background top icon
background center wave icon
background filled rhombus icon
background two lines icon
background stroke rhombus icon
header logo icon

Download "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501"

input logo icon
"videoThumbnail ⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501
Table of contents
|

Table of contents

0:00
Intro
1:43
Il volo, la compagnia, l'aereo
3:27
L'equipaggio
5:18
Decollo e salita in crociera
6:11
Problemi tecnici e la RTLU
8:15
Il sistema Fly-by-wire
12:05
La reazione dei piloti
16:39
Gli ultimi 3 minuti
22:01
Indagini e conclusioni
Similar videos from our catalog
|

Similar videos from our catalog

Video tags
|

Video tags

incidente
aereo
disastro
aerei
video
documentario
volo
volare
emergenza
disastri
incidenti aerei
disastri aerei
etti
ettiaviation
aviation
aviazione
planespotting
planespotter
planespotters
aeronautica
airlines
airways
indagini
alta
quota
documentari
emergenze
aeroplano
aeroplani
schianto
airasia
air
asia
a320
a320-200
320
airbus
bus
8501
air asia 8501
indonesia
jakarta
giacarta
singapore
france
447
malaysia
370
mh370
af447
af
scomparso
scomparsa
sparito
mare
acqua
Subtitles
|

Subtitles

subtitles menu arrow
  • ruRussian
Download
00:00:06
It's December 28, 2014. It's a
00:00:10
Sa320 grass from Erasia. It's at cruising altitude
00:00:13
during a normal scheduled flight
00:00:15
between Surabaya airport in
00:00:17
Indonesia and Singapore at the first light
00:00:19
of dawn. The plane is over the
00:00:21
Java Sea. completely surrounded by
00:00:23
very strong storms, despite this there was
00:00:26
still a
00:00:28
rather calm and relaxed atmosphere on board and no one
00:00:31
could imagine that in just over three
00:00:33
minutes of this 320 there would
00:00:35
only be a pile of wreckage on the
00:00:37
seabed. The story of the flight was Asia
00:00:40
8501. certainly one of the most
00:00:43
incredible and tragic of recent years
00:00:45
due to the extraordinary similarities to say the least
00:00:48
with the much more well-known episode
00:00:50
of the fms447 flight, which contributed to
00:00:53
raising serious doubts about the systems and
00:00:56
automatisms put in place by Erbas, to be
00:00:58
honest, however, what emerged
00:01:00
mainly from this story is
00:01:02
a bitter lesson on what can happen
00:01:04
when a crew
00:01:06
unconsciously decides to go against the
00:01:08
rules and how what should have been
00:01:10
a minor technical problem
00:01:13
became a real catastrophe
00:01:15
before continuing As in every In my
00:01:18
video I would like to point out that I am not
00:01:19
a pilot or an expert of any kind but
00:01:22
just a great aviation enthusiast
00:01:23
eager to tell these stories and
00:01:26
without further ado Make yourself comfortable,
00:01:28
fasten your seat belts and get ready for
00:01:31
the tragic story of the Asia 8501 flight
00:01:43
as announced in the introduction, it is
00:01:46
December 28, 2014 and we are at
00:01:49
the Juanda international airport in
00:01:51
Surabaya in Indonesia. It is around 5
00:01:54
in the morning and the 155 passengers of flight
00:01:57
Asia 85 01 are waiting to
00:02:00
board the grass sa320 which
00:02:03
that morning he would have taken them to
00:02:04
Singapore airport. Asia is a
00:02:07
true giant in the
00:02:10
low-cost scheduled transport sector with more
00:02:12
than 165 destinations in 25 different countries
00:02:16
in Asia and Oceania. Its head office
00:02:18
is located at the immense airport.
00:02:20
Kuala Lumpur International Airport in
00:02:22
Malaysia But as happens with the vast
00:02:24
majority of low cost airlines in the
00:02:26
world it is divided into 12 sub-companies
00:02:29
including and naming only a few of them:
00:02:32
Asia, Asia Japan and Rasia
00:02:35
Philippins and the one involved
00:02:36
in the episode of flight 85 01 Indonesia and
00:02:40
Asia considering the entire group was
00:02:42
Asia we always find ourselves faced with a
00:02:44
fleet of 228 aircraft all produced
00:02:46
by Erbas including A330 A321 Neo and 199
00:02:52
at 320 As already said a thousand other times
00:02:55
on this channel the Erba Sa320 is one
00:02:58
of the most well-known and widespread airliners
00:03:00
in the world, over
00:03:02
11,000 examples of aircraft of this type were produced,
00:03:05
also considering the smaller 318 and
00:03:08
19 and the larger 321, in particular
00:03:11
the aircraft involved in flight 85 01 was
00:03:14
registered as papa kilo Alpha ex King
00:03:17
Charlie and was built and delivered
00:03:19
specifically for Eurasia in October
00:03:21
2008 at the time of the events So it
00:03:23
had accumulated just over 6
00:03:26
years of flight activity But now
00:03:28
the time has come to get to know
00:03:30
the crew of the today's story
00:03:32
the 53 year old commander Il Rialto of
00:03:35
Indonesian nationality had a
00:03:39
total of 20,537 flight hours behind him, of which
00:03:43
4,187 on the grasslands at 320 he began
00:03:47
his career in the
00:03:48
Indonesian Air Force then at the controls of
00:03:50
military jets in the mid-2000s but
00:03:53
I decided to put aside the
00:03:54
military sector to dedicate himself to a career in
00:03:57
the civil airline sector for a few years.
00:03:59
He flew for the Indonesian companies
00:04:01
Adamer and Jaguar series but to say the
00:04:04
least, keep these names in mind because
00:04:06
in the future we will find them on this
00:04:08
channel and who subsequently
00:04:11
joined the Indonesian division of
00:04:13
