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Table of contents
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Table of contents

0:00
Intro
1:28
L'aereo, la compagnia, la rotta
3:52
L'equipaggio
6:47
Preparativi al decollo
10:08
La procedura di decollo sull'A310
15:01
Il decollo del volo 211
17:49
Lottare contro l'aereo
19:47
Il Trim
21:29
Riprendere il controllo
27:46
Indagini e conclusioni
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Subtitles
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Subtitles

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    Download
    00:00:06
    It's March 5, 2008 and an Airtransat Airbus A310
    00:00:11
    is about to take off
    00:00:13
    from Quebec
    00:00:15
    City International Airport in Canada. The
    00:00:17
    weather conditions aren't exactly
    00:00:19
    the best, especially due to the
    00:00:22
    very poor visibility. Despite this,
    00:00:25
    the pilots were ready to operate for a very
    00:00:27
    short time. flight with destination
    00:00:29
    Montreal, once the engines were set to
    00:00:31
    take-off power the crew
    00:00:34
    realized that the plane was accelerating
    00:00:36
    much faster than usual and
    00:00:39
    once it took off the plane completely
    00:00:41
    unawares of the crew began to
    00:00:43
    gain altitude tremendously
    00:00:45
    violent within a few seconds
    00:00:48
    for both the commander and the first
    00:00:50
    officer the control of the Airbus A310
    00:00:53
    had become a real
    00:00:55
    battle what was happening to
    00:00:57
    Air Transat flight 211 but above all how does
    00:01:01
    this story continue before
    00:01:03
    continuing as in all my videos
    00:01:04
    I would like to point out that I am not a
    00:01:06
    pilot or an expert of any kind but
    00:01:08
    just a great aviation enthusiast
    00:01:10
    eager to tell these stories and
    00:01:12
    without further ado Make yourself comfortable,
    00:01:15
    fasten your seat belts and get ready for
    00:01:17
    the story of Air transat flight
    00:01:27
    2111 as announced by The introduction is
    00:01:31
    March 5, 2008 and we are
    00:01:33
    at Quebec
    00:01:35
    City International Airport in Canada. It is just after
    00:01:38
    2:00 in the afternoon and the 89 passengers
    00:01:41
    of Air Transat Flight 211 are on
    00:01:44
    board the Airbus A310 which that day
    00:01:47
    it would have taken them to
    00:01:49
    Montreal airport a few hours earlier the plane had
    00:01:51
    landed at Quebec City airport
    00:01:53
    after a flight departing from
    00:01:55
    Paris Shard de goal airport from which
    00:01:58
    134 passengers had also disembarked Air transat is
    00:02:01
    a well-known Canadian airline
    00:02:03
    specializing mainly in the sector
    00:02:05
    of long-haul flights but also charter flights
    00:02:08
    to holiday destinations, it currently
    00:02:10
    has a fleet of 38 aircraft which, with the
    00:02:13
    exception of two leased Boeing 737 max8s,
    00:02:16
    are almost all Airbus between
    00:02:19
    a330 and a321 and until 2020 it
    00:02:23
    also had 14 Airbus A310 We have already seen the type of aircraft
    00:02:27
    involved in today's story
    00:02:29
    a few other times
    00:02:31
    on the channel. The Airbus A310 was the
    00:02:34
    first airliner designed
    00:02:36
    specifically for long range by
    00:02:38
    the well-known European manufacturer
    00:02:40
    Airbus, founded in the early 1990s. 80
    00:02:42
    together with the rivals Boeing 757 and 767
    00:02:46
    contributed to opening the doors
    00:02:48
    to the era of twin-engined aircraft with high
    00:02:51
    autonomy and therefore also to the gradual
    00:02:53
    decline of large four-engined and
    00:02:55
    three-engined aircraft such as the Boeing 747 dc10 md11 and
    00:03:00
    so on, this first generation of
    00:03:02
    long-lived twin-engined aircraft radius brought
    00:03:05
    many innovations to the entire
    00:03:07
    aviation sector,
    00:03:09
    also introducing a large part of
    00:03:11
    digital instrumentation in the cabin and various other
    00:03:13
    automatisms which also led to the
    00:03:15
    disappearance of the role of the
    00:03:17
    flight engineer but returning to us the ERB A310 300
    00:03:21
    protagonist of the story today it was
    00:03:23
    registered as Charlie Golf Papa
    00:03:26
    Alfa Tango was built in 1990
    00:03:30
    and the following year in August
    00:03:32
    1992 it was delivered to Emirates where it
    00:03:35
    was registered as alfa 6 Eco kilo
    00:03:37
    Juliet After approximately 9 years of service in
    00:03:40
    Emirates On 16 May 2001 the The plane
    00:03:43
    became part of the
    00:03:45
    Aransat fleet on the day of flight 211 and had
    00:03:48
    therefore accumulated just over 16 years of
    00:03:51
    flight activity. But now the time has come
    00:03:53
    to get to know
    00:03:55
    the crew more closely in today's history, to tell
    00:03:57
    the truth today's video I can tell you
    00:04:00
    very little or nothing about the pilots
    00:04:02
    However there is a series of
    00:04:03
    quite relevant information about the
    00:04:05
    data that I try to tell you usually as
    00:04:08
    name age total flight hours nationality
    00:04:11
    and flight hours on the specific Ao type
    00:04:14
    I can't tell you anything either on the commander
    00:04:16
    nor on the first officer However we know
    00:04:18
    that the commander began working for
    00:04:20
    Air Transat starting from March
    00:04:23
    1997 as first officer of the Lokid
    00:04:27
    L1011 7 years later in 2004 he
    00:04:31
    instead became first officer of Airbass A310 and
    00:04:34
    in 2007 he began his
    00:04:36
    training course to commander and on
    00:04:39
    January 24, 2008, just under a month and a
    00:04:42
    half before flight 211, he
    00:04:44
    actually became commander of airbass at
    00:04:46
    310. The only precise data I can give you
    00:04:50
    is that on the day of flight 211 the
    00:04:52
    commander had accumulated just over
    00:04:54
    100 hours flight time as commander on the
    00:04:57
    airbass a 310 I repeat just to avoid
    00:05:00
    confusion not 100 hours of total flight
    00:05:02
    on the Airbus A 310 but 100 hours of flight
    00:05:05
    in the role of commander and given his
