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Video tags
Subtitles
Russian
00:00:04
small provincial Ukrainian00:00:06
a place surrounded by greenery, all cherries and00:00:09
people loved to relax here in the apple trees in the summer00:00:11
many Kyivians, Muscovites, Leningraders00:00:14
came here quite often for everything00:00:17
filmed summer with children and household members00:00:19
dachas prepared pickles and jam for the winter00:00:22
Gathered mushrooms, sunbathed dazzlingly00:00:25
clean sandy shores they fished in00:00:27
Pripyat and it seemed amazing00:00:30
Is it really harmonious here, the beauty of nature and00:00:35
hidden happened on the fourth00:00:37
power unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant00:00:39
power plant April 2600:00:42
1986 at 1:23:40 p.m.00:00:46
Moscow time, that is, deep00:00:48
at night it’s interesting to know how they received it00:00:51
those people who felt the accident felt terrible00:00:53
worked at night at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant00:00:55
power plant or was near00:00:57
reactor this video is the biggest work00:01:00
that I've ever done on mine00:01:01
channel it was made based on two00:01:03
sources that I will indicate in the description00:01:06
if anyone is interested you can00:01:07
check it out and of course subscribe00:01:10
put likes on the channel it's really very true00:01:12
important First, let's look at00:01:13
people's memories, representing them by00:01:16
the positions they held at that time00:01:18
time Anatoly Dyatlov deputy00:01:21
chief engineer for the second stage of emergency situations00:01:23
heard the first blow, it was strong but not00:01:26
the one that sounded next Through00:01:29
few seconds00:01:30
this one has already been perceived or as one00:01:32
a long blow or two but the following immediately00:01:35
one after another and the strength of the second00:01:37
turned out to be more noticeable here with fash00:01:40
ceiling tiles fell down00:01:42
looked at the instrument readings picture00:01:45
seemed bad, it became clear that00:01:47
some kind of emergency occurred00:01:50
degree of difficulty I went out into the corridor00:01:52
to go to the Central Reactor00:01:54
hall but in the corridor there was dust and smoke00:01:57
go back to turn on the fans00:01:58
smoke removal00:02:00
the idea came that the reactor was destroyed00:02:02
but as I assumed, the steam lifted the lid00:02:05
apparatus but then she sank to00:02:07
the place turned on the fans and headed already00:02:10
to the engine room and the situation there00:02:12
Nightmarish in different directions of the sheet00:02:15
jets of boiling water steamed and blazed00:02:18
flashes of cable short circuits00:02:20
pump control most of the oil00:02:23
appeared to be destroyed in containers00:02:25
there were about 100 tons of oil00:02:28
leaked, could catch fire, but it’s already nearby00:02:31
there were turbine shop workers and00:02:34
it was decided to send this oil00:02:36
into the existing emergency drain system00:02:39
then returning to those left on00:02:40
control panel of the fourth block00:02:42
to my comrades in the corridor I saw people and00:02:45
among them a burned operator from00:02:47
of the central hall, directing them to the doctors00:02:49
you went outside and walked around the power unit00:02:52
I saw the destruction of buildings, fire on the roofs00:02:55
but at the third one adjacent to the fourth00:02:57
power unit already had a fire engine00:03:01
I saw a fireman and asked who was older than me00:03:04
pointed to Lieutenant Pravik further00:03:06
went to the control panel third00:03:08
the power unit here reported to me that00:03:10
after initial inspection of the base00:03:12
they don’t see the reactor stopping here again00:03:15
returned to the fourth block It turned out00:03:17
that two operators began to look for what was missing00:03:19
Valeria Khodemchuk but the door of the worker00:03:22
premises Where are the main00:03:24
circulation pumps jammed00:03:27
it was impossible to get inside, they became loud but00:03:30
the operator did not respond Boris Rogozhkin00:03:32
shift supervisor at Chernobyl nuclear power plant00:03:34
power plant suddenly heard a dull sound00:03:37
the blow looks like an attack from a heavy object00:03:39
within a few seconds we00:03:41
colleagues at the Central Control Panel00:03:43
station management managed to exchange00:03:45
considerations What happened?00:03:48
the devices suddenly showed a system failure00:03:51
unstable operation of electrical00:03:53
the generators' electric lights began to blink00:03:55
some communication lines went down but00:03:58
after some time the generators00:03:59
calmed down I contacted the dispatcher00:04:02
Kievenergo asked what you were thinking00:04:04
that the interruptions are coming from the center but the dispatcher00:04:07
replied this is something you have to figure out00:04:10
employee's phone rang00:04:11
paramilitary guard asked what00:04:14
happened at the station had to respond00:04:16
what else needs to be sorted out next he calls00:04:18
the station security chief has already reported that00:04:21
there is a fire on the fourth power unit I said00:04:24
so that he opens the gate and calls00:04:26
firefighters received an answer that the gate00:04:28
open and firefighters have already arrived here00:04:30
I see that the signal has turned on00:04:32
notify00:04:35
helicopter00:04:37
They were very dirty and horny00:04:40
quarreled, ran to the rubble00:04:42
formed after an explosion from debris00:04:44
building structures entered the turbine hall00:04:47
Where are the turbo generators located?00:04:50
I was interested in the premises first00:04:51
because there were supplies there00:04:54
hydrogen and engine oil, then the third00:04:57
the power unit asked the elder if he knew00:04:59
What happened on the fourth received an answer00:05:02
no, but just in case there is a man on duty00:05:04
staff have already taken the pills for00:05:06
prevention from exposure00:05:07
radioactive iodine found a protective helmet00:05:10
went to the fourth power unit and met00:05:12
Dyatlov, he threw up his hands, I don’t know Bor00:05:16
pressed the emergency protection button and seconds00:05:18
after 17 explosion looked at the instruments00:05:21
asked the block shift supervisor00:05:22
Alexandra Akimova Does it pour water for00:05:25
cooling the reactor he answered yes but not00:05:27
knows where she really goes then I00:05:30
I saw workers who were carrying00:05:32
burnt Volodya Shashenkov00:05:37
looked very dirty and was in00:05:40
in a state of shock but groaned as he gave00:05:42
Akimov and Dyatlov are ordered to deal with00:05:45
situation I helped convey the Shashenkov to Ney00:05:48
the third power unit from here contacted00:05:51
The station telephone operator told her00:05:53
to declare an accident at the nuclear power plant00:05:55
the telephone operator felt that he was not hesitating00:05:58
knows which tape cassette00:06:00
put into the machine for automatic00:06:02
accident alerts I told her to00:06:04
put the biggest one. What happens next?00:06:07
called our dispatch center in Moscow00:06:10
production association union00:06:12
atomenergo and said that we have the most00:06:14
serious accident made one more call00:06:17
in Kievenergo but reported there Simply00:06:20
there was an accident, then someone came at me00:06:22
phone director of emergency situations Bryukhanov I00:06:25
told him what I knew at about 3 am00:06:27
Dyatlov called and reported that Trey block00:06:30
needs to be stopped Igor Ivanovich00:06:32
Cossacks shift supervisor, block number00:06:34
four April 25 eighty-six00:06:38
I worked the 8am to 4pm shift.00:06:41
I received from Sasha Akimov in the morning we00:06:43
were preparing for turbine run-down tests00:06:46
Almost the entire program was completed by 200:06:48
o'clock in the afternoon and were already planning to spend it myself00:06:51
experiment at 2:00 pm 15 minutes before00:06:54
the test started, the boss called00:06:56
change of rams and said that the tests00:06:58
postponed due to being disconnected00:07:00
block at some power plant and00:07:02
there was a shortage of electricity and our00:07:05
the block it produced at that time was 500,000 kW then00:07:08
there is 50% power still needs to work00:07:12
the situation is generally common00:07:14
Often we are in the system of the Ministry of Energy00:07:16
prayed for a kilowatt-hour plan for everything00:07:19
the rest is preparing for the experiment I00:07:21
acted according to the program00:07:23
the only deviation in this00:07:24
program from the current instructions was00:07:27
removing the security system I'm on00:07:29
brought out the security system on my shift00:07:32
this was all printed in the program I00:07:34
looked at every point to do something00:07:36
do something I look from beginning to end00:07:39
I don’t see an end to all these points00:07:41
so that they demand something from us00:07:43
prohibited by the instructions, I repeat00:07:45
The only thing is the output of the sar system00:07:48
emergency reactor cooling00:07:49
again why did I do this00:07:52
The security system was created in case00:07:54
if a pipeline rupture occurs00:07:56
large diameter But this is natural00:07:59
very low probability I don't think so00:08:01
more than a plane falling on your head Yes I00:08:04
I assumed that in an hour or two there would be a block00:08:06
stopped But why in these hour or two00:08:09
which there will be a gap ahead No not00:08:11
had to happen and here's all the press00:08:13
then I spoke abroad I read00:08:16
Americans talked about this accident00:08:18
that the explosion allegedly occurred because00:08:21
The Russians took out the security system but00:08:23
no I claim no connection between00:08:26
with this explosion and the withdrawal of the reserve system00:08:28
there was no cooling and there is no And that’s what I’m talking about00:08:31
said in court when he acted as00:08:33
I don’t remember who the witness is, who is the prosecutor or00:08:36
the judge asked whether the system's conclusion affected00:08:38
safety on the course of the explosion I answered No00:08:41
the same question was asked to the experts and00:08:44
experts gave the same answer we must00:08:46
were fully prepared to carry out00:08:48
experiments 1415 1420 exactly this00:08:52
time as I now understand could00:08:54
an accident happened but fate decreed00:08:58
otherwise when they called they said that00:09:00
there won't be an experiment I won't even00:09:02
disappointment experienced interesting00:09:04
experiment to look at this whole thing00:09:06
we didn't want to have it before00:09:08
such experiments on other blocks00:09:10
tried to do it but there before it happened00:09:13
it came to the experiment and it worked00:09:15
automatic protection Well I'm disappointed00:09:17
I experienced such a thought, it’s a pity, well00:09:20
no like that no what to do like that 50% power00:09:23
and worked until the end of the shift at 1600:09:26
o'clock I handed over my shift to Yuri Trigub and left00:09:29
home in Pripyat Yuri Yuryevich Trigub00:09:32
shift supervisor of block number four 2500:09:35
April eighty-six I00:09:36
took over the shift itself acceptance of the shift00:09:39
was very heavy because it was on the table00:09:42
there were several programs There was00:09:44
test program runs out program00:09:47
air cooled reactor00:09:49
vibration measurement program and some00:09:52
fourth program I forgot my shift I handed it in00:09:54
Igor Cossacks were supposed to be tested00:09:57
to be on his shift but then there were00:09:59
seem to have been transferred to my shift I00:10:02
I wasn’t ready for the test at first00:10:04
only in 2 hours When they get to the point00:10:06
program when accepting a shift it was said00:10:08
that the security system is disabled Well00:10:11
naturally I asked Kazachkov How00:10:14
deduced says based on the program00:10:16
Although I objected, he spoke to Dyatlov00:10:19
I couldn’t convince him Well, the program00:10:22
there is a program it was developed by people00:10:24
those responsible for carrying out the00:10:26
After all, I have a habit of everything00:10:27
check I usually come on shift00:10:30
40 minutes earlier than the entry in the journals -00:10:33
that's one thing, but if I spend00:10:35
tests are not enough for me, I belong00:10:37
the staff sent their shifts to00:10:40
check everything that has been done Although00:10:42
my work was on shift and it was in full swing because00:10:44
that people measured vibration but in general00:10:47
there was no dynamics block00:10:49
worked steadily at about 45% power00:10:53
from face value only after I00:10:55
carefully read the program00:10:57
only then I have a lot of questions for00:11:00
program and in order to talk with00:11:02
management needs to study deeply00:11:05
documentation otherwise always00:11:07
you can be a fool when I have00:11:09
all these questions arose, it was already 60000:11:12
evening and there was no one with whom to00:11:15
I would not contact the program00:11:17
I liked it because it’s not specific00:11:19
it was that it was made by an electrician00:11:21
Metlenkova00:11:22
made up the Don Techenergo system00:11:25
emergency reactor cooling began00:11:27
bringing out Cossacks on shift is very00:11:30
We do a lot of work manually00:11:32
the fittings shift was tense I'm in00:11:35
mainly worked with documents and software00:11:37
I answered the phone because all the time00:11:39
they called and asked, but everything was going well in the reactor00:11:42
was normal only abnormal00:11:44
environment in terms of work intensity00:11:46
on the main board here is the connection here I’m reading the program00:11:49
come here and ask here more00:11:51
something In addition, you give an order00:11:53
check the whole program And this is quite00:11:56
difficult Well, I talked to the shift manager00:11:58
station wild told about the situation he00:12:00
naturally understands the same as I do if00:12:03
there is a program If everything is already accepted then00:12:05
Well, what objections can they have to00:12:08
I took it somewhere around 8:00 pm00:12:11
I'm asking again, I'm worried that suddenly Dick00:12:14
The dispatcher may have forgotten or got distracted00:12:16
passed the order and it’s already possible00:12:18
start the experiment dick says00:12:20
no permission must be called00:12:23
for Dyatlov's test I call Dyatlov00:12:25
he's not home, I finally call again00:12:29
got to him he says without me00:12:31
start I tell him I have00:12:33
questions a lot of questions This is not a telephone number00:12:36
don’t start a conversation without me - he said00:12:39
he called somewhere between 8:00 and 9:0000:12:41
chief engineer of Fomin station asked00:12:44
as I say the tests are postponed00:12:47
reported the situation to him. We have00:12:49
special report scheme he Wait00:12:51
Dyatlova without him, don’t start without him00:12:54
under no circumstances any preparations well00:12:57
at 10:00 pm Kievenergo dispatcher00:13:00
allowed the unloading unit to call00:13:02
Dyatlov's wife answered home that he00:13:05
already went to work appeared somewhere in00:13:07
early last night Sasha Akimov also came00:13:10
at the beginning of the twelfth I tell Akimov00:13:13
I have a lot of questions about this program00:13:15
I could have left but I thought I had to00:13:18
stay if you knew how it would end00:13:20
Sasha Akimov was the boss on that shift00:13:23
block changes Lenya Toptunov Stolyarchuk00:13:25
Kirshenbaum and fifth shift supervisor00:13:28
turbine00:13:29
plus the two of us and Gazim stayed together00:13:32
there were quite a lot of people there00:13:34
normal situation for all tests00:13:37
everything went fine in the beginning00:13:39
there was none but then later00:13:42
low flow alarm triggered00:13:44
water I see the alarm lights up in front00:13:47
Toptunov there is a special board there00:13:50
signal but Akimov rushed there too00:13:53
Sir's hem duty immediately00:13:55
send an electrician on duty00:13:58
check or truth Better let 100 times00:14:01
your legs will get tired but you need to check it out00:14:03
when I clicked on the remote control to find out00:14:05
water flow I heard Akimov’s exclamation00:14:08
Catch the power, I’m standing next to the tramplers and00:14:11
I see the power is slowly falling00:14:13
initial digit I don’t know but this is what I understand00:14:16
that they began to reduce power and with00:14:19
from that moment I began to tell him00:14:21
Which rods are free for this to00:14:23
remove them who gave the command to rise00:14:25
I don’t know the power of this, but there was a command00:14:28
raise the bridge to 200 MW and they raised00:14:32
power starts coasting experiment00:14:34
disconnect the turbine from the steam And at this time00:14:37
look how long the run-out will last and00:14:39
Here was the command given Akimov gave it00:14:42
Keshen Baum I stood next to him turned it off00:14:45
Metlenkov stop valve00:14:48
there was some kind of bad sound00:14:51
turning into a rumble, vibration appeared00:14:53
buildings yes I thought it was not good But00:14:57
that this is probably a situation you're shaking00:15:01