Erasia flying on Boeing 737s, the 46-year-old
00:04:17
first officer Remy and Manuel Plaiselle
00:04:19
of French nationality had
00:04:22
2,247 total flight hours behind him, of which 1,367
00:04:26
on Airbus A320s, Emmanuel's past
00:04:30
is decidedly particular since until a
00:04:32
few years earlier he was working in a completely different
00:04:34
sector within a
00:04:36
French oil company, he decided to
00:04:38
completely change his career and in December
00:04:41
2012, having completed his
00:04:44
flight school years, he was hired by AirAsia,
00:04:46
becoming the first officer of 20 others at the age
00:04:48
of 44 during on flight 8501
00:04:52
the first officer would have been Pilot
00:04:54
Flying therefore the one who actually
00:04:55
operates flight controls while the
00:04:58
Pilot monitoring commander in addition to the two
00:05:00
pilots and the 155 passengers On flight 8501
00:05:04
there were also 5 flight attendants
00:05:06
bringing the total number of people on board
00:05:09
to 162 The flight to Singapore would have
00:05:12
lasted approximately two hours and would have
00:05:14
covered a distance of approximately 1,400 km.
00:05:17
Around 5.15am the 320 was ready for
00:05:21
pushback. The engines were started and
00:05:23
the taxiing
00:05:25
towards the Active runway of
00:05:27
Surabaya airport began for the 5.35am the engines are
00:05:30
brought up to the necessary power and the grass
00:05:33
sa320 begins the run along the runway the
00:05:35
landing gear and flaps are withdrawn and
00:05:38
soon the plane begins the climb towards the
00:05:40
pre-established cruising altitude of 32,000
00:05:43
feet of approximately 9,700 meters approximately 8
00:05:46
minutes after adding the
00:05:48
cruising altitude at 5.57am the first officer
00:05:51
asks the commander to activate
00:05:52
anti-icing devices and
00:05:54
simultaneously the seat belt sign is turned on
00:05:56
these actions
00:05:58
were motivated by the fact that
00:06:01
highly unstable weather was forecast along La Rotta
00:06:03
in the area there were
00:06:05
abundant cumulonimbus clouds and therefore strong
00:06:07
thunderstorms which the crew would
00:06:09
soon have had to bypass precisely at
00:06:12
6 in the morning but
00:06:14
something
00:06:15
decidedly unusual happens in the cockpit suddenly
00:06:18
an alarm sound is played and
00:06:20
at the same time on lycam or the
00:06:23
central display present in the
00:06:25
cockpit on the which shows
00:06:27
a whole series of information
00:06:28
regarding the status of the various
00:06:31
systems of the sa320 grass. The
00:06:33
auto flight radder Travel
00:06:36
Limited One message appears. Before continuing, it is
00:06:39
obviously necessary for me to
00:06:40
briefly explain what this
00:06:42
message means, this error and what
00:06:44
implications it could have. Don't worry,
00:06:46
it seems a particularly
00:06:47
complex and convoluted message but I will try to
00:06:50
explain it to you in the simplest
00:06:52
possible terms essentially the plane was
00:06:54
warning the pilots about
00:06:56
a malfunction of the so-called
00:06:58
Rubber Travel Limited, a device which
00:07:02
is part of the countless
00:07:04
IT systems of the 320 which regulates
00:07:07
the maximum possible deflection of the
00:07:09
rudder The Rudder is the immense
00:07:12
control surface of the aircraft
00:07:13
located on the vertical stabilizer and
00:07:16
which has the task of controlling
00:07:17
the yaw of the aircraft itself as
00:07:20
the speed increases the ravnder
00:07:22
Travel Limited goes precisely to
00:07:25
limit the maximum deflection that the
00:07:27
Rudder can normally assume. The
00:07:30
Rudder has a movement range of 25
00:07:32
degrees but as the speed of
00:07:34
the aircraft increases, the radder Travel limiter
00:07:37
will decrease this angle up to a
00:07:39
value of 3.4 degrees, so to speak the
00:07:42
maximum deflection of the rudder is
00:07:44
limited. For the same reason why
00:07:46
you wouldn't want to suddenly
00:07:48
turn the steering wheel of your car
00:07:50
more than 90 degrees, for example if you are
00:07:52
speeding at more than 100 km per hour on the
00:07:54
motorway, this limitation is part
00:07:57
of the numerous protection functions
00:08:02
I have already talked to you about the Fly by Wire control system of the 320
00:08:04
on several occasions on this channel and
00:08:07
if you are interested in a
00:08:08
slightly more technical in-depth analysis I
00:08:10
also invite you to recover the video
00:08:11
I made on the Smart links 9001 flight
00:08:14
the Fly system by Wire represents without a
00:08:17
shadow of a doubt the
00:08:19
characteristic trademark of Erbas. And
00:08:21
at the same time also the greatest
00:08:23
innovation that the 320 brought
00:08:25
to the entire airline sector.
00:08:27
Erbas pilots control their
00:08:30
aircraft by acting on the so-called
00:08:32
sidesticks. The latter, unlike
00:08:34
the more classic control sticks or flyers
00:08:36
that we find on Boeing 737s
00:08:39
communicate the pilots' inputs to a
00:08:42
multitude of computers and it is precisely
00:08:44
these computers that, taking into account
00:08:46
the current attitude of the aircraft and
00:08:48
an immense series of data, are able to
00:08:51
govern the surfaces control and
00:08:53
therefore impart the appropriate movements.
00:08:55
The Fly by Wire system offers enormous
00:08:58
advantages and nowadays is
00:09:00
implemented on the vast
00:09:01
majority of airliners. For
00:09:04
example, computers can prevent
