fire has now been burning for a
00:25:46
while and it's starting to melt the uh
00:25:49
inboard elevon on the left-hand side
00:25:51
which is causing flight control problems
00:25:53
now the captain is trying to counteract
00:25:56
this role
00:25:57
and meanwhile that is happening the nose
00:25:59
of the aircraft is pitching up more and
00:26:02
more and its angle of attack is
00:26:04
constantly increasing
00:26:06
the first officer is listening out to
00:26:08
the atc frequency and he can hear how
00:26:10
charlie gold tower is talking to the
00:26:12
fire leader who is telling the fire
00:26:15
leader that the concorde is likely going
00:26:17
to return back for straight in landing
00:26:19
on the opposite runway
00:26:21
in response to that he calls out le
00:26:24
bourget level j and we are going to try
00:26:27
for lebo j
00:26:29
the engine fire alarm is now back again
00:26:31
in the cockpit and
00:26:33
the engine number one is surging once
00:26:35
again removing all of the remaining
00:26:38
thrust on that side of the aircraft this
00:26:40
further causes the aircraft to roll over
00:26:42
to the left and it gets into at the
00:26:45
worst point a roll angle of 113 degrees
00:26:48
to the left
00:26:49
the gpws warning system is now sounding
00:26:52
in cockpit as well saying
00:26:54
pull up pull up and as that is happening
00:26:57
there's indications that the trust is
00:26:59
being moved back on the remaining
00:27:01
engines three and four this is likely to
00:27:04
try to counteract the role and get the
00:27:07
aircraft over to wings level in order to
00:27:09
be able to
00:27:10
get it to continue to fly unfortunately
00:27:13
it is just too late only seconds later a
00:27:16
time 14 44 and 31 seconds the concorde
00:27:19
crashes into a hotel in gunness just
00:27:22
west of
00:27:24
charles gold airport
00:27:26
as it does so
00:27:27
all 109 people on board the concorde
00:27:31
parishes together with four people in
00:27:33
the hotel on the ground
00:27:36
[Music]
00:27:48
[Music]
00:27:58
this was an unspeakable tragedy and
00:28:01
start on the air accident investigation
00:28:03
started immediately at the crash site
00:28:06
when the investigators started to go
00:28:09
through all of the pieces that was left
00:28:11
behind the crash they very quickly found
00:28:13
the left landing gear boogie and when
00:28:16
they examined the landing gear boogie
00:28:17
they realized that there was a crucial
00:28:20
spacer missing the function of that
00:28:23
spacer was to keep the alignment of the
00:28:25
tires on the landing in bouquet and
00:28:27
without that spacer in place the boogie
00:28:30
could actually start to wobble up to
00:28:32
three degrees in any direction
00:28:34
now could that have actually had an
00:28:37
impact on the accident sequence and also
00:28:39
was there anything that the pilots could
00:28:42
have done in order to avoid this
00:28:44
accident from happening i'm going to
00:28:45
tell you all about what the accident
00:28:47
investigation team found out just after
00:28:50
this short message from my supporting
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the first thing that the air accident
00:30:00
investigation team started doing when
00:30:02
they found out about the missing space
00:30:04
was trying to find it because maybe it
00:30:06
was somewhere on the crash site but
00:30:07
quite quickly they actually found the
00:30:09
spacer in an air france workshop where
00:30:12
the concorde had undergone some
00:30:13
maintenance to that landing gear boogie
00:30:15
just a few days earlier this was a very
00:30:18
serious laps on behalf of air france and
00:30:20
the investigation team now needed to
00:30:22
understand whether or not this missing
00:30:24
spacer could have actually caused or
00:30:26
aggravated the accident
00:30:28
and the way they went about doing this
00:30:30
was they had a look at the performance
00:30:32
data of the concorde if the landing gear
00:30:35
boogie would have started to skew during
00:30:37
the takeoff run or indeed during the
00:30:39
taxi out you would be able to see that
00:30:41
on the way that the aircraft accelerated
00:30:44
during the takeoff and also remember how
00:30:46
the crew talked about the brake
00:30:48
temperature before the takeoff and the
00:30:50
fact that it was equal on both sides
00:30:53
well that was the first real clue that
00:30:56
the landing gear boogie was actually
00:30:58
lined well at least during the taxi out
00:31:00
because it would have been skewed that
00:31:01
would have had an indication on the
00:31:03
brake temperatures potentially higher on
00:31:05
the left hand side during the takeoff
00:31:08
roll the investigators had a look at the
00:31:10
rudder pedal movement of the pilots to
00:31:12
see if there had been some kind of pull
00:31:15
to watch either direction
00:31:16
but
00:31:17
they found nothing and on top of that
00:31:19
the data from the performance manual of
00:31:21
the concorde very closely matched the
00:31:23
actual performance of the aircraft
00:31:25
during the take-off role and that would
00:31:27
indicate that at least during the
00:31:28
take-off role initially before they ran
00:31:31
over the metal strip there was no extra
00:31:33
drag coming from the left wheel boogie
00:31:36