then a blow sounded, I jumped back and into this00:15:03
time followed The second blow, that was it00:15:06
a very strong blow, the plaster fell down00:15:09
the whole building was setting, the lights went out Popov00:15:12
emergency telephone operator on duty That night I00:15:14
was the telephone attendant at the station00:15:16
Rogozhkin called and reported an accident.00:15:19
asked what he said, big accident00:15:22
but the tape recorder broke down and the system00:15:24
automatic notification of trouble to everyone00:15:26
officials did not have to work00:15:28
call specialists manually locksmith00:15:31
Mikhailyuk nuclear power plant in the evening00:15:33
On April 25, six years ago, my son asked me00:15:37
I started telling him a bedtime story00:15:40
tell me and didn’t notice how I fell asleep00:15:42
together with the child we lived in Pripyat in00:15:45
house on the ninth floor and from the window00:15:48
the nuclear power plant was clearly visible from the kitchen00:15:51
the wife had not yet slept and felt some kind of00:15:53
the shock of the house seems to be light00:15:55
earthquake She went to the window on00:15:58
Evie's kitchen above the fourth power unit00:16:00
power plant first black cloud00:16:03
then a blue glow then white00:16:05
a cloud that rose and covered the moon00:16:08
my wife woke me up under our windows00:16:10
there was an overpass along it one by one00:16:12
the other with the hazard lights on00:16:15
alarms, fire trucks rushing by00:16:18
This is what the accident looked like in the eyes of those who00:16:20
saw her first many of those first00:16:22
witnesses suffered from traditional00:16:24
the flames were consumed by fire and fire00:16:27
boiling water from broken pipelines00:16:29
after the explosions caused destruction00:16:31
the fourth reactor shop failed00:16:34
discover the body of the senior operator00:16:35
main reactor circulation pumps00:16:38
Valeria Khodemchuk whose workplace is00:16:41
was located at the site of the collapse memorial00:16:43
a board indicating the address of his burial00:16:45
located on one of the walls of the fourth00:16:47
power unit another casualty00:16:49
at the time of the accident Vladimir Shashenok was in00:16:51
taken to hospital in serious condition00:16:54
the city of Pripyat and there on April 2600:16:56
eighty-six at 600 in the morning00:16:59
died at the same time00:17:01
108 people were hospitalized from among00:17:03
those who met trouble while within the walls00:17:06
nuclear power plant on its territory00:17:09
those who came to the first minutes and hours00:17:11
dangerous zone to eliminate the accident00:17:14
24 people had to be hospitalized in00:17:17
during the day on April 26, they all received00:17:21
large doses of radiation more than 100 Br00:17:24
at the same time, despite the explosions and fires00:17:27
defeats of people all three remaining00:17:29
power unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant00:17:31
the stations were not damaged and continued00:17:33
was in active service00:17:35
even the third reactor and the power unit as a whole00:17:38
but it is technically closely related00:17:40
was in the same building as the emergency00:17:42
fourth block and still arose00:17:45
such a situation in which work00:17:47
Chernobyl station its production00:17:50
completely required electricity00:17:52
stop and the third power unit was shut down00:17:54
at 5:00 am on April 26th the first and second00:17:58
respectively at 1 hour 13 minutes and 2 1300:18:02
min 27 April 1980 all00:18:05
the hardware rooms were then prepared for00:18:07
long-term parking in cold conditions00:18:09
station equipment was transferred to00:18:11
cold reserve position first explosion00:18:13
who probably moved from his place00:18:15
the top of the reactor led to00:18:18
depressurization destroyed the high pipes00:18:20
pressure unloading side of nuclear00:18:23
apparatus make-up compartment then00:18:25
another explosion followed though00:18:27
there are allegations that there were00:18:29
Several things happened that led to the fact that00:18:32
located inside a nuclear apparatus00:18:34
highly radioactive materials and00:18:36
designs And these are nuclear fuel blocks00:18:38
graphite control rods00:18:40
evaporation channels and other elements00:18:42
found themselves thrown out of bounds00:18:44
premises falling along with the iron00:18:46
concrete roofing fragments00:18:49
pierced the light roof of a nearby00:18:51
turbine hall of the fourth power unit00:18:54
stations caused her to catch fire and also00:18:56
found themselves scattered throughout the area00:18:59
station people today are interested in the question00:19:01
did a nuclear explosion occur during an emergency?00:19:04
fortunately no, because when it explodes we’ll say00:19:07
atomic bomb then this is accompanied00:19:09
with the strongest sound reminiscent00:19:11
deafening thunderclap temperature in00:19:13
the center of the explosion reaches several00:19:15
million degrees Celsius00:19:17
the resulting glow is more than00:19:20
100 times brighter than the sun00:19:22
nothing like this at Chernobyl00:19:24
the nuclear power plant did not happen00:19:26
it was not a nuclear explosion but a thermal explosion00:19:29
intense reactions began in the reactor00:19:31
there was an increase in vaporization00:19:33
temperatures which then led to00:19:35
heating nuclear fuel destruction00:19:38
the shell in which it was located00:19:40
a violent effervescence began in00:19:42
water apparatus into which particles have entered00:19:45
chemicals arose from the destroyed fuel00:19:48
reactions in the reactor increased sharply00:19:50
the pressure under which it00:19:52
collapsed as a result of events in00:19:54
reaction reactor in the apparatus formed00:19:57
containing hydrogen and carbon monoxide00:19:59
mixture of gases and after depressurization00:20:01
reactor when mixed with oxygen00:20:03
air This most likely led to00:20:05
another explosion about the power of a thermal explosion00:20:08
inside the reactor at least this fact says00:20:10
that as a result of its influence there was00:20:12
shifted and overturned which weighs not00:20:15
1,000 tons explained the picture of the accident00:20:18
scientists after the accident, the city of Chernobyl00:20:20
left without residents without loud screams00:20:22
rebet without the usual daily00:20:25
the district's leisurely life was00:20:27
I'll slam the shutters closed and open00:20:30
all houses, institutions and shops in the city00:20:32
there are no domestic animals left in the morning00:20:34
the cows didn't bother, they just ran wild00:20:36
dogs later and they were shot and birds00:20:39
didn't know that00:20:41
dusting by a source of increased radiation00:20:44
from document magat the accident occurred during00:20:47
testing time that was supposed to00:20:49
carried out from turbogenerators00:20:51
normal scheduled stop00:20:53
the reactor was supposed to be checked00:20:55
turbogenerator ability during00:20:57
full power supply to the station00:21:00
supply electrical energy for00:21:02
short period before backup00:21:05
diesel generators will be able to supply00:21:07
energy in emergency conditions incorrect00:21:09
drawn up test program from the point00:21:11
safety concerns and gross violations00:21:14
basic operating rules led to00:21:17
because the reactor reached low00:21:18
power at which consumption00:21:20
coolant and cooling conditions are not00:21:22
could be stably maintained00:21:24
by manual control taking into account00:21:26
special design characteristics00:21:28
which has already been said reactor00:21:30
was operated in a dangerous mode at that time00:21:33
at the same time, operators deliberately and B00:21:35
violation of the rules expelled the majority00:21:37
control and protection rods from the active00:21:40
zones and disabled some important00:21:42
security systems subsequent events00:21:44
led to intense vaporization in00:21:47
reactor core by creating such00:21:49
positive reactivity00:21:51
there was a sharp increase in00:21:53
power and an attempt was made manually00:21:56
stop the bath chain reaction00:21:59
emergency stop system which00:22:01
should have worked earlier when00:22:03
beginning of the test However, the possibility00:22:05
rapid reactor shutdown00:22:08
was limited because almost everything00:22:10
the control rods were completely00:22:12
removed from the core continuous00:22:15
increased reactivity due to00:22:17
vaporization led to instantaneous00:22:19
critical surge in Soviet power00:22:22
experts calculated that the first peak00:22:24
power reached a hundred times higher00:22:26
rated power for 4 seconds00:22:30
energy00:22:31
release a power surge suddenly00:22:34
broke some of the fuel into small pieces00:22:37
the mechanism of this rupture is well known00:22:39
from experiments according to the program00:22:41
security research00:22:44
small particles of hot fuel00:22:46
led to a steam explosion00:22:49
a ton of protective energy has shifted00:22:51
reactor lid and led to the fact that00:22:53
all cooling channels were cut off00:22:55
both sides of the reactor core00:22:58
after 2-3 seconds the second one was heard00:23:01
explosion and hot pieces of the reactor were00:23:03
thrown out of a destroyed building00:23:05
the destruction of the reactor provided access00:23:08
air which accordingly led to00:23:10
the combustion of graphite, the accident led to00:23:13
that part of the hot pieces of graphite and00:23:15
fuel was thrown out on the roof00:23:17
located near buildings began00:23:19
fires especially in the hall of block number00:23:21
four on the roof of block 3 and on the roof00:23:24
machine room in which the00:23:26
turbogenerators of two reactors It was00:23:28
final report of the international00:23:30
Nuclear Advisory Group00:23:32
security at the meeting00:23:34
consideration of the causes and consequences of the accident00:23:36
in Chernobyl Vienna from August 30 to 500:23:39
September00:23:42
1986 story Clear enough00:23:44
recorded the date and place of birth00:23:46
the world's first nuclear power plant00:23:48
contributed her energy to the district00:23:50
energy system June 2700:23:53
1954 in the city of Obninsk, Kaluga00:23:56
area Here's what he remembers about it00:23:58
Chief designer of the first reactor00:24:00
world nuclear power plant and then00:24:03
Chief designer of RBMK 1000 laureate00:24:06
Lenin State Prize of the USSR00:24:08
Academician Nikolai Dolezhal at the end00:24:10
in the forties in our country there was already00:24:12
accumulated some experience in construction00:24:15
nuclear reactors naturally in those00:24:17
times the question often arose about00:24:19
further development of the reactor00:24:21
construction and use for peaceful purposes00:24:24
self-supporting effect with chain00:24:26
reactions of fission of heavy poisons into00:24:28
practical rails the matter arose at the beginning00:24:30
fifties when Igor Kurchatov00:24:33
the father of the Soviet atomic bomb convened00:24:35
a small meeting of specialists has been decided00:24:38
was first of all to build a nuclear power plant00:24:40
power plant must remember that nuclear00:24:42
technology in those days was only in00:24:44
initial stage of development And much more00:24:47
the main result was not known enough00:24:49
work was that the entire planet00:24:51
real00:24:53
possibility of peaceful use00:24:55
energy released during fission00:24:57
atom for industrial production00:25:00
electricity generated at the first nuclear power plant00:25:02
studies and experiments have shown that00:25:05
it turned out to be quite simple and00:25:07
reliable in operation already in00:25:10
In 1956 it was possible to make useful00:25:13
for further development of the conclusions about00:25:15
reliability of fuel elements00:25:17
correctness of technical and physical00:25:20
principles underlying the development00:25:22
first nuclear power plant on the absence of radiation00:25:24
danger for both the operator00:25:26
successful for both staff and nature00:25:29
the operation of the first nuclear power plant for 20 years gave00:25:32
opportunity to spend a large number00:25:34
research and experimental work00:25:37
necessary for design00:25:38
construction of subsequent more powerful00:25:41
power reactors its operation00:25:43
was a good training school00:25:46
for new stations Obninskaya station00:25:48
became the ancestor of what is called00:25:50
channel type power reactors00:25:53
how is it structured? What are they at least in general?00:25:56
features of this new00:25:58
source of energy supply in general is00:26:00
enterprise for generating electricity00:26:02
energy using heat00:26:04
obtained from a nuclear reactor00:26:06
actually performs the function of the Firebox00:26:08
steam boiler as in the usual circuit00:26:11
thermal power plant a00:26:12
fuel elements reactors heat00:26:15
is removed by the so-called coolant00:26:17
circulating in a closed circuit00:26:19
technological circle such00:26:21
The coolant can be liquid water00:26:23
metal sodium or gas already on Obninsk00:26:26
The speakers were provided with various systems00:26:28
ensuring safety00:26:30
service personnel in all00:26:32
control devices installed in the premises00:26:34
for radioactivity is equipped with sound and00:26:37
light alarm00:26:39
triggered in the Soviet Union00:26:42
opened turf energy however00:26:45
less than a certain time were in no hurry00:26:47
build others more powerful than00:26:49
Obninsk nuclear power plant burna00:26:52
their construction began only with00:26:53
mid-seventies following00:26:55
the world's first Soviet nuclear power plant00:26:57
power plants began to be built in00:26:59
other countries in the early seventies00:27:01
130 km north of the city of Kyiv on00:27:05
pre-selected site near00:27:07
The first landing party arrived on the Pripyat River00:27:09
Builders and in a solemn atmosphere00:27:12
the first peg was driven into place00:27:14
of the future main building of the Chernobyl00:27:16
nuclear power plant at that time00:27:19
the territory administratively belonged to00:27:21
Chernobyl district of Kyiv region00:27:23
Hence the name of the station workers00:27:26
their family members lived in the new city00:27:28
Pripyat which is located to the west behind00:27:31
three-kilogram00:27:55
cooler rod with an area of 22 m August 100:28:01
1977, the first00:28:04
fuel-generating00:28:11
turbogenerator and Chernobyl nuclear power plant gave00:28:14
first electric current on January 2400:28:18
1978 generated at the power plant00:28:21
first billion kilowatt hours00:28:23
electricity December 2100:28:26
1978 The second one was launched00:28:28
power unit on April 22, seventy-nine00:28:31
year, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant generated its first00:28:34
10 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity 300:28:37
December00:28:38
1981 power start-up was carried out00:28:42
third unit of the power plant on December 3100:28:46
1983 provided the first electricity00:28:49
Note that the fourth power unit was launched in00:28:52
a few hours before New Year's Eve00:28:54
August 2100:28:56
In 1984, the Chernobyl Power Plant developed00:28:59
100 billion kilowatt-hours00:29:02
electricity thus the day before00:29:04
emergency power of four emergency units00:29:07
amounted to 4 million kW and corresponded00:29:10
design parameters number of people00:29:12
working on nuclear power is determined by the standard00:29:15
per 1 megawatt of installed capacity00:29:17
According to calculations, an average of one is required00:29:19
man and the power of four blocks00:29:21
station was 4,000 MW00:29:24
Therefore, the station board was listed00:29:27
about 4,000 workers on the night of the accident00:29:30
25 to 26 April00:29:32
1986 in the first and second stages00:29:35
The nuclear power plant had 176 people on duty00:29:38
operating personnel workers00:29:41
various workshops and repair services mode00:29:44
work and rest of the station personnel was00:29:46
the same as on any other speaker in the USSR00:29:48
for day shift five-day work00:29:51
week 8 hours a day on night shift00:29:54
people worked for 3 days for 800:29:56
hours and then had two days off together00:29:59
with the station a city also grew up on a vacant lot00:30:02
Pripyat got its name from00:30:04
river on the banks of which it is located00:30:07
first page in the biography of Pripyat00:30:09
written February 400:30:11
1970 when builders scored on00:30:14
the place of the future city is the first peg and00:30:17
The first bucket of earth was taken out with an excavator00:30:19
under the foundation of the first building quickly00:30:22
residential areas grew and with them00:30:24
Palace of Culture house of books cinema00:30:27
hotels four libraries school00:30:30
arts with concert hall swimming00:30:32
swimming pool complex of medical institutions00:30:35
well equipped medium00:30:36
secondary schools more than ten00:30:39
kindergartens technical school in00:30:42
overall it was a wonderful city where00:30:44
almost 50,000 people lived on average00:30:47
the age of the residents was 26 years00:30:49
more than a thousand were born here every year00:30:52