    00:05:08
    inexperience as commander in the role
    00:05:10
    of first officer of the Air transat flight
    00:05:12
    211 vi he was a so-called approved check
    00:05:16
    pilot or pilot examiner exactly
    00:05:19
    like the commander also the first
    00:05:21
    officer joined a transat
    00:05:23
    in
    00:05:24
    1997 as precisely the first officer
    00:05:26
    of loki D 1011 3 years later in
    00:05:30
    December 2000 he became commander while
    00:05:33
    the year following in 2001 he obtained the
    00:05:36
    Type Rating on the airbass 310 In
    00:05:39
    February 2002 he became an
    00:05:42
    airbass 310 instructor for the company while
    00:05:44
    between 2005 and 2006 he obtained the
    00:05:47
    qualifications to become officially
    00:05:49
    approved check Pilot during flight 211
    00:05:53
    the commander would have been Pilot Flying
    00:05:55
    while the pilot examiner in the role
    00:05:58
    of first officer would have been
    00:05:59
    Pilot monitoring over two pilots and the
    00:06:02
    89 passengers there were also seven
    00:06:05
    flight attendants bringing the total number
    00:06:07
    of people on board to 98 the
    00:06:10
    weather conditions that day were
    00:06:11
    quite challenging However there is
    00:06:14
    However, it must be said that the pilots of
    00:06:15
    Canadian airlines are quite
    00:06:18
    used to it. It was snowing over almost
    00:06:20
    the entire metropolitan area of ​​Quebec
    00:06:22
    City and the temperature was -10°.
    00:06:25
    At the airport the longest runway was in use,
    00:06:28
    namely runway 6 of
    00:06:30
    2743 m. the visibility along the runway a
    00:06:34
    value known as rvr or runway Visual
    00:06:37
    range was around 1800 feet just under
    00:06:40
    600 m and keep this data in mind
    00:06:43
    as we will talk about it later in the
    00:06:45
    section dedicated to the analysis. Furthermore
    00:06:47
    that day there was wind coming from the
    00:06:49
    east direction 90° and intensity equal to 24
    00:06:53
    knots with gusts up to 32 or approximately
    00:06:56
    45 km/h with gusts up to 60 given
    00:07:00
    the orientation of runway 06 that
    00:07:03
    day the pilots of Air transat flight 211
    00:07:06
    would have had a frontal wind component
    00:07:08
    equal to approximately 28 knots just over
    00:07:11
    50 km/h as already explained on other
    00:07:14
    occasions, everything possible is done to try
    00:07:16
    to land and take off against the wind.
    00:07:19
    So from this point of view,
    00:07:21
    the conditions were
    00:07:22
    quite optimal that day. But in addition to all
    00:07:24
    this, it must also be taken into consideration
    00:07:27
    another very important aspect of
    00:07:29
    flight 211, namely the relatively low
    00:07:33
    weight of the plane for that flight. I remind you
    00:07:36
    again that there were 89 passengers on board
    00:07:38
    while 310 could
    00:07:41
    easily carry
    00:07:43
    even 280 but above all it should be
    00:07:46
    underlined that the flight Quebec City
    00:07:48
    to Montreal is really very short, it
    00:07:51
    barely lasts 30-35 minutes and therefore
    00:07:55
    represents a much lower quantity of fuel on board
    00:07:57
    than we would
    00:07:59
    normally carry. An A310 on a
    00:08:02
    long flight, in fact, I remind you
    00:08:04
    that that day Flight 211
    00:08:07
    landed in Quebec City after an
    00:08:09
    Atlantic crossing departed from Paris and
    00:08:12
    therefore most of the fuel
    00:08:13
    on board had been used
    00:08:16
    during this flight. In fact, the Airbus
    00:08:18
    A310 weighed just over 106
    00:08:21
    tonnes which is a rather
    00:08:23
    low value if we consider that when empty
    00:08:25
    the plane weighs just over 79 tons and
    00:08:28
    that its maximum take-off weight is
    00:08:31
    153 tons but don't worry, I told you
    00:08:34
    this information because it will be very
    00:08:36
    important shortly at 2.15pm while
    00:08:39
    the boarding operations were about to
    00:08:41
    end the flight 211 receives
    00:08:44
    authorization from
    00:08:46
    air traffic control to carry out the flight,
    00:08:48
    the pilots are told to take off
    00:08:51
    from runway 06 and they are also informed of
    00:08:53
    the standard instrument departure
    00:08:56
    that they should have followed that day, which
    00:08:58
    is essentially one of the various
    00:09:00
    predefined routes that planes
    00:09:02
    departing from a given airport can
    00:09:05
    follow to move towards their first
    00:09:07
    route point several minutes later
    00:09:10
    Flight 211 was ready to leave the
    00:09:13
    parking area and then began pushback and
    00:09:15
    engine firing at 2.38pm
    00:09:19
    while Air Flight transat 211
    00:09:21
    was along a taxiway
    00:09:23
    of the airport from the
    00:09:25
    air traffic control they were informed of a
    00:09:27
    change in the take-off procedure
    00:09:29
    that they would have to follow the plane
    00:09:31
    now once it left the runway 06 has an
    00:09:34
    altitude of 400 feet or approximately
    00:09:37
    120 m would have had to perform a turn
    00:09:40
    towards the bow at 110°, would then have continued
    00:09:43
    the climb up to 3000 feet or just
    00:09:46
    over 900 m and then contact the
    00:09:49
    Quebec terminal controller for
    00:09:50
    further instructions. The crew
    00:09:53
    then began to reprogram the
    00:09:55
    plane's computers to insert this new
    00:09:57
    procedure and this is done without
    00:09:59
    particular problems at 2.39pm the airbus
    00:10:03
    a310 was aligned with runway 06 and everything
    00:10:06
    was ready for take-off now before
    00:10:09
    continuing with the narration of the
    00:10:10
    events I find it quite interesting
    00:10:12
    and important to go and see how
    00:10:14
    The take-off was actually carried out
    00:10:16
    on the Airbus A310 following the
    00:10:19
    Air Transat procedures. In truth, these
    00:10:21
    would be more or less common procedures for
    00:10:24
    all the other companies and also for almost
    00:10:26
    all the other planes. Simply thanks
    00:10:29
    to the Report on Flight 211 we have
    00:10:31
    the original checklists available.