so the alignment seems to have been good
00:31:38
all the way up until the aircraft
00:31:39
crossed over that metal strip and the
00:31:41
tire exploded
00:31:43
together this data indicates that even
00:31:45
though the missing spacer was a major
00:31:48
lapse in behalf of air france it still
00:31:50
didn't have any real impact on the
00:31:53
accident sequence
00:31:54
the investigation team now turned their
00:31:56
eyes towards continental airlines and
00:31:58
the dc-10 from which the metal strip had
00:32:00
fallen and when they visited continental
00:32:02
airlines and they went through the
00:32:04
maintenance history of this dc-10 they
00:32:06
recognized that this support metal strip
00:32:09
had actually been replaced not once but
00:32:11
twice within the previous two months and
00:32:14
when they looked at it they realized
00:32:16
that the metal strip in itself had not
00:32:18
been manufactured according to the
00:32:20
engine manufacturer
00:32:21
instructions it had also been drilled 37
00:32:25
times rather than the 12 times that was
00:32:28
stipulated by the engine manufacturer
00:32:30
and the metal strip next to it was
00:32:32
actually a little bit too long and that
00:32:35
was what was causing this metal strip to
00:32:37
be constantly wore down and probably
00:32:40
also the reason that it fell off in the
00:32:42
first place these findings led to quite
00:32:44
a lot of litigation and legal issues
00:32:47
between
00:32:48
the french authorities and continental
00:32:50
airlines but we're not going to get into
00:32:51
that in this video instead let's have a
00:32:53
look at how the pilots performed during
00:32:55
these 121 seconds
00:32:58
the air accident investigation team very
00:33:00
quickly realized that the pilots had
00:33:02
never been trained for a scenario like
00:33:04
this where they would lose both engines
00:33:06
on one side together with a huge fuel
00:33:08
leak and on top of that a fire
00:33:10
since the aircraft had accelerated past
00:33:12
their decision speed of v1 when they ran
00:33:14
over the metal strip and the tire
00:33:16
exploded the crew was essentially
00:33:19
committed to the takeoff from that point
00:33:22
if they would have decided to reject the
00:33:24
takeoff it is highly likely that the
00:33:26
aircraft would have had a high speed
00:33:29
runway overrun which would have led to a
00:33:32
land gear collapse and that together
00:33:34
with the already burning fire would have
00:33:36
in all probability led to
00:33:39
a complete loss of the aircraft so the
00:33:41
fact that they continued the takeoff and
00:33:43
brought the aircraft into the air was
00:33:45
completely understandable once they were
00:33:47
in the air they effectively lacked
00:33:49
enough thrust to get the aircraft to
00:33:52
accelerate up to any sustainable climb
00:33:55
speed or climb
00:33:56
given that they couldn't retract the
00:33:58
gear and the fact that they couldn't
00:33:59
retract the gear was probably
00:34:01
what was maintaining the flame outside
00:34:04
as well so even if the pilots would have
00:34:06
been able to keep the aircraft uh wings
00:34:09
level and airborne
00:34:11
the sustained fire would have eventually
00:34:14
started to eat through both the flight
00:34:16
controls on the left-hand side and the
00:34:18
aircraft structure leading to
00:34:20
the disaster so effectively the
00:34:22
investigators said that there was very
00:34:24
little to nothing that this crew could
00:34:26
have done differently in order to avoid
00:34:28
this accident from happening so in the
00:34:30
end the air accident investigation team
00:34:32
concluded that a single burst tire
00:34:34
something that happened to the concorde
00:34:36
before many times and was likely to
00:34:38
potentially happen again was the cause
00:34:40
of this catastrophic and unreversible
00:34:43
tragedy and because of that conclusion
00:34:45
the air worthiness certificate of the
00:34:47
concord was almost immediately withdrawn
00:34:49
until some serious improvements could be
00:34:52
done to the structure these improvements
00:34:55
included things like kevlar lining
00:34:57
inside of the fuel tanks to make sure
00:34:59
that even if a tire would burst it
00:35:01
wouldn't have these catastrophical
00:35:03
consequences it also included the
00:35:05
protection and partial rewiring of
00:35:07
electrical wiring inside of the landing
00:35:09
gear strut and the wheel well bay and on
00:35:12
top of that the aircraft needed to be
00:35:13
fitted with new burst resistant ncg
00:35:16
michelin tires and there were also some
00:35:18
other minor improvements that needed to
00:35:20
be done to the aircraft all of this led
00:35:22
to the concorde being grounded for more
00:35:24
than a year and just before it was
00:35:27
scheduled to get back into service the
00:35:29
horrible terrorist attacks of 9 11
00:35:31
happened in new york
00:35:33
that had a huge influence on the
00:35:35
aviation business worldwide so it was to
00:35:38
become the beginning of the end of the
00:35:41
concord era the concorde continued to
00:35:43
fly for another approximately two years
00:35:45
until british airways as the last
00:35:47
remaining operator retired the last
00:35:50
concord on the 24th of october 2003
00:35:54