children lived together in Pripyat00:30:53
representatives of thirty nationalities00:30:55
peoples of the USSR according to the master plan00:30:58
development of the city, the population here must00:31:00
was to increase to 80,000 people this00:31:03
connected with the fact that it was in full swing00:31:05
construction of the third stage of the emergency situation00:31:07
included the fifth and sixth power units00:31:10
with a capacity of 1 kilowatt each00:31:12
By putting them into operation, the nuclear power plant reached00:31:14
its planned capacity is 600 million00:31:17
we are not interested in more details00:31:20
the entire Arsenal of Soviet nuclear reactors00:31:23
And those installed at Chernobyl00:31:25
nuclear power plant is RBM to 100000:31:28
first began to be used on00:31:30
Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant in00:31:33
1973 after the Chernobyl accident00:31:35
nuclear power plant reactor installation00:31:38
RBMK must have become one of the most00:31:40
known later he modernized00:31:42
was ranked among the most00:31:44
promising recommended se to00:31:46
installation at several more nuclear power plants00:31:48
power plants of the Soviet Union itself00:31:51
the reactor is located in a concrete shaft and00:31:53
is a cylindrical00:31:54
graphite masonry which from top to bottom00:31:57
pierce the so-called holes00:31:59
technological channels in each00:32:02
VBMK fuel is placed - this is water00:32:04
which as a result of thermal00:32:06
impact from what is happening in the reactor00:32:08
chain reaction is brought to a boil and00:32:10
Steam through the top of the process00:32:12
channel and then steam-conducting00:32:15
communication enters horizontal00:32:17
separators in which it is separated from00:32:19
water and supplied to the turbines00:32:21
generating all electricity00:32:24
water cycle in the reactor00:32:25
carried out by the main Zion somi them00:32:28
eight six working and two reserve00:32:31
the entire apparatus weighs about 10,000 tons00:32:34
rests on a concrete base under00:32:37
where the bubbler pool is located00:32:39
fuel accident localization system for00:32:41
RBMK serves weakly enriched uranium00:32:44
these are some technical00:32:45
characteristics of RBMK 1000 V00:32:48
In 1978 it was officially announced that00:32:51
about half of all AC electricity00:32:54
planned to be produced at stations00:32:56
exactly with reactors like RB MK like this00:32:58
exceptional importance was attached00:33:00
these devices in practice00:33:02
RBMK operating personnel have00:33:05
dealing with a fairly complex game00:33:06
neutrons more precisely00:33:08
catastrophically dangerous movement00:33:10
invisible particles if you release them from under00:33:13
control and this is not a simple nuclear00:33:15
pedagogy monitors behavior00:33:17
rapidly flying invisible people, however00:33:19
less the creators of RBMK 1000 believed that00:33:22
The device has a lot of advantages00:33:24
it is missing00:33:26
RBMK does not have a labor-intensive housing to install00:33:29
complex and expensive steam generator to00:33:32
advantages were also attributed to high00:33:34
Reactor reliability and survivability00:33:36
RBMK designers It would seem00:33:38
also provided for the fact that during it00:33:40
operation, emergencies may occur00:33:42
situation requiring immediate stop00:33:45
reactor The reactor plant has a number of00:33:47
anti-emergency systems First of all, this00:33:50
reactor protection control system00:33:52
including 211 solid rods00:33:55
absorbers and equipment00:33:58
level and distribution of neutron00:34:00
flow it must ensure the start00:34:02
manual and automatic regulation00:34:05
planned and emergency stop power00:34:07
reactor in this way if you look at00:34:10
RBMK through the eyes of its creators and above we00:34:13
presented exactly their official00:34:15
position then the necessary security00:34:17
the device from possible troubles was00:34:19
provided and problem solving00:34:21
the safety of this reactor looked00:34:23
this one is convincing enough00:34:25
convictions were naturally implanted00:34:27
consciousness of specialists and the entire population00:34:30
complete confidence that everything is going well and00:34:32
done as it should once officially00:34:34
confirmed that there is no doubt about00:34:36
the correctness of the chosen decision to be00:34:38
Chernobyl just shouldn't00:34:39
the disaster made the world change00:34:42
look at some questions in00:34:44
in particular, ask if the same00:34:46
RBMK 1000 are some serious ones00:34:49
design flaws are real00:34:51
he still exploded, to say the least00:34:53
popular about a number of shortcomings of RBMK that they00:34:56
in that neutron flux could be dangerous00:34:59
increase If the content of the pair00:35:01
in the coolant in circulating water00:35:03
there is more inside the reactor00:35:05
one more provided for in the calculation00:35:07
the important conclusion is that in00:35:09
extreme situation injection rate00:35:12
neutron absorber rods in00:35:14
reactor core, which allows00:35:16
turned out to dampen the chain reaction00:35:18
insufficient, that is, these rods are simply00:35:20
did not manage to get to their post on time00:35:23
security now about the rods themselves, what are they00:35:26
simultaneous input did not exclude00:35:27
opportunity in water positive00:35:29
reactivity meant that in practice00:35:31
in a certain situation they not only00:35:34
stopped the chain reaction and vice versa00:35:36
accelerated it and connected It was with himself00:35:39
the design of the rods is not00:35:41
thought that the future explosion was hidden in00:35:43
some end areas of absorbing00:35:46
rods which are00:35:58
1988 the day after00:36:00
two years anniversary of the emergency accident took his life00:36:03
suicide outstanding Soviet00:36:05
scientific physical chemist, Lenin laureate00:36:08
USSR State Prize Academician Legasov suited him00:36:11
only fifty-second year Soviet00:36:13
people knew him well as a participant00:36:15
liquidation of emergency situations in the very first00:36:19
the most difficult days Apparently already thinking about00:36:21
death he worked on his notes in00:36:24
which was subjected to comprehension of this00:36:26
The tragedy of the legates was spoken unfortunately00:36:28
We don’t have enough books about Chernobyl00:36:31
all the lessons of what happened were analyzed00:36:33
he himself tried to fill in the gaps00:36:36
wrote slander on the tape recorder is in00:36:38
his notes and assessment of the state of nuclear00:36:41
reactors here are some statements on00:36:44
Scientific and Technical Council of the Institute00:36:46
the concept has been discussed quite often00:36:49
energy development but extremely rare00:36:51
technical aspects of the quality of this or00:36:54
different reactor fuel quality, however00:36:56
less formation that I had00:36:59
convinced that not everything is fine How do I00:37:02
seemed in the development of nuclear power00:37:03
energetics with the naked eye was00:37:06
it is clear that our devices are fundamentally00:37:08
differed little from Western ones, for example in00:37:10
its concept on some issues00:37:12
Even surpassing them but united00:37:15
good system management systems00:37:17
diagnostics american rossum dream00:37:20
conducted a nuclear safety analysis00:37:22
power plants where I consistently searched00:37:24
all sorts of sources of trouble00:37:26
leading to accidents systematized them00:37:29
VL probable assessments of one or another00:37:32
events assessing with what probability00:37:34
this event may lead to an exit00:37:37
let's say activity outside we found out00:37:40
from foreign sources I have not seen any00:37:42
one team in the Soviet Union00:37:44
who would bet a little competently00:37:47
and considered these issues most00:37:49
actively for nuclear safety00:37:51
energetics spoke to Sidorchenko00:37:53
the approach seemed serious to me, it was real00:37:55
knew the picture associated with the station with00:37:58
quality equipment manufacturing00:38:00
those troubles that sometimes00:38:03
met because the number of objects sharply00:38:05
the level of preparedness has increased00:38:07
involved in this process rather00:38:09
dropped around these questions00:38:11
Sidorchenko was the leader Unfortunately00:38:13
he didn't get enough support00:38:16
document each step was given with00:38:17
painful labor regarding the reactor00:38:20
RBMK was considered in Reactor KOV circles00:38:23
he was not considered bad00:38:25
security reasons from this point of view00:38:28
he even stood out during discussions in00:38:29
for the better, he was considered bad00:38:32
economic reasons for the most part00:38:34
fuel consumption for large capital00:38:37
costs on a non-industrial basis00:38:39
constructions bothered me as a chemist and00:38:42
that these devices contain a lot00:38:44
zirconium graphite water confused me and00:38:48
unusual in my opinion is not enough00:38:50
building protection systems that would00:38:52
acted in extreme situations00:38:54
only the operator could guide the rods00:38:56
emergency protection or automatically with00:38:58
feeding one of the sensors or manually00:39:01
other protection systems that would be00:39:03
independent from the operator which00:39:05
would work exclusively from00:39:06
there was no state of the device zone system00:39:09
control of the protection of this reactor was00:39:11
defective to a number of scientists this00:39:14
was known and they made a proposal00:39:16
how to remove this defect constructor Not00:39:19
not wanting quick extra work00:39:21
rushed to change the control system00:39:23
protection of what happened on the most00:39:25
Chernobyl station for years it00:39:28
conducting experiments program00:39:30
which was compiled extremely00:39:32
carelessly and carelessly before carrying out00:39:34
there were no experiments, no pranks00:39:36
possible situations It was real00:39:38
the first powerful voice that00:39:40
the public heard from the depths of that00:39:42
the most powerful department Where00:39:45
at one time and was theoretically and00:39:46
practically born collapsed during an emergency00:39:49
reactor according to this document you can00:39:51
make sure that among those who knew about00:39:53
the true state of affairs in nuclear00:39:55
there were industries and specialists00:39:58
doubting the quality of Chernobyl00:40:00
the device saw these imperfections00:40:02
some experts But their proposal00:40:04
to improve design quality00:40:06
control and maintenance of the apparatus were drowning00:40:09
in bureaucratic turmoil One more00:40:11
a very important point is that legas00:40:14
called two powers or even three powers00:40:17
which in his opinion In modern00:40:18
conditions is unacceptable the question is about00:40:21
that the scientific principles of creating a reactor00:40:23
his theory is being developed in one center00:40:26
and const in another in this case speech00:40:29
talks about the Institute of Atomic Energy named after00:40:31
Kurchatov where it was really created00:40:33
RBMK theory and research and00:40:36
Constructive Institute of Energy Engineering00:40:38
Where the device was designed as00:40:40
material reality first institute00:40:42
headed and was the author and active00:40:45
defender of the RBMK theory Anatoly00:40:47
Alexandrov, aka former president00:40:50
Academy of Sciences of the USSR is a real patriarch00:40:53
Soviet science Aleksandrov spoke about00:40:55
himself speaking at the plenum as an IPS in00:40:58
April00:40:59
1989 The fact is that I am 86 years old and not00:41:03
it's so easy to work at that age and00:41:06
the main thing is to do some things enough00:41:08
effective enough responsible00:41:10
which we should have done, comrades C00:41:13
30 years ago my active scientific career began00:41:15
activity and at the age of 30 I managed00:41:18
develop frost-resistant rubber to00:41:20
this time the plane could not land00:41:22
because the tire is synthetic00:41:24
fell apart like glass 19 in tt00:41:27
around the year I met the naval00:41:29
the fleet developed a defense system00:41:32
submarines from anti-submarine networks00:41:34
a little later in 1935 or thirty00:41:38
even an academician you can say my00:41:41
the main leader brought me to00:41:43
sailors and they put them in front of me00:41:45
task They say we are restoring00:41:47
Powerful navy00:41:49
we need a large fleet of the Soviet Union00:41:52
develop a way to protect ships from00:41:54
magnetic mines and torpedoes we started this00:41:57
the work must be said the work was very00:41:59
difficult but we completed it in time00:42:02
war, not a single ship is equipped with our00:42:04
protection system did not die from magnetic00:42:06
min Igor Valerievich Kurchatov was00:42:08
head of the laboratory at00:42:10
Institute of Physics and Technology but at the end00:42:12
1942 he was assigned work on00:42:15
creation of atomic weapons00:42:18
In 1943 I also joined this00:42:20
work was organized a little later00:42:23
first main directorate our current00:42:26
Kurchatovsky00:42:27
and I began working as a deputy00:42:29
He sent several Kurchatovs to us00:42:31
good physicists and theorists who us00:42:34
taught reactor theory because00:42:36
my specialty was different then I00:42:38
began working for Igor Vasilievich00:42:40
Kurchatov as his deputy00:42:42
Institute and until recently00:42:45
worked at the Institute of Atomic Energy and00:42:47
Then such misfortune came to me that00:42:49
I was elected president of the academy00:42:52
comrades, don't laugh, it's hard00:42:54
work and besides, I felt something00:42:56
take responsibility for work in the area00:42:58
nuclear technology is after all00:43:00
ended sadly And when it happened00:43:03
Chernobyl accident I count from this00:43:05
time and my life began to end and00:43:08
creative life I have no need to reproach myself00:43:10
for the work that I did along the line00:43:12
nuclear technology I participated in the creation00:43:15
a large group of reactors that solved00:43:17
military task of creating all the necessary00:43:20
components for atomic weapons these00:43:22
reactors have been operating for 30-40 years only00:43:25
now we start them As they say00:43:27
put out of business And here is Chernobyl00:43:29
the Chernobyl tragedy became00:43:31
Alexandrova's personal tragedy like him00:43:33
expressed from this time my life00:43:35
creative life began to end00:43:38
the old academician was deeply worried about00:43:40
what happened now is widespread00:43:42
names became known to the public00:43:44
scientists and specialists who objected00:43:47
against the construction of reactors of this00:43:48
type pointed them to constructive00:43:51
disadvantages were proposed in principle00:43:53
new approaches to improvement00:43:55
domestic reactor innovations However00:43:58
often deliberate secrecy of all00:44:00
work related to peaceful nuclear00:44:01
energy itself The atmosphere of suppression00:44:04
any dissent in that period which00:44:06
received the name of stagnation time00:44:09
allowed us to draw our temporary conclusions00:44:11
and make the necessary decisions on00:44:13
improving the safety of nuclear power plants00:44:16
among these scientists was Ivan Zhuru00:44:19
having worked at the Kurchatov Institute00:44:21
for more than 40 years he has achieved enough00:44:23
high rank awards doctor00:44:25
he demanded physical and mathematical sciences00:44:28
wrote letters to higher authorities00:44:30
the specialist approved all the reactors of this00:44:32
basically explosively dangerous00:44:34
I’ll quote part of one of the things he wrote00:44:36
letters with regret we have to admit that00:44:39
The Kurchatov spirit in the department is practically00:44:41
lost discussion00:44:57
no need to say because he is00:44:59
in the building where most00:45:01
employees no passes created by00:45:03
The situation cannot be conducive00:45:05
raising the scientific level and00:45:07
the efficiency of the department is the opposite00:45:09
it is fraught with all sorts of disadvantages00:45:12
this is what the situation was like But00:45:15
the most important thing is that she hasn’t even changed00:45:17
after the Chernobyl accident, so here is RBMK00:45:20
1000 officially enrolled in rank00:45:22
sinless with all their00:45:24
potential shortcomings were conveyed00:45:26
in your hands00:45:27
operationally how deep they are00:45:29
navigated the hidden areas until the hour X00:45:32
shortcomings of the device they service00:45:34
have the concerns of some scientists reached them?00:45:37
from the Kurchatov Institute response to00:45:39
these questions can, to a certain extent,00:45:41
provide excerpts from transcripts of court hearings00:45:44
over those responsible for the Chernobyl accident00:45:46
nuclear power plant workers tried00:45:49
for violating safety regulations00:45:51
expert addressing the defendant's ex00:45:54
Director of Emergency Situations Bryukhanov Don’t you know?00:45:56
RBMK character answer I'm not a physicist I couldn't00:45:59
know the judge Is such an accident possible00:46:02
project Bryukhanov No was not intended00:46:05
the biggest thing is a pipeline rupture00:46:07