    00:10:33
    Air transat First of all, when you
    00:10:35
    decide to start the take-off manoeuvre,
    00:10:38
    the Pilot Flying activates the so-called Go
    00:10:41
    leavers and pronounces the words takeoff
    00:10:44
    or literally take-off. The govers
    00:10:47
    placed on the throttles of the Airbus
    00:10:49
    A310 do nothing other than activate the
    00:10:54
    automatic throttle system. on the part
    00:10:56
    of the plane of the power of the engines if
    00:10:59
    any of you remember my
    00:11:00
    past videos they have exactly the
    00:11:02
    same function as the so-called
    00:11:05
    toga button on the Boeing 737 at this point the
    00:11:08
    throttles will start to move
    00:11:10
    automatically and by themselves they will bring
    00:11:12
    the power necessary to takeoff
    00:11:15
    given that it was snowing that day and
    00:11:17
    that the runway was therefore wet and
    00:11:19
    contaminated by snow, the Air
    00:11:22
    Transat procedures required the pilots to
    00:11:24
    take off with the maximum
    00:11:26
    possible power. That is, the toga a animo power
    00:11:29
    which stands for Take Off go around and to
    00:11:31
    communicate to the To
    00:11:33
    use the car's power,
    00:11:35
    the appropriate button located on the TRP or
    00:11:38
    Thrust Rating Panel must be pressed, which is
    00:11:41
    essentially a panel from which it is
    00:11:43
    possible to impose certain
    00:11:45
    power limits that the engines can deliver
    00:11:47
    controlled
    00:11:57
    by the automotive on the so-called Flight
    00:12:00
    Mode Annunciator or FMA That is, the
    00:12:03
    upper part of the main flight display
    00:12:05
    on which the
    00:12:07
    automatic systems in use by the aircraft are shown. This
    00:12:09
    call corresponds to thrust Srs runway.
    00:12:13
    To this the Pilot monitoring, after having
    00:12:15
    verified that the engine power
    00:12:17
    has reached the necessary one,
    00:12:19
    responds with checked Power set Passed
    00:12:22
    the speed of 100 knots corresponding to
    00:12:25
    just over 180 km/h the Pilot monitoring will
    00:12:29
    announce precisely 100 kns the 100 knots
    00:12:32
    correspond to the beginning of the
    00:12:34
    high speed phase of the take-off but we will not see
    00:12:36
    in this video what this entails
    00:12:39
    subsequently the Pilot monitoring
    00:12:41
    will announce V1 i.e. the achievement
    00:12:44
    of the so-called V1 speed, i.e. the
    00:12:47
    speed above which it is no longer
    00:12:49
    possible to interrupt take-off and if
    00:12:51
    this were to happen there is a high
    00:12:53
    risk of excursion from the runway and
    00:12:55
    major damage to the aircraft. And obviously there
    00:12:57
    is also always a risk to people
    00:12:59
    Pilot monitoring the rotate call
    00:13:02
    at which the Pilot Flying begins to
    00:13:04
    pull the clos towards itself the aircraft at
    00:13:07
    this point gradually begins to
    00:13:08
    lift off the ground and once
    00:13:12
    the actual start of the Climb has been verified via the variometer the Pilot
    00:13:14
    monitoring announces positive Climb
    00:13:17
    immediately after the Pilot Flying communicates
    00:13:19
    Gear up or the instruction that
    00:13:21
    corresponds to the withdrawal of the trolley and the
    00:13:24
    Pilot monitoring follows after a short time
    00:13:26
    Even if to tell the truth Air transat
    00:13:28
    unlike many other companies does not
    00:13:31
    communicate a specific condition for
    00:13:32
    when to carry out this step the Pilot
    00:13:34
    Flying communicates engage autopilot or
    00:13:38
    rather the command to activate the
    00:13:40
    autopilot and once
    00:13:42
    the Pilot monitoring has been carried out it announces autopilot
    00:13:45
    engaged at 1500 feet altitude the Pilot
    00:13:49
    monitoring activates the
    00:13:51
    thrust Rating Panel via the trp the climb power
    00:13:54
    by pressing the button Climb or precisely
    00:13:57
    Climb thrust the thrust of the engines therefore
    00:14:00
    decreases slightly
    00:14:02
    the take-off power is no longer necessary shortly
    00:14:04
    after the aircraft reaches the acceleration
    00:14:06
    altitude precisely the altitude at
    00:14:09
    which the climb ratio is reduced
    00:14:11
    to favor acceleration towards
    00:14:14
    usually 250 knots the acceleration
    00:14:17
    altitude for Quebec City airport
    00:14:19
    was 3000 feet and at this the Pilot
    00:14:21
    Flying calls accelerating once
    00:14:24
    the minimum speed at which it is
    00:14:27
    possible to retract the flaps is exceeded which on the
    00:14:29
    main flight display is indicated
    00:14:31
    with the letter F the Pilot Flying
    00:14:33
    communicates flaps Zero The Pilot monitoring,
    00:14:36
    after having verified the correct
    00:14:38
    speed, communicates Speed ​​checked flaps
    00:14:40
    zero and moves the Lever. Consequently, shortly
    00:14:43
    afterwards the exact same thing is done
    00:14:45
    once the minimum speed at