00:09:06
pilots from issuing commands that would
00:09:07
put the aircraft in a situation
00:09:09
particularly risky to
00:09:11
better understand this concept I
00:09:13
propose a direct comparison between the
00:09:15
behavior of a Boeing 737 is a grass
00:09:18
stands at 320 in front of the same input
00:09:20
if a pilot of 320 were to start
00:09:23
tilting the nose
00:09:25
of the plane upwards Fly by Wire system
00:09:27
will prevent him from accessing the so-called
00:09:29
critical angle or the angle of
00:09:31
incidence beyond which
00:09:33
an aerodynamic stall would be produced on the Boeing 737.
00:09:36
However this would not happen since it is not
00:09:38
equipped with the Fly By The Wire system and
00:09:40
therefore it would proceed beyond the Cri angle
00:09:43
euro trying to simplify as much as possible
00:09:45
and indeed I apologize in advance to
00:09:47
any grass pilots if you are listening but
00:09:49
this video is not intended to be a
00:09:51
Time Rating course on the 320 the protections
00:09:53
offered by the drip and wire system
00:09:55
could be defined as a sort of
00:09:57
layered system let's call them for
00:10:00
to be clear, protection extracts are
00:10:02
known as controls and are divided
00:10:05
into normal Low, alternating Low and Direct Low
00:10:09
as the name suggests, normal Law is the
00:10:11
condition in which the aircraft
00:10:13
usually finds itself. When the
00:10:15
low rule is active and I repeat it is practically
00:10:17
always all the protections of the
00:10:20
Flaibe Wire system are active and ready to
00:10:23
intervene, therefore the aircraft cannot
00:10:25
exceed certain
00:10:26
load values, pitch, roll, angles of
00:10:29
attack, etc., etc., in short,
00:10:31
all the protections are active if
00:10:33
any type of
00:10:34
malfunction were to occur in the computers
00:10:36
of the Fly device. by Wire the
00:10:38
normal Low protection mode is degraded to
00:10:41
alternate Law some types
00:10:45
of protection are lost among which the most
00:10:47
important one for this video is the
00:10:49
stall protection, the one
00:10:51
previously mentioned in the event of further and
00:10:54
more serious malfunctions
00:10:55
the Direct Low would be activated.
00:10:58
lowest layer without any type of
00:11:00
protection I repeat This is an
00:11:02
oversimplified discussion each of these
00:11:04
layers has a thousand implications there
00:11:06
would also be a fourth known as
00:11:08
mechanical the backup but let's leave it aside
00:11:10
for this video it's more than fine so
00:11:12
the last technical analysis to be done
00:11:14
before continuing with the story I
00:11:16
swear it is about the computers that
00:11:18
manage the Fly by Wire system also
00:11:20
here I invite you to recover the video on the
00:11:22
Smart links flight 9001 there I talked about it in
00:11:25
quite detail
00:11:26
essentially The system is made up
00:11:29
of 7 computers known as elac 1 and elak 2
00:11:32
Sec 123 and FAQ 1 and fac2 elac Sec and FAQ
00:11:38
went mainly different areas of expertise
00:11:40
and manage They are precisely
00:11:43
the control surfaces of the aircraft and
00:11:45
for reasons of redundancy they are
00:11:47
obviously present in multiple units for the
00:11:49
case of flight 85 01 we are
00:11:52
specifically interested in the FAQs, that is, the flight
00:11:54
augmentation computers are precisely
00:11:56
the ones that deal with the
00:11:58
movement of the rudder and the rudder Travel
00:12:01
Limit unit that I spoke to you about before is
00:12:03
essentially part of the FAQs, having clarified
00:12:06
all this, let's go back to the flight it was Asia
00:12:08
8501, having realized of the
00:12:11
error message the first officer announces Icam
00:12:14
Action this phrase means
00:12:16
precisely carrying out the actions indicated
00:12:18
on the cams. Remember the central display
00:12:20
mentioned before on the latter, in fact for
00:12:23
each error message
00:12:24
the instructions for solving it also appear and
00:12:27
practically as for the most
00:12:29
IT problems The
00:12:31
solution that is proposed to pilots
00:12:33
by the ecam is to turn it off
00:12:35
and on again and then reset FAQ 1 and 2
00:12:39
this is exactly what is done
00:12:41
first it is turned off on FAQ 1 and then
00:12:44
also 2 finished this action the
00:12:47
error message disappears and the
00:12:49
problem seems apparently resolved
00:12:51
about 4 minutes later at 6:04 the
00:12:54
commander contacts
00:12:56
air traffic control to request a
00:12:58
15 mile deviation from the
00:13:00
pre-established route as expected the reason
00:13:02
behind this deviation is
00:13:04
find themselves in the
00:13:05
meteorological conditions and in fact the crew
00:13:08
found themselves having to avoid a
00:13:10
storm the request is approved and
00:13:12
the plane begins to fly in the direction of 310
00:13:15
Degrees 2 minutes later the crew
00:13:17
carries out the cruise crew briefing
00:13:19
essentially a speech in which
00:13:21
they address issues such as the
00:13:23
available alternate airport and the procedures to be
00:13:25
carried out in the event of an
00:13:27
emergency descent. 3 minutes later, however,
00:13:29
an
00:13:32
Error message relating to problems
00:13:34
with the Travel Limit unit radders appears again on the
00:13:37
ecam in response to the crew and follows
00:13:38
again the actions indicated by the lecam
00:13:41
then the restart of FAQ 1 exactly
00:13:43
as before the error message
00:13:45