with a diameter of 900 mm, defendant Kovalenko00:46:11
Tell me, was our enterprise00:46:13
explosive in which document is this00:46:15
recorded response not recorded00:46:17
defendant former chief emergency engineer00:46:19
Fomin made no mistakes by staff00:46:21
should have led to an accident if not00:46:24
design features of the RBMK defendant00:46:26
former deputy chief engineer of emergency situations00:46:28
second stage Dyatlov emergency protection00:46:30
instead of shutting down the reactor played a role00:46:33
sunk in And then everything happened due to00:46:35
positive effect of reactivity00:46:37
which as stated in the documents00:46:39
he shouldn't always be like this00:46:41
negative We had no distortion00:46:43
state of the neutron field Previously, I had00:46:46
dealing with reactors is a completely different physics00:46:48
defendant former emergency shift supervisor00:46:50
Rogozhkin I confirm the shortcomings00:46:53
reactor physics design I don't00:46:55
imagined that overclocking could lead to00:46:57
explosion is not in any of the textbooks00:47:00
that our reactors could explode00:47:02
Expert What is overclocking Rogozhkin overclocking00:47:05
- this is the melting of fuel Expert in00:47:07
throws up his hands in bewilderment answer00:47:10
completely unprofessional Rogozhkin00:47:12
continues it was not written down anywhere that00:47:14
when the minimum decreases, the reactor in the active00:47:17
zone becomes explosive I am 27 years old in00:47:20
nuclear industry went through everything00:47:22
Uranium graphite reactors and only now00:47:25
during the investigation I learned that we had exploded00:47:27
dangerous witness shift supervisor emergency dick00:47:30
Created locally in the reactor00:47:31
critical mass What served as acceleration00:47:34
fast neutrons broke the steam channels00:47:37
got into the reactor space00:47:39
broke the scheme and then it happened00:47:42
hydrogen explosion as concluded00:47:44
government commission guilty00:47:46
staff I don't agree with this judge00:47:48
interrupts, we didn’t invite you here00:47:51
expert on government findings00:47:53
Commission witness changes the topic but then00:47:55
returns was prepared for explosion00:47:58
previous operating time I00:48:00
I think that the staff did not know what was happening00:48:02
low power reactor00:48:05
goes into a nuclear hazardous state00:48:07
nowhere in the regulations did it say that00:48:09
when operating at low power reactor00:48:11
goes into a nuclear hazardous state00:48:14
nowhere in the regulations did it say that00:48:16
if there is at least pn in the core00:48:18
absorber rods then the apparatus00:48:20
goes into a nuclear hazardous state00:48:23
was the state prosecutor previously in00:48:25
the regulations recorded a decrease in stock00:48:27
reactivity of rods in the core00:48:29
less than five reactors must be stopped00:48:32
witness I forgot the old regulations00:48:34
now after the accident there is a new state prosecutor00:48:37
Yes, this is preparation throwing up its hands00:48:40
Expert, you said that in the reactor00:48:42
a local Crete mass arose if the facts00:48:45
confirming witness RBMK was00:48:48
designed outside of norms00:48:50
nuclear safety steam effect00:48:53
positive it led to overclocking00:48:55
there shouldn't be a reactor like this at all00:48:57
physics textbooks Expert if00:49:00
worked Lara would have created a Crete mass00:49:02
Witness Lara Short Regulating00:49:05
neutron flux rods have nothing to do with it00:49:07
they are on top of the active zone and not below00:49:10
the steam effect has always been in the reactor but00:49:12
when the rods went down they moved00:49:15
neutron field and Crete was created below00:49:17
mass Expert Why steam increased00:49:20
effect the witness could get into the air about00:49:22
I learned about the shortcomings of RBMK after the accident before00:49:25
accidents We worked in a constantly nuclear00:49:27
former witness in dangerous mode00:49:29
shift supervisor of the fourth power unit00:49:31
Emergency situation of the Cossacks, we didn’t know what would happen00:49:33
less than 15 reactivity rods per00:49:36
reactor reactor goes nuclear00:49:39
dangerous state state00:49:41
prosecutor could there be such00:49:43
consequences if the staff followed00:49:45
requirements of the regulations witness Apparently00:49:47
yes Even with regulations it could explode00:49:49
there is a positive steam effect even00:49:51
if the circuit depressurizes there would be an explosion00:49:54
what's the worst thing about our EU apparatus?00:49:56
if there is less water and more steam then00:49:58
the device overclocks even if00:50:01
the main circulation pumps were running00:50:03
according to the regulations, the probability of an explosion is not00:50:05
excluded Expert how do you know what00:50:07
the rods serve only to support00:50:09
neutron propagation coefficient00:50:11
A witness in the field said so Expert00:50:14
it means again according to rumors. Can you00:50:16
say that after working out the reasons00:50:18
accident, do you know its cause in detail?00:50:20
witness Yes, they sorted it out but completely00:50:23
no understanding I think it’s a reactor00:50:25
this type would explode sooner or later00:50:28
This is a volume positive reactor00:50:30
which no one in the world has used00:50:32
judge But the reactor worked for many00:50:34
years the witness is now at the reactor00:50:36
measures have been taken to ensure safety has become smaller00:50:38
positive steam effect00:50:40
reactivity and in the state in which00:50:42
there used to be emergency apparatus on Smolenskaya00:50:45
Kursk due to high steam00:50:47
coefficient of reactivity and absence00:50:49
there was a constant danger of restrictions00:50:51
explosion witness former secretary00:50:53
Party Committee for Emergency Sergei Pashin I00:50:56
I think that the entire foreign press will report00:50:58
the entire Soviet public after that00:51:00
the court finds out that he is at fault for the accident00:51:02
station staff staff are guilty but not00:51:05
on the scale we worked on nuclear00:51:07
dangerous reactors we did not know that we00:51:09
explosively dangerous witness one of00:51:11
creators of RBMK 1000 Pavlushin is like this00:51:14
the reactor can be operated and00:51:16
it's safe, just right00:51:17
exploit the regulations say that00:51:19
the device is usually negative00:51:21
steam reactivity coefficient But if00:51:24
if something positive arises, you have to accept it00:51:26
safety measures emergency system00:51:28
provides security as well as reset00:51:30
rods Az provides muffling00:51:32
Dyatlov reactor In which document were00:51:35
safety precautions are recorded00:51:37
positive effect witnesses in00:51:39
documents questions positive00:51:40
effects were made in special00:51:42
calculations, experts formulate their00:51:44
conclusions 2 days present some of them00:51:47
whether the court's question is confirmed by the position00:51:50
experts previously made conclusions00:51:52
government commission about the shortcomings00:51:54
reactor expert answer experts00:51:56
confirm the shortcomings first of all00:51:58
positive steam effect00:52:00
there was no reactivity00:52:02
stipulated how one should behave when00:52:04
in such a situation, operating personnel00:52:06
confirmed unsatisfactory00:52:08
protection control system designs00:52:10
But this could only lead to an accident if00:52:12
errors in the operation of the reactor operator00:52:15
personnel question whether the court provided00:52:17
Operating regulations for the reactor00:52:19
security typical expert answer00:52:21
regulations ensured safety that00:52:24
Regarding this accident, it’s not about that00:52:26
standard instructions A in violations00:52:28
personnel side question of the court Safe00:52:30
whether the reactor is the answer of experts, availability in00:52:33
active zone 26-3 rods compensates00:52:36
positive reactivity RBMK reactors00:52:39
can be considered safe00:52:42
question of the court Why in the documents of the main00:52:44
RBMK designers are not00:52:46
there was a physical and technical justification00:52:49
inability to work in hot weather00:52:51
device power less than 750 mW or less00:52:54
15p rods in the core answer00:52:57
experts these explanations are not necessary otherwise00:52:59
regulations swollen no it is assumed that00:53:01
the staff is competent and knows everything but00:53:04
Now the regulations include a provision on00:53:06
nuclear danger regimes, the question of the court in00:53:09
what documents contain the prohibition?00:53:11
remove the rods from the core answer00:53:13
experts' main document on the minimum00:53:16
number of rods typical00:53:17
technological operating regulations00:53:19
RBMK writes there that if in the zone there is less00:53:22
fifteen rods then the reactor should00:53:24
be muted question00:53:27
did the reactor meet the requirements?00:53:29
nuclear safety expert answer yes00:53:32
all design solutions have complete00:53:34
accident protection on00:53:40
happened as follows: accident at00:53:44
The emergency is classified as unlikely00:53:47
means that the cause of the tragedy00:53:49
an almost impossible coincidence appeared00:53:51
violations of operating rules00:53:53
power unit approved by its operator00:53:55
person and as a result a situation arose00:53:58
in which they played their fatal role00:54:01
some inherent in the design itself00:54:03
RBMK 1000 dangerous features the path to00:54:06
such an official conclusion where00:54:07
The root cause of the accident is still considered00:54:10
people's behavior turned out to be difficult00:54:12
note that the investigation into the causes00:54:14
the disaster began literally in the first00:54:16
the hours after what happened then were00:54:19
readings from numerous instruments were taken00:54:21
collected paper tapes with graphs00:54:23
automatic recorders taken out00:54:25
Magnetic tapes of duty officer's conversations00:54:27
personnel collected the remaining magazines where00:54:30
noted the order of actions of people in00:54:33
the period of development of the accident as a whole00:54:35
there were enough researchers00:54:37
serious material for analysis which00:54:39
they have done all this work already 2600:54:42
April00:54:43
1986 began to implement00:54:45
government liquidation commission00:54:47
accidents and also attracted00:54:49
State Committee on00:54:51
use of atomic energy in the USSR00:54:53
specialists in the work of studying the causes00:54:55
the accident involved leading Soviet00:54:57
specialists scientists What is the main00:55:00
feature of what happened during the emergency Like00:55:02
any technology reactor perpetual motion machine00:55:05
is not from time to time it is necessary00:55:07
stop inspect do00:55:10
prevention replace something strengthen00:55:12
That is, after some time, any00:55:14
nuclear apparatus requires shutdown What00:55:17
is done according to a pre-designed00:55:19
schedule here is the fourth power unit of the emergency situation00:55:22
supposed to be shut down at the end of April00:55:24
more precisely the twenty-third00:55:26
the reactor feeds into the country's electrical grids00:55:29
neither more nor less, but daily 24 million00:55:32
kilowatt-hours00:55:34
electricity which is often simply not00:55:36
enough And so as not to unexpectedly deliver00:55:39
in the difficult situation of industrial00:55:41
agricultural enterprises00:55:43
municipal services of cities and towns00:55:45
the power plant management must00:55:47
obtain permission in advance00:55:49
shutdown of the reactor at the united dispatcher00:55:51
energy systems And they have their own problems and00:55:54
They often say wait no00:55:56
turn on there is not enough energy in the networks00:55:59
special difficulties arise if the solution00:56:01
o Stopping a large power unit was00:56:04
accepted during the day on weekdays when everything00:56:06
enterprises are operating at full capacity00:56:09
it was precisely this dependence that we fell into00:56:11
Emergency Situations somehow agreed to shut down the reactor00:56:14
on the day of April 25th there is a weekend ahead in00:56:17
Friday there are still more needs00:56:19
in electricity all factories factories00:56:22
act intensively for leadership00:56:24
nuclear power plant moment but power unit00:56:27
primarily its nuclear installation as00:56:30
the rule is also associated with additional00:56:32
worries at this time are often carried out00:56:34
various studies experiments about00:56:37
they are trying new technical solutions after all00:56:40
the power unit seems to be freed from its00:56:42
don't have any direct responsibilities00:56:44
power grid and completely goes into00:56:47
conducting nuclear power plant specialists this time too00:56:49
before shutting down the reactor manual00:56:51
Chernobyl nuclear power plant00:56:54
planned some experiment00:56:56
research for which00:56:59
telegram from different cities of Ukraine00:57:01
two groups of specialists were called00:57:04
Let's briefly describe what was planned00:57:06
first of all, these were tests of one00:57:08
from turbogenerators in speaking mode00:57:10
in the language of professionals, run out of load00:57:13
own needs of the block What does this mean00:57:16
the question asked was very interesting00:57:18
some foreign correspondents00:57:20
covering the Chernobyl events And that's what00:57:23
for example, foreign readers learned00:57:25
Poko with the message he spread00:57:28
via wire agency journalist00:57:30
Heckman an experiment was carried out that night00:57:32
a completely closed type here is clearly the author00:57:35
disingenuous, especially since he was in Chernobyl00:57:37
could, if desired, obtain the necessary00:57:39
we will do the explanations ourselves now00:57:41
the concept of coasting is secret only00:57:44
for non-professionals, the essence of the experiment00:57:46
is to simulate an emergency00:57:48
situations when a turbogenerator machine for00:57:51
electricity generation may remain00:57:54
without its driving force, that is, without00:57:56
steam supply from the reactor is lost00:57:58
ability to generate electricity A00:58:01
at the power plant during this period00:58:02
for some reason absent00:58:04
constant power supply from the network for00:58:07
such a case is being developed00:58:09
special mode mode runs out00:58:11
just for about 40 seconds at that time00:58:14
the period when work is included00:58:15
backup diesel generators available00:58:18
on each speaker thus the coast-down00:58:20
relates to security systems more00:58:23
Moreover, it is included in the project itself00:58:25
Energy blo Therefore upon delivery00:58:27
fourth power unit into operation00:58:30
corresponding frequency converter00:58:32
current and all necessary equipment00:58:34
needed to be mounted and it should00:58:37
was standing still but didn't stand still00:58:39
state commission leadership00:58:42
stations received the fourth power unit00:58:44
this system is now in operation00:58:47
corrected the situation and invented what00:58:49
the creators should have done it earlier00:58:52
electric generator This is one of the tasks00:58:54
which was scheduled to be resolved on April 2500:58:57
during shutdown of the fourth reactor but00:59:00
there was another one at the fourth power unit00:59:03
installed like on others, two00:59:05
turbogenerator number se and eight00:59:07
The last of them belonged to the new00:59:09
modification was considered experimental00:59:12
in certain modes he started00:59:14
vibrating is a very unpleasant phenomenon00:59:17
when operating turbogenerators00:59:19
which often requires them to stop00:59:21
why did the emergency management call00:59:23
specialists from the Kharkov Turbine Plant00:59:25
plant00:59:26
manufacturer of turbogenerators in order to00:59:29
so that they, together with the station staff00:59:31
spent00:59:41
carry out vibroizol but not at all00:59:43
it was necessary to plan them for one00:59:45
time since they were significantly different00:59:48
according to test methods00:59:50
Let's repeat the leadership of the emergency situation and the united00:59:53
energy systems have come to an agreement00:59:55
decision to stop the fourth00:59:57
power unit of a nuclear power plant during the day01:00:00
25th of April01:00:03
1986 it was planned01:00:06
conduct a run-down study and01:00:08
turbogenerator vibration true concept01:00:11
research is rather more suitable for01:00:13
the second type of planned work because01:00:15
specialists had to practically01:00:17
find out whether the generator can when it01:00:20
The rotor rotates only by inertia, losing01:00:22
the speed after turning off the steam is sufficient01:00:24
reliably power motors with electricity01:00:27
main circulation pumps task on01:00:29
at first glance it seemed clean01:00:31
electrical engineering so we approached it01:00:34
That's how it was carried out. That's why01:00:36
The person responsible for this experiment was01:00:39
electrical shop emergency developer of the entire system01:00:42
running out to introduce a third party01:00:45
Don Tekhenergo from the city of Gorlovka also01:00:48