    00:14:48
    which it is possible to withdraw the slats is exceeded, the
    00:14:50
    Pilot Flying communicates slat retract the
    00:14:53
    Pilot monitoring checks the speed
    00:14:55
    sets the Flap and slat lever to 0 and 0 and
    00:14:59
    communicates Speed ​​checked slats retracted
    00:15:01
    This is the whole take-off procedure
    00:15:04
    How it should be carried out but now
    00:15:06
    let's see what happens to the flight Air transat
    00:15:09
    211 the commander as per procedure,
    00:15:11
    he activates the govers and pronounces Take Off
    00:15:15
    thrust Srs runway the engines are
    00:15:18
    brought to toga power the Airbus A310
    00:15:21
    begins to accelerate along the runway and
    00:15:23
    everything continues normally
    00:15:26
    but suddenly presumably after exceeding
    00:15:28
    the speed of 100 knots the first
    00:15:30
    officer he notices that his headphones
    00:15:33
    with which he was also communicating with the
    00:15:35
    commander had been partially
    00:15:38
    disconnected. He notices this due to
    00:15:40
    an annoying interference that
    00:15:42
    he could hear in the headphones and therefore tries
    00:15:44
    to connect the audio jack better in the
    00:15:47
    meantime, however the plane was accelerating
    00:15:49
    very quickly I remind you of what
    00:15:52
    was said at the beginning that day the plane was
    00:15:54
    particularly light it had an
    00:15:56
    important frontal wind component
    00:15:59
    and it was using the maximum
    00:16:01
    power that the engines could deliver the
    00:16:03
    General Electric cf6 engines of the 310300 are
    00:16:08
    very powerful think that they are for
    00:16:10
    example the same ones mounted on the Boeing
    00:16:12
    747 400 are approximately two and a half times more
    00:16:16
    powerful than the cfm 567b used on the
    00:16:20
    737800. In short, a
    00:16:22
    very important amount of power which
    00:16:25
    meant that in the meantime in which the
    00:16:27
    first officer was trying to
    00:16:28
    reconnect the headphones the plane had
    00:16:31
    already well exceeded the speeds
    00:16:33
    of V1 and the rotation speed the
    00:16:36
    commander does not notice this as he is
    00:16:39
    completely concentrated on looking straight ahead
    00:16:41
    outside the aircraft. I remind you
    00:16:44
    that that day the visibility was very
    00:16:46
    poor so it was even more important
    00:16:48
    than usual for the commander to keep a
    00:16:50
    watchful eye on the situation
    00:16:52
    outside the aircraft the first officer after
    00:16:55
    restoring the headset announces
    00:16:57
    rotate at 182 knots more than 40 knots
    00:17:01
    above the correct
    00:17:03
    rotation speed the aircraft a few seconds
    00:17:06
    later begins to take altitude and
    00:17:08
    thus leaves the Quebec City airport only
    00:17:11
    40 feet from the ground but around 12 m the
    00:17:14
    captain prematurely begins to
    00:17:17
    execute the turn to the right on the bow at
    00:17:19
    110°. I repeat that according to the procedure he
    00:17:22
    should have executed this turn at
    00:17:24
    400 feet not 40 due to the very high
    00:17:29
    speed the plane begins to gain altitude
    00:17:31
    the incredible climb rate of over
    00:17:34
    6300 feet per minute almost 2000 m per
    00:17:38
    minute to give you an idea normally at
    00:17:40
    take off you reach between 2,500 and 3500
    00:17:44
    feet per minute per minute aircraft was going
    00:17:46
    from 2 to three times the
    00:17:48
    normal climb ratio due to the unexpected
    00:17:50
    violence of this climb the commander
    00:17:53
    asks the first officer to withdraw the
    00:17:55
    flaps well in advance compared to
    00:17:57
    what was seen they were at an altitude of
    00:18:00
    just 1700 feet and the the plane continued to
    00:18:03
    climb Practically like a rocket the
    00:18:05
    first officer retracts the flaps And
    00:18:07
    at the same time also the
    00:18:09
    landing gear which in the meantime had
    00:18:11
    also remained extended the plane was
    00:18:13
    climbing so fast that the normal
    00:18:15
    flow of the take-off procedure was
    00:18:18
    completely interrupted And in fact just
    00:18:21
    for this reason the first officer forgets
    00:18:23
    a very important step, namely the
    00:18:26
    aforementioned reduction in the power of the
    00:18:29
    climb thrust engines, the
    00:18:31
    climb power at almost the same time,
    00:18:34
    always at 1700 feet, the captain asks
    00:18:37
    the first officer to activate
    00:18:38
    the autopilot, the first officer carries out
    00:18:41
    the The autopilot is actually
    00:18:43
    enabled but only 5 seconds
    00:18:45
    later the commander decides to
    00:18:47
    deactivate it. From this moment
    00:18:50
    the annoying autopilot disconnection alarm begins to ring in the cockpit.
    00:18:54
    The pilots have the
    00:18:56
    possibility to deactivate the alarm
    00:18:58
    very easily by pressing the appropriate button.