disappears and the system seems to have
00:13:47
returned to normal again 2
00:13:50
minutes later flight 85 01 is
00:13:52
passed to the radar control center in
00:13:55
Jakarta with which the pilots they
00:13:57
regularly contact the controller
00:13:59
in Jakarta the commander asks to be
00:14:01
able to climb up to 38,000 feet around
00:14:04
11,600 meters this choice was also
00:14:07
linked to the weather to therefore try to fly over
00:14:09
the disturbance at 6.13
00:14:12
minutes and 41 seconds just over 4 minutes
00:14:15
compared to the last one time
00:14:18
the usual error message appears again on the ecam
00:14:20
the pilots then
00:14:23
restart FAQ 1 and 2 again the same thing
00:14:25
happens a fourth time at 6-15
00:14:28
minutes and 16 seconds and the pilots
00:14:30
respond exactly the same way
00:14:32
at 6:16 the Jakarta controller
00:14:35
responds to flight 85 01's request
00:14:37
to be able to climb up to 38,000 feet by
00:14:40
authorizing it to climb up to 34 feet
00:14:42
on foot, this is because
00:14:45
other planes were already present in the area, obviously they
00:14:47
wanted to avoid conflicts. However, the
00:14:49
response from the plane was slow in arriving and
00:14:51
to be honest, from flight 85 01 there
00:14:55
will be no more radio communications. This
00:14:57
time, however, the commander no longer wanted to
00:14:59
follow the instructions indicated by the
00:15:01
display. In fact, remember that just
00:15:03
three days earlier, on 25 December
00:15:06
2014,
00:15:09
the exact same thing had happened at Surabaya airport.
00:15:11
exactly what on the same plane even on
00:15:14
that occasion by resetting FAQ 1 and 2 the
00:15:17
problem was not
00:15:18
definitively resolved soon as they
00:15:21
were still on the ground a
00:15:23
maintenance technician from erasia had come on
00:15:25
board the plane to take a look at the
00:15:27
problem the commander observed the
00:15:29
maintenance technician resetting
00:15:31
the protection switch or
00:15:33
circutbreaker relating to FAQ 1 and
00:15:36
2, the protection switches
00:15:38
completely interrupt
00:15:40
the electrical supply of the
00:15:42
panoramas involved, thus producing a
00:15:44
complete reboot of FAQ 1 and 2 after
00:15:47
this restarting, the commander
00:15:49
realizes that the error message had actually
00:15:51
no longer appeared and consequently asks
00:15:53
the maintenance technician
00:15:55
if this operation could
00:15:58
also be performed in flight. To this the
00:16:00
technician replies to follow the
00:16:02
ECAM instructions which, however,
00:16:04
I reiterate, do not indicate to activate the
00:16:07
protection switches during the
00:16:09
flight 85 01 the commander remembers this
00:16:12
interaction and therefore decides to activate
00:16:14
the protection switch now
00:16:17
Just to be on the same page
00:16:19
This is an operation absolutely
00:16:22
not to be done it is very grass reiterate in
00:16:24
your manuals that it is not possible
00:16:26
to reset the computers of the
00:16:29
aircraft control system in this way while
00:16:30
in flight, this operation can
00:16:33
easily be done on the ground and under the
00:16:35
supervision of the technical staff but
00:16:37
absolutely not at cruising altitude. In
00:16:40
any case, he therefore decides to interrupt the
00:16:42
transformation electric to FAQ 1 and 2
00:16:44
Activate the protection switch of
00:16:47
fac1 which is located on the upper panel
00:16:49
and shortly after also that of fac2 which is
00:16:52
located in a panel behind the
00:16:54
first officer's seat this is
00:16:56
precisely the moment that marks
00:16:58
the beginning of the tragic end of flight 85
00:17:01
01 instantly the autopilot
00:17:04
is disconnected the cam is filled with
00:17:07
an avalanche of error messages and the
00:17:10
320 enters as an alternative since
00:17:12
all the rudder deflection protections had just been lost
00:17:15
the latter
00:17:17
carries an inclination two degrees
00:17:19
to the left, an angle largely
00:17:21
sufficient to cause the plane to begin
00:17:24
a violent roll to the left side,
00:17:26
both pilots are completely
00:17:28
taken by surprise. Faced with this
00:17:30
situation for a good nine seconds the first
00:17:33
officer has no type of reaction
00:17:35
and then grip the sidestick and
00:17:37
re-establish level flight but for
00:17:39
some reason immediately after it begins to
00:17:42
tilt the nose upwards the plane
00:17:44
begins to climb at the frightening rate
00:17:47
of 11,000 feet per minute a value
00:17:49
completely out of scale for any
00:17:51
phase of flight In truth at this point
00:17:53
remember what was said before about the
00:17:56
Alternate Low protection mode
00:17:58
or the fact that stall protection is not included
00:18:00
in this
00:18:02
particular phase for this reason
00:18:04
shortly after the flight erasi 85 01 enters an
00:18:08
aerodynamic stall and in the
00:18:09
cockpit it starts insistently to
00:18:12
sound the corresponding alarm
00:18:18
at this point the commander begins to
00:18:21
repeat a phrase which is really difficult to
00:18:24
interpret correctly and begins to
00:18:26
repeat to the first officer
00:18:27
the expression Pull down
00:18:31
referring to the Side stick. The problem is
00:18:34
that these are decidedly
00:18:35
contradictory terms when it's called Pool
00:18:38
or pulling means actually
00:18:40
pulling the Side stick inside yourself pulling
00:18:43
the site stick makes the nose wheel up and doesn't
00:18:46
make it point downwards as it