located in Ukraine in March01:00:50
eighty six years old has been coming to the station01:00:53
senior engineer Don Techenergo Gennady01:00:55
Metlenkova01:00:59
you need to create a program01:01:01
tests describe Who exactly for what01:01:04
will be responsible to determine the order01:01:06
organization of the experiment action schedule01:01:09
of its participants it’s all traditional01:01:11
fell on Metlenkov's shoulders01:01:19
and the nuclear power plant workers seemed to move into his01:01:22
subordination senior brigade engineer01:01:24
promptly compiled a draft program and01:01:27
giving his team the task of cooking01:01:29
completed the technical part of the planned work01:01:31
to Gorlovka to finalize some reports01:01:34
he returned to Pripyat on April 1401:01:37
started preparing for tests01:01:39
about two weeks left01:01:41
Metlenkov's subordinates01:01:43
the program was printed and agreed with01:01:46
Deputy Head of the Electrical Shop01:01:48
head of the turbine shop and with01:01:50
head of the Chernobyl site01:01:52
association smolenskenergo adjustment decay01:01:56
continued the work he started, he met with01:01:58
Head of Reactor Shop No. D01:02:00
Kovalenko Deputy Chief Engineer01:02:02
Dyatlov but all practical01:02:04
organizational work still lay01:02:06
the epic continued on it for almost 7 years01:02:09
carrying out a run-down test01:02:11
Lenko at the nuclear power plant were already accustomed to believing that he01:02:14
knows everything here and understands everything here and01:02:17
there was a serious error in the program01:02:19
could not be considered only electric01:02:22
in fact, it is closely linked with01:02:24
the work of the rector himself the same main01:02:27
circulating feed pumps01:02:29
which had to be connected to01:02:31
unverified sources01:02:33
power supply runs out during01:02:36
continued to act and provide01:02:38
hot reactor with cooling water01:02:41
there were also a number of very serious dependencies01:02:43
between electrical engineering tasks01:02:46
experiment and reactor operation by others01:02:48
in words, an experiment carried out by the most01:02:51
directly affected the safety01:02:53
operation of a nuclear apparatus is01:02:56
I may well not know or misunderstand01:02:58
electrician Metlenkova01:02:59
emergency managers should have known01:03:03
knew other things of this kind01:03:05
experiments of their program can be01:03:07
implement only after agreement with01:03:09
chief scientific supervisor01:03:11
designer chief designer01:03:13
RBMK 1000 and State Atomenergo Supervision of the USSR01:03:17
and this is not just a wish, it is unshakable01:03:20
rule operating law01:03:22
the station itself already needed01:03:24
approval of the program by the nuclear department01:03:26
security who oversees01:03:28
Deputy Chief Engineer for Science and01:03:31
finally copies of such test programs01:03:34
must apply for preliminary01:03:36
studies on the workplace of all01:03:38
performers Now we are bitter01:03:40
we state neither with the designers nor with01:03:43
designers from State Atomenergo01:03:45
no one tried to supervise the program01:03:48
they didn’t discuss it in the department either01:03:50
nuclear safety of Chernobyl01:03:52
nuclear power plant but we will provide01:03:54
word from management and01:03:57
specialists from those who carried01:03:59
responsibility for emergency safety A01:04:01
also to the participants of the experiment the director01:04:03
Chernobyl nuclear power plant01:04:05
Bryukhanov I knew that there would be repairs01:04:07
reactor but usual about the program01:04:09
tests I didn’t know I didn’t see her If01:04:12
If I had known, I would certainly have agreed on it01:04:15
Chief Emergency Engineer Fomin initiated01:04:17
the experiment was an electrical shop for him01:04:20
mode01:04:22
runs out. So we had to infiltrate01:04:25
inspectors made a comment that it was not there01:04:28
Deputy Chief Engineer for01:04:30
operation of the second stage of emergency situation Dyatlov01:04:32
coasting is a design decision; it is necessary01:04:35
it was necessary to complete such tests01:04:37
were carried out and had not been seen before01:04:39
what reasons were there to doubt01:04:41
the need to carry them out After all, we have already01:04:44
checked the blocks while running at idle01:04:46
they met the design requirements and01:04:48
after those tests, chief engineer01:04:51
signed a technical decision to put into operation01:04:53
temporary operation of the run-down unit we01:04:56
dontech energy studied in detail01:04:57
the electrical part of the program and me01:04:59
asked Metlenkov for it with other workshops01:05:03
We didn’t discuss the mechanical part with him01:05:05
then someone took this program to01:05:07
signatures to Fomin Fomin it came to me01:05:10
in the usual way by mail through the secretary01:05:13
Anatoly Dyatlov I told Fomin that01:05:15
program Not agreed upon01:05:17
production and technical reacted01:05:20
the department had to monitor01:05:21
correct release of the program so that01:05:24
those who need to familiarize themselves with it01:05:26
head of reactor shop number d01:05:28
Kovalenko brought me the test program01:05:31
for Metlenkov's signature01:05:34
I stood at the door and asked to hurry up, I didn’t01:05:38
I knew that in addition to running out there was also vibration01:05:40
research shift supervisor for emergencies Rogozhkin01:05:43
programs at my workplace01:05:45
there were no tests, I didn’t see her, I wasn’t01:05:47
is even involved in this program01:05:49
state nuclear inspector01:05:51
safety of the State Atomenergo Supervision01:05:53
USSR in emergency situations01:05:56
Personally, I was on block account number 401:05:59
on the morning of April 24 there was no program there01:06:02
she appeared only on April 25 But on this01:06:05
day I was away I was on01:06:07
medical examination at the clinic In addition01:06:10
presence of a gosatomicnadzor inspector01:06:12
tests by our rules are not01:06:14
senior brigade engineer provided01:06:16
Don Tekhenergo Metlenkova01:06:19
April 2016 we approved the program I01:06:23
I smashed a copy of it myself onto block boards01:06:26
number 1 and 2 and also in01:06:28
production and technical department and 2401:06:31
April we already clearly knew that the tests01:06:33
will be held on April 25 starting at 12:00 at night01:06:37
the program for the experiment was allocated 401:06:39
for hours we talked at meetings that when01:06:42
during our tests the reactor must be shut down01:06:45
all technical points related to nuclear power plants in01:06:47
the program was written by the station workers themselves01:06:50
Deputy Chief Engineer of Emergency Situations Lyutov I01:06:53
I didn’t know about these tests but what01:06:55
I knew the agreement with Tekhenergo01:06:58
Metlenkova01:07:07
there was no design solution for coasting01:07:09
I also explain that all the previous01:07:11
experiment for a week I was in training01:07:14
officer training and showed up at work01:07:16
after 16:00 on April 25th so here it is01:07:20
This is what the organization procedure looked like01:07:23
experiment it is obvious what to do with it01:07:25
treated like just another one enough01:07:27
an ordinary event that does not require01:07:30
special attention and what happened01:07:32
the program did not provide for01:07:35
there are no nuclear safety measures01:07:37
determined that during the tests themselves01:07:40
must necessarily01:07:41
representatives of the department will be present01:07:43
Nuclear Safety and Inspector01:07:46
gosatomicnadzor01:07:47
as it turns out, they didn’t know about it at all01:07:50
upcoming events on the fourth01:07:52
power unit And it’s not at all clear why01:07:55
serious experiments were not reported01:07:57
the director of the AS cannot fail to note that01:08:00
the fact that some are responsible01:08:02
nuclear power plant workers at the very01:08:04
responsible time could have been where01:08:06
anything but at the nuclear epicenter01:08:09
dangerous events they are there all day01:08:11
at the clinic without showing up at all01:08:13
territory of the nuclear power plant where complex01:08:16
the work of another on whose shoulder01:08:18
entrusted with all scientific justification for01:08:20
making important decisions somewhere01:08:22
improved his officer skills01:08:24
representative01:08:25
production and technical department01:08:27
who had to check correctly01:08:29
drawing up and coordination of the program01:08:31
experiment to multiply them and send them out01:08:34
all services the chief is away01:08:36
emergency engineer received the program through01:08:39
his secretary formally approves it01:08:41
the boss does the same with his signature01:08:44
reactor shop number 2 Kovalenko On01:08:46
by the way it's not even on the list01:08:48
responsible persons present at01:08:50
carrying out hazardous work accordingly01:08:52
Was absent from testing in this way01:08:55
All organizational work is underway01:08:57
outside electrical engineer01:08:59
organization is decay it is01:09:02
he delivers the program for signature01:09:04
in different offices without looking at the01:09:07
Some of them where you need to go01:09:09
First of all, these are offices01:09:11
nuclear safety specialists in01:09:13
as a result, the program included01:09:15
provisions that were grossly violated01:09:17
existing operating rules for nuclear power plants01:09:20
for example, the document required disabling01:09:22
automatic cooling systems01:09:24
reactor What is strictly prohibited01:09:27
the program provided for connection to01:09:29
operation of two reserve main01:09:31
circulation pumps what could01:09:33
influence the speed and nature of movement01:09:35
water inside the reactor is also01:09:37
unacceptable program sanctioned01:09:40
installation of additional electrical01:09:42
diagram in the automatic control system01:09:44
for reactor safety the so-called01:09:47
maximum design basis accident button MPa01:09:50
which imitated a break with its signal01:09:52
pipeline with a diameter of 900 m was introduced01:09:56
the mode ran out of the main systems01:09:59
security in general amateur activities01:10:02
which the station workers themselves without01:10:03
agreement with nuclear designers01:10:05
the apparatus simply did not have the right to allow01:10:08
there turned out to be plenty. But in01:10:11
some were not recorded in the program01:10:12
the most important requirements first01:10:15
the experiment could only be carried out with01:10:17
shut down reactor with remaining steam01:10:20
they did that before, but not this time01:10:22
made it legal to speak out after the accident01:10:24
what not but there is one here01:10:26
fundamental point: what to do with it?01:10:29
couples who remain unemployed after01:10:31
shutdowns01:10:32
turbogenerator is of course not all violations01:10:35
programs were the direct cause of the accident01:10:37
neither turning off the sar nor the MPa button directly on01:10:41
its development was not affected by the program01:10:43
That’s why it requires such work01:10:45
most thorough01:10:48
levels because it must guarantee01:10:51
complete safety of an emergency situation01:10:54
when conducting experiments related to01:10:57
functioning of the nuclear apparatus 8:0001:11:00
During an emergency there was a mandatory shift change01:11:03
personnel and general station01:11:05
conference call where they sum up01:11:07
the results of the work determine the state01:11:10
stations at that time it was reported that01:11:12
reactor of the fourth power unit01:11:14
operated by stock rod01:11:16
absorbers 13.2 with permissible and then01:11:20
only with the permission of the chief engineer01:11:22
station stock not less than petit rod01:11:25
operating rules strictly01:11:27
demand an urgent shutdown of nuclear01:11:29
apparatus in such a situation but the main one01:11:32
the engineer who conducted this meeting01:11:34
he said that he would sort it out01:11:37
but in general I quietly removed it from the agenda01:11:39
question about Stop for Reactor Health01:11:42
In this case, we could trace01:11:44
inspectors gosatomicnadzor but as already01:11:47
it was said that they were absent from the nuclear power plant01:11:50
because they checked personal health in01:11:52
city clinic and program01:11:54
The experiment was already performed on April 2501:11:57
eighty-six situation01:11:59
developed as follows 1:0001:12:02
According to the schedule for shutting down the reactor at01:12:05
scheduled preventive maintenance01:12:06
personnel began to reduce power01:12:08
device that previously worked on01:12:11
thermal power of about 3,000 MW 130501:12:15
at a thermal power of 1,600 mW switched off01:12:18
from the network turbogenerator number seven01:12:20
part of the fourth system01:12:22
power unit own power supply01:12:24
needs were transferred to turbogenerator number 801:12:27
14:00 according to the program01:12:30
tests the emergency system is switched off01:12:32
reactor cooling it is assumed that01:12:34
experiments will begin and the reactor will be01:12:37
shut down from Ukrainian power plants01:12:40
there was a shutdown of the power unit in the networks01:12:42
electricity shortage and dispatcher from01:12:45
the center does not allow me to stop01:12:46
Chernobyl power unit he continues01:12:48
operate at reduced power01:12:51
without an important security system Dyatlov01:12:54
appointed chief engineer of station F01:12:56
named senior for conducting tests01:12:58
and the reactor shutdown waited after that01:13:00
2 more hours and went home to rest01:13:03
he will be back by midnight 14:0001:13:06
there is a shift change on the block01:13:08
operational staff shift supervisor01:13:10
Cossacks handed over his powers three times01:13:13
who with his team actually01:13:15
and prepared for the test01:13:17
core reactor safety system01:13:20
sar was brought out under Cossacks, he understood01:13:23
that this shouldn’t be done, but that’s how it happened01:13:25
written in the program However, he suggested01:13:27
still leave Dyatlov in action01:13:29
First second emergency subsystem01:13:31
cooling and block only the third but01:13:34
Dyatlov gave the order to remove the saur01:13:37
the shift manager doesn't argue at all01:13:39
began to work together with Triguba01:13:42
emergency shift supervisor Dick at his work01:13:44
I didn’t find the place where the program was01:13:47
Only on the fourth control01:13:49
power unit Having learned about the shutdown of sar knowing01:13:52
it's not safe to do this, he's half a couple01:13:55
the power unit saw what was included in01:13:57
approved test program and01:13:59
he did not cancel the order of the chief engineer01:14:02
dared trigub while accepting the post discovered01:14:05
at the workplace of the unit shift supervisor01:14:07
three run-down test programs at once01:14:09
By01:14:17
vibroizol continued more reliable01:14:19
decommissioning of the sar system and01:14:22
We were waiting for the dispatcher from the center to arrive01:14:24
will give permission to shut down the reactor01:14:27
requested every 2 hours However, in response01:14:30
sounded no In this case it was required01:14:32
turn on the emergency system again01:14:34
cooling but it took hours01:14:36
four thought and decided to leave everything01:14:39
as it is about 20 hours TSU true01:14:42
called Dyatlov at home and asked what01:14:44
do he replied wait without him01:14:46
do not start any operations on the block01:14:49
somewhere after that Fomin called01:14:51
I was wondering how things are going with you 231001:14:54
finally received permission to01:14:56
reactor shutdown Dyatlov has not yet arrived 2401:14:59
hour change of shift again management01:15:01
now took over the power unit01:15:03
shift supervisor Alexander Akimov Sr.01:15:06
reactor control engineer Leonid01:15:08
Toptunov A in the place of the shift supervisor01:15:10
now Boris Rogozhkin has become on his desk01:15:13
the test program never appeared01:15:15
he inquired about her from Akimov by telephone01:15:18
the reactor was operating at power at that time01:15:20
760 mgW thermal then Dyatlov came up01:15:24
Rashkin trusted this leader and therefore01:15:27
was calm about the fourth power unit01:15:29
showed that there was something special going on there01:15:31
attention at the same time, it is there under01:15:34
Events are brewing under Dyatlov's leadership01:15:37
Later they will be restored with01:15:39
Accurate to the second This is the picture01:15:42
chronicle of the birth of the largest in history01:15:44
civilized world accident during descent01:15:47
reactor power unknown By whose01:15:50
initiative up to 200 MW trampler operator01:15:53
I couldn't control it, I need to explain01:15:55
that absorbent rods can01:15:58
manage everything at once or in parts01:16:00
groups In a number of operating modes01:16:03
reactor becomes necessary01:16:05
switch or disable control01:16:07
local groups of tramplers could not01:16:10
quickly enough to eliminate the emerging01:16:12
imbalance in the regulation system A in01:16:14
As a result, the reactor power dropped01:16:17
to zero. In such cases, the device must01:16:19