    00:19:00
    disconnect button on the clos
    00:19:02
    However this is not done this
    00:19:05
    gives an idea of ​​the terribly
    00:19:07
    tense atmosphere that reigned in the cabin at that
    00:19:09
    moment the commander was
    00:19:11
    practically no longer up to speed with his plane
    00:19:13
    the commander had just deactivated
    00:19:16
    the autopilot because he is convinced that
    00:19:18
    the plane would soon have exceeded the
    00:19:20
    limit of the
    00:19:21
    take-off procedure of 3000 feet. Remember that
    00:19:24
    air traffic control had
    00:19:26
    authorized them to climb up to 3000 feet and in
    00:19:28
    fact they would then have to
    00:19:29
    request further authorization
    00:19:31
    to continue beyond 2400 feet
    00:19:34
    altitude at the absurd climb rate
    00:19:37
    of
    00:19:38
    5400 feet per minute the commander
    00:19:41
    begins with all his strength to push
    00:19:43
    the closh forward to try to
    00:19:45
    lower the nose of the aircraft to
    00:19:47
    further help himself in this maneuver he
    00:19:49
    also begins to use the Trim of the
    00:19:51
    horizontal stabilizer This is a
    00:19:54
    concept that I have already explained in several
    00:19:56
    other videos However it is quite useful
    00:19:58
    to refresh your memory to put it in
    00:20:00
    very simple words the
    00:20:02
    horizontal stabilizer represents those two
    00:20:04
    small fins that are found in the Cod of the
    00:20:06
    plane when the pilot pulls or pushes
    00:20:08
    the yoke intervenes on the
    00:20:11
    control surfaces known as equalizers located
    00:20:14
    right at the rear end of the
    00:20:16
    horizontal stabilizer and these are
    00:20:18
    precisely the surfaces that make it
    00:20:20
    possible to govern the pitch of
    00:20:21
    the aircraft. Therefore the inclination
    00:20:23
    upwards or downwards However, at the
    00:20:26
    moment when the pilot instead activates
    00:20:27
    the Trim of the horizontal stabilizer
    00:20:32
    the entire assembly moves upwards and downwards, the
    00:20:34
    Trim adjustment is fundamental to say the least
    00:20:37
    as it allows the pilot
    00:20:39
    to govern the natural attitude that
    00:20:41
    the aircraft maintains in flight to give a
    00:20:44
    quick example, if while we are trying to
    00:20:46
    make the plane gain altitude and therefore
    00:20:48
    by pulling the yoke towards us we do not
    00:20:50
    have to intervene on the Trim we should
    00:20:52
    obtain the yoke in this way for the
    00:20:54
    duration of the entire climb
    00:20:56
    instead using the Trim to set the
    00:20:58
    correct position climb attitude to maintain
    00:21:00
    we could even not touch the
    00:21:02
    yoke at all thus saving a lot of
    00:21:04
    effort on the Air Bass at 310 it is possible
    00:21:07
    to control the Trim of the
    00:21:09
    horizontal stabilizer mainly in two ways
    00:21:11
    i.e. through a special switch
    00:21:13
    located on both clos or through the
    00:21:16
    so-called Trim wheel the wheel or
    00:21:19
    Trim wheel is particularly important
    00:21:21
    since it is precisely through the latter
    00:21:23
    that the pilots can actually
    00:21:25
    realize what the
    00:21:27
    Trim level is currently set.
    00:21:29
    In any case, returning to flight 211 the
    00:21:32
    commander begins to give the input of Trim
    00:21:35
    to dive However, he probably
    00:21:38
    doesn't realize that he has decidedly
    00:21:40
    exaggerated with this command since he
    00:21:42
    actually ends up setting the
    00:21:44
    Trim at 2.7 gr downwards, which is
    00:21:48
    practically the maximum
    00:21:50
    possible extension. At
    00:21:52
    1440 minutes and 44 seconds the 310
    00:21:56
    finally interrupts its climb
    00:21:58
    to 3100 feet altitude but the
    00:22:01
    relief lasts very little because
    00:22:04
    due to the excessive
    00:22:06
    Trim setting the aircraft soon begins to lose
    00:22:09
    altitude the nose gradually begins to
    00:22:11
    point downwards and the aircraft
    00:22:13
    reaches a vertical speed of minus
    00:22:15
    2000 feet
    00:22:18
    at this point the first officer tries to
    00:22:19
    warn the commander about the dangerous
    00:22:22
    situation they had found themselves in. The
    00:22:23
    commander begins to pull the clos towards
    00:22:26
    himself with all his strength. But the 310
    00:22:29
    continued to lose altitude. At this
    00:22:31
    point the commander to try to
    00:22:33
    prevent the plane from reaching
    00:22:35
    excessive speeds he decides to bring the
    00:22:37
    engine power to minimum However,
    00:22:40
    in bringing back the throttles he accidentally commits
    00:22:42
    another very serious mistake. In fact
    00:22:44
    he touches and activates
    00:22:48
    the GO leavers again, the
    00:22:50
    in-flight activation of the govers has The effect of
    00:22:53
    Activating the auto go-around mode
    00:22:56
    Throttle and So this
    00:22:58
    action leads to
    00:23:04
    automania not having realized that he had
    00:23:07
    accidentally activated the goers
    00:23:10
    remains totally confused
    00:23:12
    by the activation of the
    00:23:14
    go-around mode in the cabin in addition to the already
    00:23:16
    present pilot disconnection alarm
    00:23:18
    automatically the altitude alarm also begins to be
    00:23:20
    played
    00:23:22
    since the aircraft was no longer at the
    00:23:24
    pre-established altitude of 3000 feet, it was in
    00:23:27
    fact well
    00:23:33
    below it and in addition to all this
    00:23:36
    the sudden acceleration due to the
    00:23:38
    increase in engine power had
    00:23:41
    induced the commander to fall victim
    00:23:43
    to the so-called somatogamy illusion.