00:18:48
would like to do and as would be the
00:18:50
correct procedure for
00:18:52
stall recovery in full response In fact For the
00:18:55
remaining duration of the flight the first
00:18:56
officer will continue to pull the side
00:18:59
stick towards himself. From this moment, however,
00:19:01
the commander
00:19:04
begins to give the correct command via his site stick,
00:19:05
namely to
00:19:07
lower the nose. Unfortunately, however,
00:19:10
another element comes into play here. aspect of the
00:19:11
Fly by Wire system that
00:19:13
many of you will surely already know if you have seen
00:19:15
other videos of mine in which I talked about
00:19:17
20 others, namely the fact that the two site
00:19:20
sticks of the first officer commander
00:19:22
are not mechanically interconnected with
00:19:24
each other. This means that the two Side sticks
00:19:27
can be moved in a
00:19:28
completely independent manner in Boeing aircraft, for
00:19:31
example the two sticks are
00:19:32
actually mechanically
00:19:34
interconnected so at any moment it is
00:19:36
possible to realize the inputs that
00:19:38
are actually taking place while
00:19:39
the Side sticks of the Erba ones
00:19:42
work in a different way or
00:19:44
in the case in which they were to be operated
00:19:47
simultaneously the Fly by
00:19:49
Wire system will add the inputs together.
00:19:52
So you can well understand that two
00:19:55
sidesticks in positions diametrically
00:19:57
opposed to each other will essentially
00:19:59
produce a null input during
00:20:02
flight it is essential to maintain the
00:20:04
distinction between Pilot Flying and Pilot
00:20:06
monitoring precisely to avoid this
00:20:08
type of confusion so that at any
00:20:10
time only one pilot has
00:20:12
effective control of the aircraft when
00:20:14
on the Airbus Iside sticks are moved
00:20:17
simultaneously in the cabin
00:20:19
an alarm known as Dual
00:20:21
input is played. The problem is that during on flight
00:20:23
85 01 the aircraft was already in the very
00:20:26
dangerous condition of
00:20:28
aerodynamic stall so this alarm
00:20:30
had a higher priority than
00:20:32
the Dual input alarm which is why the pilots
00:20:34
never realized the
00:20:36
opposing inputs that the commander was giving each other.
00:20:39
Furthermore he had not even
00:20:41
uttered the expression I have
00:20:43
controls which unequivocally states
00:20:44
the responsibility for
00:20:47
controlling the plane if he had
00:20:49
uttered these words The first
00:20:51
officer would certainly have let go
00:20:52
and entrusted control
00:20:54
of the plane to the commander
00:20:56
However, the sidestics possess the
00:20:58
so-called priority button button
00:21:01
that is pressed once disconnects the
00:21:03
autopilot While if pressed
00:21:05
continuously it makes the
00:21:07
Side stick of the person who
00:21:09
is pressing it take priority and if pressed
00:21:11
continuously for 40 seconds it will
00:21:14
completely disable the opposite site stick
00:21:17
This is a function designed
00:21:18
mainly for any
00:21:20
technical problems relating to one of the two sidesticks
00:21:23
during flight 85 01, however the commander does
00:21:26
not carry out any of these operations.
00:21:28
Rather, he simply simply presses
00:21:30
the priority change button but for a few
00:21:33
moments and not continuously.
00:21:35
by now the plane had become totally
00:21:37
unrecoverable It was losing altitude at
00:21:40
a terrifying rate of feet per
00:21:43
minute the grass was at 320 by now it was no
00:21:46
longer a plane but a stone in
00:21:48
free fall without any type of
00:21:50
aerodynamic characteristics unfortunately
00:21:51
at 6.20 the flight was Asia 85 01
00:21:56
crashes into the Java Sea killing
00:21:58
all 162 occupants instantly as
00:22:02
the plane crashed in the middle of the sea and the
00:22:04
search operations were
00:22:05
particularly complex and obviously
00:22:08
the weather didn't help already during the
00:22:10
first day however several
00:22:12
local fishermen managed to find some pieces
00:22:14
of the plane and soon the search operations
00:22:17
involved as many as 90
00:22:19
ships from Malaysia Indonesia South Korea
00:22:22
Japan China Australia United States and
00:22:26
Russia Bearing in mind the period and
00:22:28
geographical area in which
00:22:30
this disaster occurred for for some time
00:22:32
there was certainly terror on the part
00:22:34
of the authorities and above all by the
00:22:37
families of the victims of finding themselves in
00:22:38
front of a new Malaysia 370 or even
00:22:42
sadly famous Boeing 777 200 which
00:22:45
just nine months earlier on 8 March
00:22:48
2014 had left the airport of Kuala
00:22:51
Lumpur in Malaysia and then disappeared into
00:22:53
thin air with 239 people on board
00:22:56
fortunately for today within the
00:22:58
first two weeks of research
00:23:00
all the larger remains of
00:23:03
flight 85 01 were identified and obviously the discovery
00:23:06
of both the cabin voice recorder
00:23:08
and the flight data a
00:23:11
great sigh of relief was breathed for this
00:23:12
video I have almost illustrated the causes of the disaster
00:23:15
Along the way
00:23:16
that wicked decision taken so
00:23:19
lightly and their extraordinary
00:23:21
inability to manage a
00:23:23
stalemate situation had practically
00:23:25
sealed the fate of the flight 85 01
00:23:28
digging deeper, however, there are a
00:23:31
couple of very important reflections to
00:23:33
make. First of all, the investigators