jammed but the staff didn't take it into account01:16:21
demand began unknown by whose01:16:24
initiative to increase power at 1:00 already 2601:16:28
April the staff finally managed to raise01:16:30
reactor power and stabilize it01:16:33
at 200 MW instead of 1,00001:16:36
included in the test program in 1 0301:16:38
and at 07 to six working main01:16:41
circulation pump optional01:16:43
connect two more to increase01:16:45
Reliability of core cooling01:16:47
device after testing total consumption01:16:50
water through the reactor increased to 60,00001:16:53
cube of HF at a rate of 45,000 What is01:16:57
gross violation of regulations01:16:59
operation In this mode, the pumps01:17:01
may disrupt the water supply01:17:03
occurrence of circuit vibrations01:17:05
due to strong boiling of water01:17:07
preparations for water hammer have begun01:17:10
experiment hour 20 minutes rods01:17:12
automatic regulation went out of order01:17:15
core to the upper limit switches and01:17:17
the operator even helped this with help01:17:19
manual control was the only way to do it01:17:21
keep the device power at 20001:17:24
thermal wool But at what cost01:17:27
violations of the strictest ban on working for01:17:29
reactor without a certain reserve01:17:31
neutron absorber rods hour 2201:17:34
minutes 30 seconds according to printout01:17:37
rapid assessment programs01:17:38
reactivity in the core was01:17:41
total -8 rods this value is approximately01:17:44
half the maximum permissible and01:17:46
again the reactor needed to be shut down 101:17:48
hour 23 minutes 4 seconds operator closed01:17:52
turbo generator stop valve number01:17:55
eight the steam supply to it stopped01:17:57
the shutdown mode has started01:18:00
the turbogenerator should have worked01:18:02
another automatic protection and01:18:04
stop the reactor it shouldn't work01:18:07
when two turbogenerators are turned off01:18:08
However, the staff knowing this in advance01:18:11
blocked the protection so that apparently01:18:13
be able to repeat the test01:18:16
if First Try fails situation01:18:19
resulting from01:18:20
unregulated01:18:24
carrier into such a state when even01:18:27
a small change in power leads to01:18:29
increasing the volume of steam content in01:18:31
many times greater than at nominal01:18:34
power growth of volumetric steam content01:18:37
caused the emergence of a positive01:18:38
reactivity neutrons accelerated their01:18:41
movement hour 2340 seconds shift supervisor01:18:44
fourth power unit realizing the danger01:18:46
situation gave a command to the senior engineer01:18:49
reactor control press the button itself01:18:51
effective emergency protection for Az-501:18:53
the rods went down, squeezing out01:18:55
displacer located at the ends01:18:58
water from the canals and then the operator saw01:19:00
that the absorbers stopped then he01:19:02
de-energized the servo clutches to01:19:05
rods fell into the core under01:19:07
by the action of its own gravity but01:19:09
most of the absorbers remained01:19:11
in the upper half of the core01:19:13
total water flow through the reactor01:19:15
began to fall due to the fact that everything is up01:19:18
worked from running out of their turbogenerator01:19:21
shaking observed by Khodemchuk total01:19:23
positive reactivity in active01:19:25
zone as a result of a sharp decline01:19:27
cooling water flow through the reactor01:19:29
due to the weakening of those working from the system01:19:32
ran out to grow there was a rise in temperature through01:19:35
3 seconds After pressing the power button01:19:38
reactor water consumption exceeded 530 MW01:19:41
decreased even more with increasing pressure in01:19:43
reactor valves slammed shut and01:19:46
the water supply through the01:19:49
the core pressure increased with01:19:51
at a speed of 15 atmospheres per second, here is the rod01:19:54
with the created field distribution01:19:56
neutrons at the height of the reactor turned out to be01:19:58
the explosion occurred ineffectively01:20:01
way the staff's desire despite01:20:03
what to do the experiment on entered into01:20:05
contradiction with the requirement of the regulations01:20:08
operational reactor operation01:20:10
emergency personnel allowed themselves to deviate from01:20:12
normal April 25 and 2601:20:16
1986 they were admitted to six01:20:20
the grossest first reduction in operational01:20:24
reactivity pass, that is, a decrease01:20:26
number of absorber rods in01:20:28
reactor core below permissible01:20:30
second magnitude in case of unexpected failure01:20:33
power the reactor was not stopped and01:20:36
continued to work with less01:20:38
provided by the test program01:20:40
thermal power level third01:20:43
connecting all eight heads to the reactor01:20:45
circulation pumps with excess01:20:47
expenses for individual state prices established01:20:49
the regulations included this error in01:20:52
the test program itself is fourth01:20:54
blocking reactor protection by signal01:20:56
shutting off steam from two turbogenerators01:20:59
fifth blocking device protection by01:21:01
water level and pressure in the drum01:21:04
separator sixth system shutdown01:21:07
protection provided in case01:21:08
occurrence of an accident and all this was done01:21:11
I justify myself with people because of their consciousness01:21:13
met with resistance from01:21:15
emergency management person on such an important01:21:18
site like a nuclear power plant01:21:20
First of all, you yourself must be a guarantor01:21:23
security like What are these people like?01:21:26
Of course, after the accident a lot was said about01:21:28
we'll give you some01:21:30
characteristics expressed in the official01:21:32
situation about the director of emergency situations Bryukhanov01:21:35
Bryukhanov’s character did not suit him01:21:37
the position of director was not firm but 1501:21:39
years at the station It always seemed to me that01:21:42
he finds it hard to work amazed by this01:21:44
an outstanding engineer and a good friend01:21:47
the teacher may not be tough enough01:21:49
knew how to withstand pressure from others01:21:51
Steinberg didn't say hello to people01:21:54
weak character missed work with personnel01:21:57
Dyatlov is a mistake by Bryukhanov Simonenko01:22:00
about the chief emergency engineer Fomina electrician01:22:03
specialty Fomin took courses01:22:05
advanced training in Obninsk A I01:22:07
accepted his diploma defense from them01:22:09
the work turned out to be the most interesting01:22:12
even singled her out as the best among01:22:14
other studies dealt with it01:22:17
analysis of the security level at these01:22:19
most power units with RBMK in which it01:22:22
revealed a lot of shortcomings, that is, from the point of view01:22:25
safety perspective Fomin01:22:27
knew the blocks well but he had not yet taken the course01:22:29
was the chief emergency engineer and when there01:22:32
a vacancy appeared01:22:33
were confidently recommended by him01:22:36
personal shortcomings in particular he01:22:38
I always imagined myself as a director01:22:40
As soon as Bryukhanov left,01:22:42
he sat in his office and directed01:22:44
like director Ignatenko at the end01:22:47
1985 Fomin gets into01:22:50
car accident breaks spine01:22:52
long-term paralysis of the collapse of hopes but01:22:55
the powerful body coped with the disease and01:22:57
Fomin returned to work on March 2501:23:01
1986, a month before Chernobyl01:23:04
explosion, he did a great job in all his appearance01:23:06
there was some kind of lethargy01:23:08
Medvedev A Deputy Chief Engineer01:23:10
for operation of the second stage of emergency situation Dyatlov01:23:13
Dyatlov was the most competent physicist in the world01:23:15
our station his authority01:23:24
man sometimes he had arrogance01:23:27
features But this was justified by the fact that he01:23:29
was two heads taller than everyone else01:23:31
nuclear power plant workers but Dyatlov man01:23:33
mood of the Cossacks I had a conversation with01:23:36
Dyatlov I knew that he was exclusively01:23:38
specialist but he's not doing well01:23:40
relationships with people offered him01:23:43
he did not agree to become the head of the block01:23:45
parasha Dyatlov rude hard subordinates01:23:49
they were afraid of him, my belief is that if not01:23:51
Dyatlov, the accident would not have happened, carpenter01:23:54
strategic mistake in appointing Dyatlov01:23:57
he is a rude person in terms of business skills01:23:59
was a specialist but didn’t understand much01:24:01
the design of the block related to people01:24:04
dismissively Simonenko I said01:24:06
Bryukhanova what to take Dyatlov on01:24:08
position of head of the reactor department01:24:10
he will not be able to control the operators01:24:12
difficult not only due to character01:24:15
he clearly did not master the art of communication, but01:24:17
and based on the experience of previous work, purely01:24:19
atomic technology physicist does not know after01:24:22
my departure, Bryukhanov moved Dyatlov to01:24:24
head of the reactor department and then01:24:27
made deputy chief engineer for01:24:29
operation of the second stage of the nuclear power plant01:24:31
Apparently there was no station in it01:24:34
sufficiently developed necessary01:24:36
caution and sense of danger so01:24:38
needed by the head of nuclear operators01:24:41
But disrespect for operators and01:24:43
technological regulations at least01:24:45
more than enough Medvedev And emergency shift supervisors01:24:48
matting no special assessments about01:24:50
it didn't sound good01:24:53
worked as an employee worked in a nuclear power plant01:24:56
industry, the shift he leads01:24:58
was considered one of the best during emergencies01:25:00
has repeatedly won01:25:01
socialist competition about01:25:03
shift supervisor of the fourth block01:25:05
Akimov He died as a result of an acute01:25:08
radiation sickness in May01:25:10
1986, his character is such that01:25:13
adhered to Orlenko's regulations01:25:15
Toptunov and Akimov are a mistake Both without01:25:18
experience in Zarkovsky Akimov is literate01:25:21
Simonenko about senior management engineer01:25:23
reactor of the Toptun power unit died in01:25:26
as a result of acute radiation sickness01:25:28
in May01:25:29
1986 Toptunov was not prepared for01:25:33
post some slowness01:25:35
Simonenko toptunov siur weak reeds01:25:38
of course in the night experiment in his01:25:40
much more was involved in the preparation01:25:42
people but about these emergency workers in connection with01:25:45
The Chernobyl accident has been spoken and written about01:25:48
Most often it is their behavior01:25:50
predetermined the outcome of events leaked into01:25:52
Single explosive node abacus theorists01:25:55
nuclear apparatus designers and technical01:25:57
who helped them with their actions01:25:59
turning into Grozny radiation01:26:01
hurricane neither Dyatlov nor Rogozhkin are guilty01:26:04
They didn’t admit themselves if it wasn’t Dyatlov who is to blame01:26:06
then Akimov or Toptunov is very01:26:08
it is important to know whether siur himself started01:26:11
increase the power of the device After it01:26:12
the failure was either the initiator01:26:14
deputy chief engineer himself01:26:16
Akimov made dangerous decisions or01:26:19
was under the influence of personality01:26:21
Dyatlov can answer these and other questions01:26:23
it would be possible to find answers from the entries in01:26:25
operational log of the fourth shift01:26:27
power unit where everyone is recorded01:26:29
decisions made and actions taken01:26:32
him actions but log after the accident01:26:34
disappeared, the ceilings sagged and straightened01:26:37
calmed down after a slight trembling of the walls01:26:39
the electric light blinked and flashed under01:26:42
the wreckage of the collapsed premises of the main01:26:44
reactor circulation pumps01:26:46
department of the fourth power unit died01:26:49
or the operator died painfully01:26:51
Valery Khodemchuk, almost mad with pain01:26:54
crawled along the long corridor of the nuclear power plant01:26:56
station another main operator01:26:58
circulation pumps dictate01:27:01
the open reactor threw out fragments01:27:03
similar to fireworks that replaced it then01:27:06
a quiet bluish-orange glow01:27:09
heavy ones were flying in all directions01:27:10
metal cylinders with compressed ozone01:27:13
which were intended to be pushed out01:27:15
water into the reactor using the saur system in case01:27:18
accident, the roof of the central hall disappeared01:27:21
a terrible black mouth formed01:27:23
who with pale faces with wide open01:27:25
eyes were in bewilderment01:27:27
fourth control room01:27:29
the power unit has not yet been imagined01:27:32
saw the whole panorama of what happened01:27:34
consciousness probably01:27:36
calculates causes and consequences01:27:38
heard blows at that moment on the bowl01:27:41
weighing their upcoming behavior with01:27:43
one side was thrown by fear which01:27:45
commanded to escape from this hell, but with01:27:48
the other side turned out to be human01:27:50
courage responsibility for nuclear power plants and people01:27:53
finally a professional01:27:54
responsibilities the latter exceeded became01:27:57
literally the main thing in their behavior01:27:59
ordered where to go and what to do first01:28:02
what Akimov Diesel shouted? This means that01:28:04
he took care of providing reliable01:28:07
power supply for all equipment01:28:09
power unit hoping to connect the system01:28:11
security tried not to stop01:28:13
main pumping of cooling water through01:28:16
reactor was the right decision01:28:19
available nuclear operational personnel01:28:21
station theoretical ideas but01:28:23
as it turned out later it turned out01:28:25
useless in practice01:28:28
circulation pumps are already inactive01:28:30
pipelines for supplying water to the apparatus01:28:32
broken automatic cooling01:28:35
reactor earlier by the same personnel01:28:37
completely blocked, however, its balloon01:28:39
some of them were destroyed by Dyatlov01:28:42
quickly gives the command to everyone to move to01:28:43
backup power unit control panel01:28:45
that is, move to another room01:28:48
but immediately cancels this command01:28:50
orders Akimov to turn on the pump01:28:52
cooling the reactor sends a worker01:28:54
open the valves of the forced01:28:56
circulation he does this work partially01:28:58
fulfilled Akimov fulfilled it01:29:00
order but he had one01:29:02
important duty to turn on the system01:29:04
notifications about an accident that occurred01:29:06
connected with apartment telephones01:29:08
managers and key specialists01:29:10
The automatic power plant should have notified01:29:12
each of them with some delay But01:29:15
it was Akimov who made the shift supervisor01:29:17
station received an automatic notification01:29:19
but to the apartments of nuclear specialists01:29:21
stations in the city of Pripyat this signal is not01:29:23
got there when Rashkin came on the fourth01:29:26
the power unit found Famin in extreme01:29:28
depressed, he sat with01:29:30
with his head down, an explanation for him01:29:32
Dyatlov gave And only after the question01:29:34
Rogozhkin about whether it is supplied to the reactor01:29:36
water He raised his head and said yes01:29:38
served but then he started to act01:29:41
actively the main thing for them then was01:29:43
water water and water that is, in any way01:29:46
Through any possible channels, submit it to01:29:48
reactor so that it doesn’t melt01:29:50
fuel And this could lead to extreme01:29:53
severe consequences01:29:54
right up to a nuclear explosion, alas, they have not yet01:29:57
knew what situation he was in01:29:58
Another task is to turn off the device01:30:01
electrical networks that could01:30:03
it was still necessary to cause a fire01:30:05
secure such burning explosive01:30:08
sources as containers for machine01:30:10
hydrogen storage and supply system oils01:30:13
all this was dispersed across different01:30:15
premises where Dyatlov and Akimov urgently01:30:17
directed people at the same time from Dyatlov01:30:20
another command followed, he demanded01:30:22
leave the premises01:30:24
all the extra people who weren't01:30:26
are connected in their work with the station01:30:28
primarily related to01:30:30
experimenter's house of technical energy and01:30:32
workers of the Kharkov Turbine Plant01:30:34
factory, an attempt was made from the remote control01:30:36
operator to send absorber rods01:30:38
deep into the reactor core to01:30:41
suppress a possible chain reaction but01:30:44
this system didn't work No didn't know didn't01:30:46
were represented by nuclear power specialists01:30:48
power plant tragedy of its reactor01:30:51
even Dyatlov, who had already managed to offend01:30:54
premises inspect the power unit building01:30:56
outside Even those people who have already seen01:30:58
mysterious orange glow above01:31:01
the location of the nuclear device is not01:31:03
they were in a hurry to come to a conclusion they came up with for themselves01:31:06
and firmly adhered to the legend that01:31:08
that something else exploded for them01:31:10
the reactor seemed invulnerable alone01:31:13
one of the first to run at Akimov’s command01:31:15