    00:23:46
    As already explained in my video on
    00:23:48
    Galfer Flight 72, the somatogamy illusion is a
    00:23:51
    phenomenon that affects pilots when in
    00:23:53
    conditions of poor visibility they are
    00:23:55
    subjected to a sudden acceleration or
    00:23:58
    deceleration. This sort of illusion
    00:24:00
    occurs is based on the fact that our
    00:24:02
    vestibular system which is responsible for the sense
    00:24:04
    of balance can confuse
    00:24:06
    linear acceleration with
    00:24:08
    the inclination of the head and therefore
    00:24:11
    although the plane at that moment
    00:24:12
    had its nose slightly tilted
    00:24:14
    downwards the sudden
    00:24:16
    acceleration had created in the
    00:24:18
    commander the feeling that the plane
    00:24:20
    was actually tilting
    00:24:22
    upwards and for this reason he did not intervene
    00:24:25
    decisively on the plane which continued to
    00:24:27
    lose altitude and indeed. At this point it
    00:24:29
    was accelerating towards the ground the
    00:24:32
    first officer again put on
    00:24:34
    alert the commander tells him that
    00:24:36
    the plane was continuing to point
    00:24:38
    downwards and to resume the climb
    00:24:41
    however he receives no response
    00:24:43
    a few seconds later he tries
    00:24:45
    again but the commander still does not
    00:24:48
    respond he was in fact totally
    00:24:50
    paralyzed at this point the first
    00:24:52
    officer he begins to suspect that the
    00:24:54
    commander was having some kind of
    00:24:56
    health problem and therefore decides to
    00:24:59
    take control he disconnects
    00:25:00
    the automania He reduces the power to 45% and
    00:25:04
    tries to get the plane to regain altitude
    00:25:06
    When he begins to pull the clos towards
    00:25:08
    himself however he realizes that it required
    00:25:11
    truly incredible force for
    00:25:13
    all this time the plane continued to
    00:25:15
    have the Trim in the position of maximum
    00:25:18
    downward deflection and the first
    00:25:20
    officer had not noticed it the plane
    00:25:23
    continued to lose altitude it had now
    00:25:25
    descended below the 2000 feet and the
    00:25:27
    descent ratio had reached minus 3900 feet
    00:25:30
    per minute the
    00:25:32
    ground proximity alarms began to sound and shortly
    00:25:34
    afterwards the excessive speed alarm
    00:25:40
    [Applause]
    00:25:44
    had reached
    00:25:48
    310 knots over 680 km /h less than 500
    00:25:54
    m from the ground at
    00:25:56
    14:41 minutes and 39 seconds The plane reaches
    00:26:00
    its lowest altitude,
    00:26:03
    1393 feet, almost 425 m. Luckily,
    00:26:07
    the first officer manages to
    00:26:09
    stop the descent and the plane
    00:26:11
    gradually starts to climb again in the
    00:26:14
    meantime he had also given a series of
    00:26:16
    intermittent and short Trim commands to
    00:26:19
    climb up thus helping the aircraft to
    00:26:21
    recover the attitude. However, it is very
    00:26:24
    probable that these commands, although
    00:26:26
    useful, were also accidentally given by them.
    00:26:28
    These short and
    00:26:30
    irregular Trim commands are
    00:26:32
    rather unusual but above all if he
    00:26:35
    had really realized
    00:26:37
    the exaggeration of Trim that the plane
    00:26:39
    had at that moment he would certainly
    00:26:41
    have given a continuous command about
    00:26:43
    20 seconds later with the plane now
    00:26:46
    out of immediate danger the commander
    00:26:48
    contacts the controller of Torre
    00:26:50
    dell' Keber City airport declares
    00:26:52
    pan pan or essentially a state
    00:26:55
    of urgency but in which
    00:26:57
    the lives of the
    00:26:59
    plane's occupants are not in immediate danger, it is practically an
    00:27:01
    emergency call of a degree lower
    00:27:03
    than mayday requiring the
    00:27:06
    plane's climb to be stopped at 10,000 feet to carry out
    00:27:08
    a series of checks and controls, the
    00:27:10
    commander was in fact convinced that
    00:27:12
    the plane had had some type of
    00:27:13
    malfunction in the
    00:27:15
    speed and attitude indicator. However, after having
    00:27:18
    carried out a series of
    00:27:20
    cross-checks with air traffic control
    00:27:22
    on altitude and speed
    00:27:23
    of the plane itself they realize that
    00:27:26
    in fact there was no
    00:27:28
    problem the decision is therefore made
    00:27:30
    to continue towards Montreal and everything
    00:27:33
    ends up almost in the best
    00:27:35
    way despite the plane having
    00:27:37
    well exceeded the vmo. That is,
    00:27:40
    the maximum operating speed was
    00:27:42
    remained perfectly intact and there
    00:27:44
    was no type of problem the day
    00:27:46
    after the events of flight 211 Air
    00:27:49
    Transat decided to report the event
    00:27:51
    to the TSB the Canadian Transport Safety Board
    00:27:54
    essentially the equivalent
    00:27:57
    of the US NTSB and the Italian
    00:28:00
    ANSV however in this report
    00:28:03
    they wrote that the plane had been
    00:28:05
    involved in an episode of windshear,
    00:28:07
    which is a very dangerous
    00:28:09
    meteorological phenomenon that involves a sudden
    00:28:11
    and rapid change in wind speed and
    00:28:14
    intensity. Windshear is a
    00:28:16
    feared but also very well-known phenomenon in
    00:28:18
    aviation and was responsible of
    00:28:20
    several accidents in the past and
    00:28:22
    certainly the most famous was that
    00:28:24
    of Delta Airlines flight 191. For
    00:28:27
    several decades now, planes have been equipped with
    00:28:29
    systems capable of predicting
    00:28:31
    winsers and their presence is always
    00:28:34
    reported on airport weather bulletins.