00:23:35
managed to trace the root of the
00:23:37
problem that had caused that continuous
00:23:39
error message on the ecam, a
00:23:42
joint crack in the welding of the Ruder
00:23:44
Travel Limit had caused those
00:23:47
technical problems And yes if any of you remember
00:23:49
it is a very similar problem to the one
00:23:51
seen recently in the case of the
00:23:53
Transage Airways flight 235 both. These
00:23:56
incidents however are connected by the fact
00:23:58
that this welding defect
00:24:00
should in no way have caused the
00:24:02
disasters that actually it
00:24:04
turned out that for both flight 235 and
00:24:07
85 01 there were actually the
00:24:09
correct procedures to deal with this
00:24:11
problem I remember In the case of flight 235
00:24:14
the crew should not have even
00:24:16
left while for 85 01 the
00:24:19
correct procedures were illustrated on lecam
00:24:21
investigating more carefully the
00:24:23
maintenance of the 320 involved in the
00:24:25
history of flight 85 01 the investigators
00:24:28
found that this error message
00:24:30
was appearing with increasing
00:24:32
frequency during 2014 it had
00:24:35
appeared a total of 23 times with
00:24:38
greater insistence in the months of November
00:24:40
and December above all the crew would have to
00:24:42
continue the flight
00:24:43
by resetting the system as necessary or
00:24:45
even better they could have returned
00:24:47
to the departure airport to have
00:24:49
the company technicians take a better look by
00:24:51
deciding to improvise and
00:24:53
voluntarily violate the rules they
00:24:55
have done nothing but create this
00:24:57
terrible disaster, however, there is a
00:25:00
much more serious issue to deal with.
00:25:02
It was clear that the crew of flight 85
00:25:04
01 was totally unprepared in
00:25:07
knowing how to manage a situation of recovery
00:25:09
from stall and anomalous attitude but the
00:25:12
fault of this is not strictly to be
00:25:14
found in the pilots but in the fact
00:25:16
that the upset prevention and
00:25:18
recovery training courses or rather the
00:25:21
recovery courses from 7 anomalies were not
00:25:24
mandatory for the Erbas pilots due to
00:25:26
the protections offered by the Fly
00:25:29
by Wire system. Airbus did not consider these
00:25:31
notions particularly fundamental for
00:25:34
the pilots of the their planes It is also true, however,
00:25:36
that the commander of flight 85 01 had
00:25:39
previously faced the course of
00:25:42
finding you during training for
00:25:43
the 737 just as you had the opportunity to
00:25:46
see. However, during the video there are a
00:25:48
series of notions that are specific to
00:25:50
grass if they are absolutely
00:25:52
essential to know and as mentioned
00:25:54
at the beginning remember that this disaster
00:25:56
occurred more than 5 years after the
00:25:59
very famous case of Air France flight
00:26:01
4407. If you know the story you will surely have already
00:26:04
drawn numerous
00:26:06
parallels that exist between these two
00:26:08
accidents that have really I opened my
00:26:10
eyes wide to the enormous potential problem that
00:26:13
excessive automation can cause to
00:26:15
pilots. I would like to point out that the
00:26:17
Erbas protections are truly
00:26:19
extraordinary and have saved a lot
00:26:21
of situations in the past. The problem
00:26:24
arises when you rely too much
00:26:26
on these protections and numerous systems.
00:26:28
and we end up forgetting the most
00:26:31
rudimentary notions of flight. In
00:26:33
conclusion, this accident
00:26:35
definitively pushed Erbas to adopt
00:26:37
pset prevention and recovery
00:26:39
training. Furthermore, Asia itself was
00:26:41
possibly improving the training
00:26:43
of its crews and,
00:26:45
above all, strengthening the cru Resort management which
00:26:47
I mention so much in my videos this is
00:26:49
all I have to say On flight
00:26:51
Asia 8501 it was a truly tragic but
00:26:55
absolutely very important event which
00:26:57
marked a real
00:26:59
turning point on this channel As already said
00:27:01
on other occasions I like to talk about
00:27:03
somewhat more unknown
00:27:04
surely almost all of you will know
00:27:07
that of flight 447 but certainly less so
00:27:10
that of flight 85 01 I repeat it
00:27:13
again because it really is a
00:27:15
fundamental lesson to learn from episodes
00:27:18
like this automation is not an enemy it's
00:27:20
what Erbas has done in the last 40
00:27:22
years and create real
00:27:24
technological jewels. The problem is
00:27:27
when you think you can replace it
00:27:29
entirely with the flight knowledge you
00:27:31
get from the Air France 4.47 and the
00:27:34
Asia 85 01 where this difference in
00:27:37
ideas is particularly evident, it lies
00:27:39
precisely in the eternal diatribe among those I am
00:27:41
therefore passionate about aviation as to who is
00:27:43
better between Erbas and Boing in which
00:27:45
I have never taken sides and never
00:27:47
will. They are two schools of thought which are
00:27:49
certainly different but both very
00:27:51
valid and with my videos what I
00:27:53
want to do is to put in highlight where
00:27:55
they succeeded where they failed
00:27:57
And what was learned above all I hope
00:28:00
you enjoyed this video if so please like it
00:28:02
subscribe to the
00:28:04
channel and above all activate the
00:28:06
notification bell to stay up to
00:28:07
date on everything I
00:28:09
publish we'll see you next time
00:28:12
video