marking the end at least for now for
00:35:57
passenger supersonic flight
00:36:00
i also want to mention here that the uk
00:36:02
air accident investigation team had some
00:36:04
serious issues with the way that they
00:36:05
had been treated by the french
00:36:07
investigation team in this effort
00:36:11
the uk team said that they had been
00:36:13
denied access to crucial bits and parts
00:36:16
of the information they hadn't been able
00:36:18
to investigate some of the debris that
00:36:21
was found on the runway until much much
00:36:23
later and many other points like this
00:36:25
and this is all outlined in an appendix
00:36:27
to the final report now if you guys want
00:36:30
to see an absolutely hair racing story
00:36:32
about two pilots who pushed their
00:36:34
aircraft to its absolute limits during a
00:36:37
positioning flights in the u.s would had
00:36:39
some really serious consequences
00:36:41
well then check out this video up here
00:36:44
or you can binge watch this entire video
00:36:47
series about air crash investigation
00:36:49
using this playlist up here have an
00:36:52
absolutely fantastic day and if you guys
00:36:54
want to support me and support the work
00:36:56
that i do with the channel well then
00:36:58
consider becoming a patreon i have
00:37:00
weekly hangouts with my patreon crew i
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love doing that and i hope to see you in
00:37:05
one of those hangouts next time bye

Description:

Thanks to Curiosity Stream for sponsoring today’s video. Go to https://curiositystream.com/?coupon=mentourpilot and use code MENTOURPILOT to save 25% off today, that’s only $14.99 a year. Check out this video about pilots playing around in their aircraft, next: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCMmCekKO_c On the 25th of July 2000 the world changed forever. With the first fatal crash of a Concorde since it first came into service, the confidence in the worlds only super sonic passenger jet was shattered. But what actually happened on during that fateful takeoff of Air France Flight 4590 in Charles de Gaulle Airport in France? What cased the huge fire and the eventual loss of controls? In this video I will go to the bottom of all the little details that led up to this crash, I hope you will find it interesting. If you want to support the work I do on the channel, join my Patreon crew and get awesome perks and help me move the channel forward! 👇 👉🏻 https://www.patreon.com/mentourpilot Get the Mentour Aviation app and discuss what You think about this! Download the app for FREE using the link below 👇 📲https://app.mentourpilot.com/ 📲 Join the Mentour Pilot Discord server here! 👉🏻 https://discord.com/invite/JntGWdn I have also created an Amazon page with Aviation books, material and flight simulator stuff that I think you will enjoy! 👉🏻 https://www.amazon.com/shop/mentourpilot Follow my life on instagram and get awesome pictures from the cockpit! 📲 https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser To find the right HEADSET for YOU, check out BOSE Aviation 👉🏻 https://boseaviation.aero/ Artwork in the studio 👉🏻 https://aeroprints.shop/ Get some Awesome Mentour Pilot merch 👉🏻 https://mentour-crew.creator-spring.com/ Below you will find the links to videos and sources used in this episode. Enjoy checking them out! Concorde 1969: @ André Cros https://www.aerotime.aero/upload/files/1200px-02.03.69_1er_vol_de_concorde_avec_jacqueline_auriol_(1969)_-_53fi1931-2.jpg Concorde 1969 2: @ AFP 2021 https://sputnikglobe.com/20170721/concorde-cia-us-opposition-1055754509.html CDG: @ NEW NEWS https://n00news.wordpress.com/2010/10/19/paris-airport-running-short-on-fuel-because-of-strike-action/ airfrance check in: @ caen-airport.com https://caen-airport.com/check Aircraft Maintenance @ gla.ac.uk http://www.cud.ac.ae/sites/default/files/programs/2017/fd-computer-networking-engineering-technology-1920x1080.jpg Memorial site: @ Christopher P. Hood https://hoodcp.wordpress.com/2020/07/25/remembering-the-concorde-flight-af4590-crash/ Wires: @ lectromec.com https://d2wwvh76f5odon.cloudfront.net/lectromec-wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Article109-0.jpg Concorde in flight: @airlineratings.com https://www.airlineratings.com/news/concorde-ever-perform-barrel-roll/ 9-11: @ AP Photo/Chao Soi Cheong https://ca-times.brightspotcdn.com/dims4/default/079074e/2147483647/strip/true/crop/1800x1200+0+23/resize/2000x1333!/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcalifornia-times-brightspot.s3.amazonaws.com%2F1d%2F1c%2F49ffd0c240f1b4eec5ad6884207f%2Fla-photos-wap-ap716367926225.jpg Last Concorde: @ Pedro Aragão https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aerospatiale-British_Aircraft_Corporation_Concorde,_British_Airways_JP6199717.jpg CFA1VX7XZ1G8FFY7   00:00 - Intro 00:36 - A Marvel of Engineering 03:36 - The Fuel System 04:41 - Performance Penalty 06:13 - Cockpit Inspections 07:11 - Engines Start 08:28 - The DC-10 10:40 - The Taxi to 26-R 13:51 - The Line Up 15:05 - 121 Seconds 19:03 - Watch Out! 23:08 - Airborne 25:33 - Uncommanded Roll 27:13 - Too Late 27:13 - The Jigsaw Begins 30:00 - Offset Landing Gear? 31:55 - The DC-10 / Continental Airlines 32:58 - Crew Performance 34:30 - Conclusions

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