    00:28:36
    But exactly for this
    00:28:38
    reason it was really difficult to believe in
    00:28:40
    these hypotheses, after all the
    00:28:42
    Quebec City airport had not
    00:28:44
    issued any type of winser warning the day before nor
    00:28:46
    all the pilots who had
    00:28:48
    landed or taken off there and I know well that
    00:28:50
    this apparently false report
    00:28:53
    on the part of of transat may make you turn up your
    00:28:55
    nose however it is not as it seems Air
    00:28:58
    transat In fact they were genuinely
    00:29:00
    convinced that that was the real cause
    00:29:03
    behind what happened on flight 21 and only
    00:29:06
    after evaluating this information they
    00:29:08
    actually understood that this
    00:29:10
    incident needed to be investigated much more
    00:29:13
    than officially the TSB decided to
    00:29:15
    open the investigation into Flight 211 14
    00:29:19
    days after the incident, however this
    00:29:21
    unfortunately meant that the contents
    00:29:23
    of the Cockpit Voice Recorder of the
    00:29:25
    cockpit voice recorder had
    00:29:27
    been completely overwritten by
    00:29:29
    subsequent flights. However, fortunately they managed
    00:29:31
    to have access to the contents of the
    00:29:33
    flight data Recorder or the
    00:29:36
    flight data recorder and
    00:29:38
    by analyzing the latter and
    00:29:39
    comparing it with the words of the pilots
    00:29:41
    involved They managed to add to the
    00:29:43
    truth about what happened on flight 211
    00:29:46
    right from the beginning but it was clear a
    00:29:48
    major irregularity remembered at the beginning
    00:29:51
    of the video when I told you about the
    00:29:52
    visibility value along runway 06
    00:29:55
    of Quebec City airport of 1000
    00:29:57
    800 feet according to the procedures
    00:29:59
    of Quebec City airport however it
    00:30:01
    was not possible to take off from runway 06
    00:30:04
    with a divisibility value lower than 2600
    00:30:07
    feet However the Air planes transat
    00:30:10
    they had a special and regular permit
    00:30:12
    to take off even with visibility
    00:30:15
    lower than 1200 feet so
    00:30:18
    everything may actually seem ok but this
    00:30:20
    is not the case given that the commander of flight
    00:30:23
    211 had accumulated just over 100 hours
    00:30:26
    of flight in the role of commander he
    00:30:29
    could not take off with less than 2,600
    00:30:32
    feet of visibility. But given that the
    00:30:34
    examining pilot in the role of first
    00:30:36
    officer had the take-off rating
    00:30:38
    with poor visibility up to 600
    00:30:41
    feet, it was decided to continue
    00:30:44
    with the flight anyway. Furthermore,
    00:30:46
    the commander was retained in the role of Pilot Flying
    00:30:48
    even if this corresponded to a major
    00:30:51
    irregularity according to the Air
    00:30:53
    Transat regulations in these conditions it would have been
    00:30:55
    up to the first officer to carry out the
    00:30:57
    take-off given that it was he who
    00:31:00
    possessed the necessary qualifications
    00:31:02
    at the same time, however in the
    00:31:04
    Air Transat rules it was specified
    00:31:06
    that he would be the commander In any
    00:31:09
    case, having to carry out take-offs in low
    00:31:11
    visibility, this evident conflict
    00:31:13
    gave the crew the false
    00:31:15
    impression of actually
    00:31:17
    following the rules. This situation
    00:31:19
    was caused by an almost
    00:31:21
    incredible series of absurd circumstances
    00:31:24
    which aligned starting from the
    00:31:26
    light weight of the aircraft. the aircraft taking off in toga and
    00:31:29
    various features of how the 310
    00:31:32
    was designed such as the
    00:31:34
    lack of an audible signal or an
    00:31:36
    error message that warns
    00:31:38
    pilots of
    00:31:40
    Out of Trim situations or the precisely the
    00:31:43
    situations in which the Trim setting is
    00:31:45
    not compatible with the
    00:31:47
    flight, controlling the aircraft while it
    00:31:49
    is in Out of triam attitude is
    00:31:52
    truly incredibly complicated and
    00:31:54
    really requires immense physical strength,
    00:31:57
    the Airbus A310 unlike all others
    00:32:00
    subsequent models do not feature the
    00:32:02
    sophisticated Fly by Wire system which
    00:32:04
    was put in place precisely with
    00:32:06
    the intention of avoiding
    00:32:08
    situations of this type as much as possible. Fly by Wire
    00:32:11
    actively prevents pilots from
    00:32:13
    entering dangerous conditions for
    00:32:15
    the aircraft and if I invite you to watch
    00:32:17
    the video on Air France flight 2510 to
    00:32:19
    better understand the 310 was still a
    00:32:22
    rather traditional aircraft with the controls
    00:32:24
    mechanically interconnected to the
    00:32:26
    surfaces and therefore making it possible
    00:32:28
    for the pilots to have very strong physical feedback
    00:32:31
    during the investigation. On flight 211
    00:32:34
    it was also outside another
    00:32:35
    very interesting aspect the
    00:32:37
    investigators In fact they wanted to
    00:32:39
    delve deeper into Why the crew had been so
    00:32:41
    surprised by the
    00:32:43
    aircraft's performance And speaking of
    00:32:46
    this they discovered that the
    00:32:48
    simulator training carried out by the Air transat pilots
    00:32:50
    at the CAE factories
    00:32:52
    Canadian Aviation Electronics had a
    00:32:56
    very important difference compared to
    00:32:58
    the real aircraft. The CAE simulators
    00:33:01
    actually tried to replicate the Airbus
    00:33:03
    A310 200 rather than the 300. These two
    00:33:07
    A310 models seen from the outside are
    00:33:10
    practically completely
    00:33:12
    indistinguishable. However, they have two
    00:33:14
    very important differences: the 310 300. it has
    00:33:18
    a range more than doubled
    00:33:20
    compared to the 200 of almost 9600 km
    00:33:23
    compared to the 4600 of the previous model