open the valves which by the way01:31:17
closed especially securely under01:31:19
his leadership on the previous shift was01:31:22
Yuri Trigub along the way he learned that01:31:24
destroyed cylinder room sar but01:31:26
valves are not at all like water valves01:31:28
the crane has large metal wheels01:31:31
which required large01:31:33
if not a huge effort01:31:36
needed help He saw two01:31:38
operators from the chemical workshop01:31:40
covering01:31:42
fabrics but the guys didn’t help However01:31:46
this was apparently the only case when01:31:48
someone was avoiding trouble01:31:50
the majority still went to the very01:31:52
literally dived into the radiation inferno01:31:54
cloud burning vapors and even a dex tracker01:31:57
their face screamed that they needed to be saved01:32:00
Khodemchuk Trigub kept twisting and unyielding01:32:03
the valves were sweating, his strength was quickly leaving him01:32:06
I still didn’t understand what was going on, I thought it was01:32:09
everything from fatigue quickly enough01:32:11
managed to establish workers on duty at01:32:14
this night shift who did not make themselves known01:32:16
after the explosions they were the first to be looked for01:32:19
turn hodemchuk managed to find everyone but01:32:21
he’s not there, the situation was developing01:32:24
An alarm signal was sounding somewhere01:32:26
about his critical condition01:32:27
destroyed reactor A in others01:32:29
the rooms were pitch black and water01:32:32
began to flood the lower rooms But people01:32:35
something was opened, blocked, disconnected01:32:37
Vashchenko shift supervisor of the reactor workshop01:32:40
took charge of the liquidation01:32:42
accidents on the most difficult sections of Baranov01:32:45
the turbine generator operator managed01:32:47
cool turbogenerators01:32:49
of the third and fourth power units that01:32:52
prevented an explosion and fire in01:32:55
machine room is just a couple of sketchy01:32:57
portraits of the heroes of that terrible night from01:33:00
number of Chernobyl operations01:33:02
AS are just a few of the thirty who gave01:33:05
life They died in a specialized01:33:07
Besides them, the Moscow clinic needs01:33:09
note Khodemchuk and Shashenkov first01:33:13
died at the station itself, the second in the hospital01:33:16
city of Pripyat April 26 Akimov and01:33:19
the tramplers also did not leave their posts01:33:21
until they were replaced there might have been victims01:33:24
less and not only with lethal01:33:26
outcome but also with radiation diseases01:33:28
which many of us suffer today01:33:30
emergency liquidation participants01:33:33
NPP we have already said that the shift manager01:33:36
Rogozhkin failed to explain the night01:33:38
what kind of person is on duty at the telephone exchange?01:33:40
load the tape cassette into01:33:42
device for automatic01:33:43
alerts on members' home phones01:33:46
emergency brigade, which included the most01:33:48
responsible emergency workers telephone operator01:33:51
I was also confused and started calling someone01:33:53
will come but not to the director and chief01:33:55
power plant engineer However, about01:33:58
2:00 am at Bryukhanov’s apartment01:34:00
the phone call still rang01:34:02
the head of the chemical workshop reported01:34:04
that there is a problem in an emergency and the garage attendant is already01:34:07
sent a bus to the director's house01:34:09
equipped with radio station Victor01:34:11
Petrovich quickly contacted the duty officer01:34:13
telephony ordered her to make an announcement01:34:16
announce the incident to all services01:34:18
general readiness for relevant01:34:20
emergency action then01:34:23
the director of the nuclear power plant needs to explain01:34:25
is also a leader01:34:27
Civil Defense on the introduced him01:34:29
facility in the USSR - this is a special service01:34:32
which has its own organization01:34:34
material base and main schedule01:34:37
actions in case of occurrence01:34:38
danger of people being harmed01:34:40
traditional chemical and other01:34:42
sources Bryukhanov should have01:34:45
quickly enter exactly this01:34:46
duty of the head of the Civil01:34:49
defense at the nuclear power plant bus01:34:51
rushed towards01:34:53
station and then Bryukhanov was surprised01:34:56
I saw that the roofs of the fourth power unit01:34:58
no, the car drove up to the usual entrance01:35:00
into the room01:35:02
administrative and commercial01:35:15
The telephone operator asked urgently01:35:17
arrive at the station followed by another sound01:35:20
one phone call and one of01:35:21
heads of nuclear power plant departments01:35:24
confirmed the seriousness of the situation01:35:26
Vorobyov was a military man in his time01:35:29
graduated from the Military Academy of Chemical Engineering01:35:30
protection if Bryukhanov led01:35:33
civil defense of the nuclear power plant in01:35:35
in order of combination with its main01:35:37
position, Vorobyov was its first01:35:39
Deputy on these issues01:35:41
Chief of Civil Defense Staff01:35:44
I was only involved in this matter, that is, I was01:35:46
an employee who was preparing specifically for01:35:48
so possible life-threatening and01:35:50
people's health events he had01:35:53
own farm bomb special shelter01:35:56
protective equipment devices for01:35:58
radiation measurements workwear01:36:00
there were rescue programs01:36:02
subordination and workers receiving a signal01:36:04
anxiety, he immediately got dressed and jumped out01:36:07
outside and ran to the garage where he stood01:36:10
his personal car minutes01:36:12
five years later he was already driving01:36:14
A nuclear power plant appeared on the road in front of him01:36:17
a familiar figure was caught by Passing01:36:19
transport secretary of the party committee01:36:21
Pashin nuclear power plant together with him01:36:24
was one of the deputy directors01:36:25
station they were also lifted out of bed01:36:27
phone calls Sergei Konstantinovich01:36:30
parashi former secretary of the party committee01:36:32
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant They called me approximately01:36:34
half an hour after the accident01:36:48
a car with its headlights on is choking01:36:50
I raised my hand, it was Vorobyov coming01:36:53
Chief of Civil Defense Staff01:36:55
stations also raised him on a signal01:36:57
alarm at approximately 2:10 2:15 am we01:37:00
were at the station when the fire arrived01:37:03
no longer existed but the change itself01:37:05
block configuration led me to01:37:07
the corresponding state has entered01:37:09
office of the director of AS Bryukhanov, here I am01:37:11
I saw the second secretary hot01:37:14
Veselovsky were deputy director for regime01:37:17
me and Vorobyov when we got into the office01:37:19
Bryukhanov immediately said that we were switching to01:37:21
management in the bunker oh he apparently understood01:37:24
that there was an explosion and therefore gave such01:37:26
the command is as it should be according to the instructions01:37:28
civil defense Bryukhanov was in01:37:30
depressed I asked him what01:37:33
happened I don’t know he was there at all01:37:35
taciturn in normal times, but at other times01:37:38
night I think he was in a state of Shock01:37:40
I was inhibited, I was in a state of Shock myself01:37:43
almost six months after the accident and another year in01:37:45
in complete decline We moved into the bunker01:37:47
located here under the AK-1 building01:37:50
this low room is crowded01:37:52
office desks with one chairs01:37:55
small table with telephones01:37:57
the remote control sat down at this table Bryukhanov table01:38:00
unsuccessfully placed next to the entrance01:38:02
door and Bryukhanov was, as it were, isolated01:38:04
from us all the time people walked past it01:38:06
the front door was slamming and there was noise too01:38:09
the fans all started flowing01:38:11
heads of workshops and shifts, their deputies01:38:13
Chugunov Sitnikov came from a conversation with01:38:16
Bryukhanov I realized that he called the Regional Committee01:38:18
said there is a collapse but it’s not clear yet01:38:21
what happened there is being sorted out01:38:24
after 3 hours adj Dyatlov talked to01:38:26
Bryukhanov then I sat him down at the table and01:38:28
started asking I don’t know anything01:38:31
I understand he said I'm afraid that the director01:38:33
so no one reported that the reactor01:38:35
blown up wording reactor blown up not01:38:38
not a single deputy chief gave01:38:39
engineer and the chief engineer did not give it01:38:42
Fomin Bryukhanov himself went to the area01:38:44
fourth block and didn’t understand it either01:38:46
that's the paradox people didn't believe in01:38:48
the possibility of a reactor explosion01:38:50
developed their own versions and01:38:52
obeyed01:38:53
I also have to formulate for myself what is there01:38:55
happened I assumed it exploded01:38:58
drum separator the whole ideology first01:39:01
the night was built on the fact that everyone was01:39:03
We're sure it wasn't the reactor that exploded, but something01:39:05
It is not clear yet what was in the bunker01:39:08
3040 people stood Noise and Uproar each01:39:11
on his phone, he was talking with his01:39:13
everything on the shop floor01:39:22
the little man arrived at the station with a spit01:39:25
somewhere between 7 and 9 o'clock in the morning he01:39:28
came with a group of people and we talked about01:39:30
that you need to draw up a single document01:39:32
which would go through all channels or01:39:34
Bryukhanov instructed me or I did it myself01:39:36
volunteered now it's hard to say but I01:39:39
took up this document, thought it was like01:39:41
I'm in control of the situation and started writing this01:39:43
I was clumsy with paper back then01:39:46
another one took it and wrote a draft01:39:48
five of us agreed on this and that01:39:51
roof collapse level was indicated01:39:53
radiation in the city was still low and01:39:56
It is said that further study is underway01:39:58
there were problems like this before01:40:00
unpleasant thing I find it difficult now01:40:02
explain the head of civil defense01:40:04
Vorobyov with whom we arrived through01:40:06
a couple of hours later he came up to me and reported01:40:09
drove around the station and found it near01:40:11
the fourth block has very large fields01:40:13
radiation of the order of 200 roentgens Why me01:40:16
Vorobyov did not believe him by nature01:40:18
a very emotional person and when he01:40:21
it was said to him it was scary01:40:22
look I didn't believe it I told him to go01:40:25
prove it to the director and then I asked01:40:27
Bryukhanova how bad Unfortunately I don't01:40:30
I didn’t finish the conversation with the director01:40:33
demanded a detailed answer from him01:40:35
If I fully knew and01:40:36
imagine what happened I would of course01:40:39
I did the wrong thing, but I thought it was radiation01:40:41
associated with the release of water from the drum01:40:43
separator alarm I began to sound too01:40:46
late on the second night when it flared up01:40:48
reactor then I started calling the City Committee01:40:50
we just need to evacuate the children01:40:52
then Yes It dawned on me that I need it urgently01:40:55
evacuate But by that time to the city01:40:57
a lot of high ranks have already arrived01:40:59
directors to a government meeting01:41:01
the commission did not invite him, no one01:41:03
asked about the arrival of the bosses01:41:05
great psychological effect they all01:41:08
these big ranks are very serious01:41:10
to yourself Trust they say People have arrived01:41:13
who know everything only understand everything01:41:15
much later when I talked to them this01:41:17
Faith passed We did not accept any01:41:20
decisions are all right and wrong01:41:22
decisions were made by us01:41:24
the staff were doing something mechanically like01:41:26
sleepy flies there was too much stress and01:41:29
our faith was too great that01:41:31
the reactor cannot explode massively01:41:34
blinding many see what happened but01:41:37
they don’t believe me and now they’re stalking me01:41:38
feeling of guilt for life I think very01:41:41
performed poorly that night in the bunker01:41:43
I had to say at the trial that I01:41:45
I chickened out. Otherwise I couldn’t explain my01:41:47
behavior because I sent Sitnikov01:41:49
Chugunov Uskov and others on the fourth01:41:52
this tragedy is hanging over me, after all01:41:55
Sitnikov died, they ask me why01:41:57
I didn’t go to the fourth block myself then I01:41:59
went there but not that night What can I do01:42:02
say No, I don’t think so, I’m just chickening out01:42:04
I didn’t understand then, but it’s me alone01:42:06
I know it myself, but how can I explain it to people?01:42:09
everyone was there, everyone was irradiated, you darling01:42:12
you are standing alive in front of us, although you should01:42:14
everything is explained simply myself on the fourth01:42:17
didn’t know the block worked on the First if only01:42:19
it happened on the First I would have gone myself01:42:22
here sitting in front of me is the former Chugunov01:42:24
the shop manager and Sitnikov are both there01:42:26
worked just six months ago I say01:42:28
the director needs to send them no one better01:42:31
won’t figure them out, won’t help Dyatlov and01:42:33
they both went and even they are the best01:42:36
honest people who did not carry01:42:38
even they are responsible for the explosion01:42:40
when they came back they didn’t say what was there01:42:42
happened if Sitnikov understood that01:42:44
if it happened he wouldn’t have died because he’s tall01:42:47
professional just trying to make excuses01:42:49
This is a weak excuse Nikolai Vasilievich01:42:52
Karpan Deputy Head of Nuclear01:42:54
physical laboratory the day before the accident01:42:56
I returned from Moscow and was not at work.01:42:59
I found out about the accident at 7:00 am when I called01:43:02
a relative from Chernobyl asked what01:43:04
happened at the station they told her01:43:06
I was assured of terrible things about some kind of explosion01:43:09
her that there could be no explosion I01:43:12
I called the station in the evening and found out that01:43:13
the fourth block goes to a stop and before01:43:16
stops usually perform some kind of01:43:18
work related to the opening01:43:20
safety valves and ejection01:43:22
a large amount of vapor into the atmosphere is01:43:24
creates noise effects soothes her01:43:27
I still have some anxiety01:43:29
started calling the station on the fourth01:43:31
block none of the phones answered I01:43:34
I called the third block and they told me that01:43:36
there is practically no central01:43:38
hall above the third and fourth blocks01:43:41
went outside and saw the changed01:43:43
outlines of the second line when I called01:43:45
to his boss and asked if he did01:43:47
attempt to get to the station, he answered yes01:43:50
but I was detained by the posts of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs01:43:52
the nuclear safety department was not allowed in01:43:54
the boss and I went to the station01:43:56
a small round area before leaving01:43:58
decided to hitchhike out of town01:44:01
in the car we saw the shop manager there01:44:03
adjuster who said that she left01:44:05
director's car and we can do anything01:44:07
get to the station together We have arrived01:44:09
to the station at 8:00 am So I ended up in01:44:12
the bunker there were the chief director01:44:14
Party organizer deputy chief engineer01:44:16
scientific engineer they managed to do this01:44:19
time to take air and water samples and01:44:21
carry out analyzes in air samples01:44:23
detected up to 17% activity01:44:26
conditioned by neptunium And neptunium is01:44:29
transitional flood from Uranus 238 to01:44:33
plutonium fuel water activity also01:44:36
was extremely high the first thing I did01:44:38
collided in a bunker and what do I need01:44:40
seemed very strange to us nothing about01:44:42
no one knows about the details of the accident01:44:45
didn't say anything Yes it happened01:44:47
some kind of explosion about people and their actions01:44:49
committed that night we had no01:44:51
the slightest idea Although work on01:44:54
The accident was localized from the very moment01:44:56
explosion then later that morning I myself01:44:59
tried to restore the picture01:45:01
ask people but then in the bunker01:45:03
we were not told anything about01:45:05
what's going on in the central hall in the turbine hall who01:45:08
of the people there were How many people01:45:10
evacuated to the medical unit what is there01:45:12
at least presumably the doses are all01:45:14
those present in the bunker were divided into01:45:16
two parts people in a stupor01:45:19
The director, chief engineer, was clearly in shock01:45:21
and those who tried to somehow influence01:45:24
actively influence the situation01:45:26
change it for the better01:45:28
less among them I include primarily Porto01:45:31
Organization of the station Sergei Konstantinovich01:45:33
parashino of course parashi didn’t try01:45:35
assume responsibility for technical01:45:37
decisions but he continued to work with01:45:39
he dealt with people and decided01:45:42