Description:

------------------------------------- SOCIAL -------------------------------------------------------------------- Instagram (@ettiaviation) : https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser TikTok (ettiaviation) : https://www.tiktok.com/@ettiaviation Discord - https://discord.com/invite/tXHfgBWfRY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ✈️ Un Airbus A320 si schianta nel mar di Giava senza inizialmente lasciare traccia, scatenando preoccupazioni di un nuovo MH370 ⏰ CAPITOLI DEL VIDEO ⏰ 0:00 Intro 1:43 Il volo, la compagnia, l'aereo 3:27 L'equipaggio 5:18 Decollo e salita in crociera 6:11 Problemi tecnici e la RTLU 8:15 Il sistema Fly-by-wire 12:05 La reazione dei piloti 16:39 Gli ultimi 3 minuti 22:01 Indagini e conclusioni ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FONTI USATE: Report dell'incidente - https://bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/Final_Report_PK-AXC-reduite.pdf VIDEO INCLUSI: Aeroporto Kuala Lumpur - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeyGPRbq510 AirAsia X A330 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KG-OClEcAQA AirAsia A321neo - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXWzTR2zy2o AirAsia A320 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0POYAhVpig A320 UPRT - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKi87fMla7A Sequenze su Microsoft Flight Simulator realizzate da me Foto prese da planespotters.net e jetphotos.com