    00:33:27
    but above all it has the
    00:33:29
    General Electric
    00:33:31
    cf68 C2 engines compared to the 80 A3 of the
    00:33:35
    200 model which are approximately 20%
    00:33:39
    more powerful and this difference although
    00:33:41
    it may seem minimal It becomes very
    00:33:43
    accentuated at low weights the
    00:33:45
    investigators In fact trying to
    00:33:47
    replicate flight 211 on the kae simulators
    00:33:50
    of 3102 obtained rather
    00:33:54
    different results following the conclusion
    00:33:56
    of the investigations
    00:33:58
    several safety recommendations were issued
    00:34:00
    First of all Air transat
    00:34:02
    completely changed the take-off procedure in
    00:34:04
    case of reaching a
    00:34:06
    very low initial altitude As it was precisely
    00:34:08
    the 3000 feet of the Quebec
    00:34:10
    City airport I do not intend to explain to you
    00:34:12
    in detail how this procedure
    00:34:15
    has changed it would require a
    00:34:16
    rather detailed explanation of the
    00:34:18
    automatic system of the 310 you can
    00:34:21
    pause the video and read the
    00:34:23
    paragraph of the investigation report and
    00:34:25
    indeed I invite some pilots perhaps to
    00:34:27
    write some clarification in the
    00:34:29
    comments in the training of
    00:34:31
    Air transat pilots as for practically all
    00:34:33
    modern companies an
    00:34:35
    upset prevention and
    00:34:37
    recovery training program has been inserted, i.e. training
    00:34:40
    of prevention and recovery of the aircraft from
    00:34:42
    anomalous attitudes and furthermore all 10
    00:34:45
    A310 Chai simulators in the world were
    00:34:48
    updated with the new specifications of the
    00:34:50
    300 version this is all I have to
    00:34:52
    say On Air transat flight 211 I
    00:34:55
    honestly found it one of the
    00:34:57
    most interesting stories I've seen
    00:34:59
    so far with just one story I've brought you
    00:35:01
    a really huge amount of
    00:35:03
    very fascinating concepts of flight and
    00:35:06
    I hope the results are quite
    00:35:07
    pleasant and not too heavy and when I
    00:35:10
    bring you a video on the a 310 I can't help
    00:35:12
    but to think how much Airbus
    00:35:15
    has evolved since
    00:35:16
    1983 I find it really fascinating
    00:35:19
    to think for example that the Airbus A320 one
    00:35:21
    of the most advanced aircraft still in use
    00:35:24
    today is only 5 years younger than
    00:35:26
    the 310 the progress made by Airbus in
    00:35:29
    that period was truly
    00:35:31
    extraordinary and it is truly It's absurd that
    00:35:32
    they happened in so few years. For
    00:35:35
    example, to cite a couple of examples of
    00:35:37
    how an episode of this type is
    00:35:39
    much more difficult to cause on a
    00:35:41
    modern Airbus. Trim management on the
    00:35:44
    A320, A330 and so on is practically
    00:35:48
    entirely managed by the automation
    00:35:50
    of the The pilots of current Airbus aircraft
    00:35:53
    do not need to intervene
    00:35:55
    on the trim in practice, but the
    00:35:58
    numerous computers of the Fly by
    00:36:00
    Wire system continuously adjust the trim of the aircraft
    00:36:02
    to ensure the
    00:36:04
    most efficient control. Furthermore, Airbus has removed
    00:36:07
    the GOS from all after the 310
    00:36:10
    many companies had complained to
    00:36:13
    the manufacturer about their location
    00:36:15
    which made their inadvertent
    00:36:16
    activation all too simple and finally
    00:36:19
    even the thrust Rating Panel no
    00:36:21
    longer exists on modern aircraft it has also been
    00:36:24
    completely automated and as
    00:36:26
    regards the I was involved in this
    00:36:28
    story continued to fly with Air
    00:36:30
    Transat until March 2020
    00:36:33
    when the entire
    00:36:35
    Air Transat A310 fleet was over 30 years old it was
    00:36:38
    therefore time to make
    00:36:40
    way for more modern ones after the withdrawal
    00:36:42
    from the service Charlie golfp alfat Tango
    00:36:45
    was demolished in October 2021 but even
    00:36:48
    today I think I have kept you long
    00:36:50
    enough if you liked the video,
    00:36:52
    like it, subscribe to the channel and
    00:36:54
    above all activate the notification bell
    00:36:56
    to always stay updated
    00:36:58
    on everything we publish
    00:37:00
    I'll see you again in the next video

    Description:

    ------------------------------------- SOCIAL -------------------------------------------------------------------- Instagram (@ettiaviation) : https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser TikTok (ettiaviation) : https://www.tiktok.com/@ettiaviation Discord - https://discord.com/invite/tXHfgBWfRY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ⏰ CAPITOLI DEL VIDEO ⏰ 0:00 Intro 1:28 L'aereo, la compagnia, la rotta 3:52 L'equipaggio 6:47 Preparativi al decollo 10:08 La procedura di decollo sull'A310 15:01 Il decollo del volo 211 17:49 Lottare contro l'aereo 19:47 Il Trim 21:29 Riprendere il controllo 27:46 Indagini e conclusioni ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FONTI USATE: Report dell'incidente - https://www.tsb-bst.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08q0051/a08q0051.html VIDEO INCLUSI: Air Transat A330 Montego Bay - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eINcMomwFug Air Transat A310 Takeoff - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cWjY4-gBEU Air Transat A310 C-GPAT - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KTloPlRl-ZM Air Transat A310 YUL - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Ng0WQ8UPOA Air Transat A310 Snow - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfyw04-SMDo Austrian A320 Skiathos - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Soo5cgArnWE Sequenze su Microsoft Flight Simulator realizzate da me Foto prese da planespotters.net e jetphotos.com Musica "Epic Action Trailer by Infraction [No Copyright Music] / Battle" di Infraction - No Copyright Music https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=23O6WMMy8B4

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