Preparing download options

popular icon
Popular
hd icon
HD video
audio icon
Only sound
total icon
All
* — If the video is playing in a new tab, go to it, then right-click on the video and select "Save video as..."
** — Link intended for online playback in specialized players

Questions about downloading video

mobile menu iconHow can I download "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501" video?mobile menu icon

  • http://unidownloader.com/ website is the best way to download a video or a separate audio track if you want to do without installing programs and extensions.

  • The UDL Helper extension is a convenient button that is seamlessly integrated into YouTube, Instagram and OK.ru sites for fast content download.

  • UDL Client program (for Windows) is the most powerful solution that supports more than 900 websites, social networks and video hosting sites, as well as any video quality that is available in the source.

  • UDL Lite is a really convenient way to access a website from your mobile device. With its help, you can easily download videos directly to your smartphone.

mobile menu iconWhich format of "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501" video should I choose?mobile menu icon

  • The best quality formats are FullHD (1080p), 2K (1440p), 4K (2160p) and 8K (4320p). The higher the resolution of your screen, the higher the video quality should be. However, there are other factors to consider: download speed, amount of free space, and device performance during playback.

mobile menu iconWhy does my computer freeze when loading a "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501" video?mobile menu icon

  • The browser/computer should not freeze completely! If this happens, please report it with a link to the video. Sometimes videos cannot be downloaded directly in a suitable format, so we have added the ability to convert the file to the desired format. In some cases, this process may actively use computer resources.

mobile menu iconHow can I download "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501" video to my phone?mobile menu icon

  • You can download a video to your smartphone using the website or the PWA application UDL Lite. It is also possible to send a download link via QR code using the UDL Helper extension.

mobile menu iconHow can I download an audio track (music) to MP3 "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501"?mobile menu icon

  • The most convenient way is to use the UDL Client program, which supports converting video to MP3 format. In some cases, MP3 can also be downloaded through the UDL Helper extension.

mobile menu iconHow can I save a frame from a video "⚫️ PRECIPITARE IN MARE IN 3 MINUTI - ✈️ Volo AirAsia 8501"?mobile menu icon

  • This feature is available in the UDL Helper extension. Make sure that "Show the video snapshot button" is checked in the settings. A camera icon should appear in the lower right corner of the player to the left of the "Settings" icon. When you click on it, the current frame from the video will be saved to your computer in JPEG format.

mobile menu iconWhat's the price of all this stuff?mobile menu icon

  • It costs nothing. Our services are absolutely free for all users. There are no PRO subscriptions, no restrictions on the number or maximum length of downloaded videos.