numerous problems What happened01:45:44
that night that's what I found out01:45:46
when the explosion happened near the station01:45:48
there were several dozen people there01:45:51
and security and builders, fishermen with those who01:45:54
I was in close proximity01:45:55
talked and asked them what they saw01:45:58
that we heard the explosion completely blew off the roof01:46:00
western wall of the central hall01:46:02
destroyed a wall in the region of the marz, broke through01:46:05
fragments of reinforced concrete structures01:46:07
roof smear caused a fire in the roof01:46:10
everyone knows about the fire on the roof, but very little01:46:12
who knows what's inside the machine room01:46:14
fires also started, but there01:46:16
there were turbogenerators filled01:46:19
hydrogen, tens of tons of oil, this one01:46:21
internal fire and represented the most01:46:23
great danger the first thing they did01:46:25
reactor they closed the door to the central01:46:28
the hall or rather in that space under01:46:29
open sky what's left of the hall they01:46:32
gathered all the people except01:46:34
the deceased Khodemchuk was taken out of danger01:46:36
zones, a wounded man was carried out of the destruction zone01:46:39
Shashenkov Taya whose shift was led01:46:41
Sasha Akimov began to do everything to01:46:44
generators to remove explosive hydrogen01:46:46
and replace it with nitrogen to turn off the burning01:46:48
electrical assemblies and mechanisms in01:46:50
smeared to pump oil so God forbid01:46:53
the fire didn't spread here01:46:55
firefighters worked on the roofs and personnel01:46:58
everything else was done internally by them01:47:00
suppression of fires in the smear and01:47:02
preventing explosions and here is the ratio01:47:05
dangers and volumes of work performed in01:47:07
such conditions and such losses were given01:47:10
firefighters working on the roof died01:47:12
six people and those who worked inside01:47:14
23 people died, certainly a feat01:47:17
firefighters have gone down in centuries and not in numbers01:47:19
the degree of heroism and risk is measured but01:47:22
nevertheless, what the personnel did in01:47:24
the first minutes after the accident should also01:47:26
be known to people I am convinced of the highest01:47:29
professional competence01:47:31
fifth shift operators Alexander01:47:33
Akimov was the first to understand what happened already in01:47:35
3:40 min he told the shift supervisor01:47:38
station to Vladimir Alekseevich Babich01:47:40
arrived at the station on call01:47:42
director what happened in general01:47:44
radiation accident This means that01:47:46
primary care already knew what happened01:47:49
in fact, not only that, he reported01:47:51
this guide he estimated the dimensions01:47:54
the accident perfectly represented the whole01:47:55
danger of the incident did not leave the area01:47:58
doing everything to provide01:47:59
cooling of the power unit and remained at01:48:02
this person Here is an example You know what01:48:04
under normal conditions, three work at the bshu01:48:07
operator and shift supervisor so here01:48:10
the youngest of them is a senior engineer01:48:12
turbine control Kirshenbaum which01:48:15
didn’t know the layout of the building Akimov urgently01:48:17
kicked out of the common room by Kirshenbaum, you said01:48:20
there is nothing more that can help us here01:48:23
leave all the information you took from01:48:25
zone Woodpeckers Sitnikov Chugunov Akimov She01:48:28
everything settled in the bunker at the level01:48:30
director and chief engineer01:48:32
cement here and didn’t miss it01:48:34
I certainly can’t go on with any certainty01:48:36
say that she didn't reach the top01:48:38
floors of the leadership of our headquarters but before01:48:41
This information did not reach us at all01:48:43
subsequent knowledge of what happened01:48:45
got it yourself this way01:48:47
the director became like a liaison01:48:50
a link between the reality that has developed on01:48:53
nuclear power plant and how it was served01:48:55
to the governing bodies that were01:48:57
at a great distance from the accident and01:48:59
after all, how realistic was it01:49:01
the current danger, first of all01:49:03
traditional those who were on01:49:05
territories of the same fourth01:49:07
unfortunately they have a power unit01:49:09
there was virtually no presentation01:49:11
that they are in the fields01:49:13
lethal ionizing radiation01:49:15
here it must be said that it is a duty01:49:17
arrange a quick01:49:20
nuclear power plant shift monitor01:49:23
Rogozhkin had at his disposal01:49:25
specialists from the labor protection department and01:49:27
safety precautions that night01:49:30
their eldest was Samoilenko What01:49:32
the devices were in their arsenal they01:49:34
according to their technical data they were not01:49:36
able to determine real numbers01:49:38
dangers When the first dosimetrist01:49:40
appeared on the fourth power unit became01:49:43
take measurements then the instrument arrow01:49:45
constantly went all the way to the right01:49:47
that means the device shows x-rays01:49:50
an hour and something more that's all for01:49:52
dosimeters of this type were read that01:49:54
in fact, to find out01:49:57
other more powerful devices are required01:49:59
But they were not in service01:50:01
dosimetrist at the station They are of course01:50:03
were available and in the hands of those who were obliged01:50:06
urgently diagnose the danger of this01:50:08
radiation accident they were absent01:50:11
the most powerful measuring device01:50:12
radiation levels was in the hands01:50:14
Chief of Civil Defense Staff01:50:16
Vorobyov station he is accompanied by01:50:18
two of your employees in a personal car01:50:21
went to take measurements. What01:50:23
data He brought back to the shelter on01:50:25
area around the cutlery01:50:27
showed its maximum measurement of 20001:50:30
x-ray per hour the hand rested on its01:50:32
limit And how many more x-rays are there for01:50:34
beyond the capabilities of the dosimeter01:50:36
I could only guess01:50:38
frightened Vorobyov urgently returned to01:50:40
shelter reported the result to the director01:50:42
of his dimension but Bryukhanov did not01:50:44
excited He only asked Where01:50:47
employees of the labor protection and technology department01:50:49
security thus head01:50:52
defense citizens made it clear to Vorobyov01:50:54
that his report doesn't matter yet01:50:57
experts themselves will not confirm this01:50:59
station at approximately 3400 am to Vorobyov01:51:02
firefighters asked to give them01:51:04
gas masks and protective suits he sat down in01:51:07
fire truck along with the device and01:51:10
area of the warehouse with special clothing again01:51:12
took a measurement There were about 2001:51:15
x-ray per hour They drove through the territory01:51:18
stations in the dark and there’s something under the wheels01:51:20
the firefighters crunched and explained what it was01:51:22
I'll probably throw the graphite out of the reactor01:51:25
having given out the equipment, Vorobyov returned again01:51:27
I have now reported to the bunker to the director01:51:29
Yukhanov told him about graphite that it was necessary01:51:32
assemble a special formation01:51:34
civil defense Vorobyov went to01:51:36
telephone operator contacted the boss01:51:38
Kyiv Civil Defense Headquarters01:51:41
region Yuri Kornyushin reported on measurements01:51:44
radiation dose of 200 roentgens per hour to him01:51:47
They didn’t believe me, they said what kind01:51:49
scary information can be done with your head01:51:51
ordered to pay to take a measurement01:51:54
again A at about 4:30 Vorobyov01:51:57
I saw the head of the dosimetric department01:51:58
the AS carabey has already carried out the service of no one01:52:01
did some kind of check01:52:04
analyzes His report to the director01:52:06
stated the radiation level was about 1501:52:08
X-rays per hour sources of increased background01:52:11
- short-lived radioelements are light01:52:14
radioactive gases believing that they will soon01:52:16
will fall apart the trouble will pass it happened01:52:18
serious accusation of Vorobyov as an alarmist01:52:20
Saint Vorobyov again sent curled into01:52:22
radiation reconnaissance And again he didn’t01:52:25
I regretted my personal car for this01:52:27
car went along with his01:52:29
employee Vasily Solovyom engineer01:52:32
emergency civil defense headquarters and again01:52:34
high levels of radiation near the building01:52:37
administrative building number01:52:39
2p x-ray further closer to reactor 109001:52:43
X-rays per hour returned But closer to 601:52:45
hours later they took another device and again01:52:47
a fresh dosimeter confirmed the reconnaissance01:52:50
near the dining room over 200 ringi device01:52:53
again01:52:55
yati goes off scale in the place where they carried01:52:58
service two women arrows01:53:00
paramilitary guards they intended 109001:53:03
x-ray and a worker was standing nearby01:53:05
police who did not allow entry into the area of the nuclear power plant01:53:08
extra vehicles Vorobyov told him01:53:10
to urgently leave and he went on foot to01:53:12
side of Chernobyl further radiation levels01:53:15
changed but then began to hold on01:53:17
at one high level Vorobyov realized that01:53:20
this is already recorded radiation from it01:53:22
passenger car She drives around on her own01:53:24
traditionally polluted dangerous places01:53:27
became a source of radiation Therefore, in01:53:29
in the city of Pripyat they got out of the car01:53:31
the dosimeter was also dirty and01:53:33
emitted radioactivity in the city itself01:53:36
they actually determined the radiation levels01:53:38
more or less low levels returned to01:53:40
bunker to the director were called again01:53:42
dangerous numbers and again misunderstanding with01:53:45
from Bryukhanov’s side he said firmly01:53:47
I have Karabekov no more conversation01:53:50
continued So 6:00 am next01:53:52
call to Kyiv regional headquarters01:53:54
Vorobyov asked for civil defense01:53:56
phone number of Chief of Staff Kornyushin but01:53:59
he was no longer in the city, he left for him01:54:01
limits Seraphim Stepanovich even perked up01:54:04
probably the leader went to them for01:54:06
there was no help at all in Pripyat01:54:08
Vorobyov began to dictate the other side01:54:10
duty officer at the Kyiv level headquarters01:54:12
radiation but the message was clearly received01:54:15
not the professional who asked01:54:17
Explain how x-rays differ from01:54:19
miles of x-ray Yes, I have no time to explain01:54:22
Vorobyov was happy to write, he was also interested in01:54:25
when will a special one appear in Pripyat01:54:27
mobile civil defense unit01:54:29
the arrival of which he asked in response01:54:32
reported that the detachment had been assembled but not01:54:34
at the request of the emergency situation And already by order of the headquarters01:54:36
civil defense of the USSR means Moscow01:54:39
has already begun to take decisive action01:54:41
Alexander Yurievich Asaulov 34 years old01:54:44
Deputy Chairman of the City Executive Committee01:54:46
city of Pripyat at night I was raised by twenty01:54:49
six somewhere at pm Maria called01:54:52
Grigorievna our secretary said there was an accident01:54:55
at the nuclear power plant some friend of hers01:54:57
he worked at the station he came at night01:54:59
woke her up and told her at 104 I was in01:55:02
the executive committee has already appointed a chairman01:55:05
fame and he went to the nuclear power plant01:55:07
station I immediately called our01:55:09
Chief of Civil Defense Staff01:55:11
picked him up in a gun he lived in a dormitory01:55:14
the chairman of the mountains arrived immediately afterwards01:55:16
Vladimir Voloshko came to the executive committee01:55:18
Pavlovich We all got together and began01:55:21
figure out what to do I went to our01:55:23
ATP decided to organize a city wash01:55:26
called the executive committee karny asked01:55:28
send a washing machine, it's the same01:55:31
song We didn't have enough for the whole city01:55:33
would you believe four watering washing machines on01:55:36
50,000 residents arrived with a car with a tank01:55:39
I don’t know where they dug her up, the driver wasn’t01:55:41
her family didn’t know how to turn on the pump01:55:44
water flowed from the hose only by gravity01:55:46
I drove him back, he arrived in minutes01:55:49
after 20 I already learned to turn this on01:55:51
pump we began to wash the road Near01:55:53
refueling now I already understand in hindsight01:55:56
number that it was one of the first01:55:58
dust suppression procedures, water came from01:56:00
soap solution then it turned out that01:56:02
it was just very polluted01:56:04
place at 10:00 am there was a meeting at01:56:06
Gorkom very short for 15-20 minutes01:56:10
there was no agreement after the meeting I01:56:12
I went straight to the medical unit after lunch01:56:15
the second secretary invited me01:56:16
The Kyiv regional committee has a small husband and entrusted me with01:56:19
organize the evacuation of the heaviest01:56:21
patients in Kyiv to the airport for dispatch01:56:23
to Moscow and the Civil Defense Headquarters01:56:26
country was a Hero of the Soviet Union01:56:28
Colonel General Ivanov he flew to01:56:30
the plane gave this plane for transportation01:56:33
all this happened somewhere after 170001:56:36
Saturday 26 April form a column01:56:39
it turned out to be difficult it’s not easy01:56:41
it was necessary to load people for each01:56:43
prepare medical history documents01:56:46
test results main delay01:56:48
was in the preparation of personal affairs even01:56:51
such moments arose, a seal is needed A01:56:53
seal at the nuclear power plant hushed it up01:56:56
the case was sent without a stamp, we were carrying 2601:56:59
man this is one red bus01:57:01
we drove straight through the intercity and roundabout01:57:03
on the field to the plane there is already a crew01:57:06
warming up the engine and another episode hit01:57:08
a pilot came straight to my heart01:57:11
and says how much these guys got01:57:13
I ask what X-ray I say01:57:16
enough But in principle it’s a matter of the World Cup and he01:57:19
I also want to live, I don’t want unnecessary01:57:22
X-ray I have a wife, my children have flown away01:57:25
they said goodbye and wished you a speedy01:57:27
recovery, we drove to Pripyat01:57:30
It's already the second day since I haven't slept and01:57:32
I couldn't sleep at night when I was still driving01:57:35
I saw columns of buses going to01:57:37
Pripyat was already preparing to meet us01:57:40
evacuation of the city on April 26 was listed01:57:44
Saturday but as we have it01:57:46
call it black Saturday, that is, working Saturday01:57:48
and a team of builders Nikolai's Installers01:57:51
Zaporizhzhya of six people01:57:53
went to my facility that was located01:57:56
in an open place about 400 meters from01:57:58
reversal of a power unit on the spot by explosion01:58:01
they arrived at about 7:30 and on their01:58:04
on the way we met a police cordon and01:58:06
on duty The police major said that in01:58:08
in the area of the nuclear power plant the situation is traditional01:58:10
dangerous they don’t let you in there And the setting01:58:13
Is it normal there and how to judge this01:58:15
the officer has no information01:58:18
its specialists did not arm themselves with service01:58:21
danger to your health and01:58:23
the builders went to their site and so01:58:25
it just so happened that I had to go to work that day01:58:27
The crane operator didn't show up and it turned out that the installers01:58:29
nothing to do in about 30 minutes They01:58:32
went home and we were taken as01:58:34
drunk explained later his condition01:58:36
Zaporozhye when they came to the hostel01:58:39
everyone started vomiting In the end, for this01:58:41
short period of stay in the zone01:58:43
impact of the destroyed fourth01:58:45
power unit, all six received a dose01:58:47
irradiation 300-500 br and steel01:58:50
disabled people, that’s what Vorobyov was so afraid of01:58:53
That's why he didn't spare any of his personal01:58:56
the car in which he drove around01:58:58
territory or your health like this01:59:01
Nuclear power plant in the city of Pripyat01:59:03
surrounding areas For many hours01:59:05
found themselves without traditional diagnostics01:59:08
What prevented the adoption of extremely important01:59:10
operational organizational decisions01:59:13
mobile specialized unit01:59:15
civil defense arrived in Pripyat01:59:17
only between 8 and 10 o'clock Vorobyov personally01:59:20
gave the detachment commander a dacha01:59:22
organize a point at the entrance to the city01:59:24
carry out sanitary treatment01:59:26
dosimetric measurements at Detikino01:59:29
around the AS the detachment left to carry out tasks01:59:32
returned with my data only to01:59:34
lunch on April 26th undeniably figure01:59:37
Vorobyov in this difficult situation in01:59:40
overall it looks quite attractive01:59:42
here on the face and personal courage and01:59:44
real human civilian01:59:46
excitement for the fate of people and01:59:49
after all, he himself admits that with the best01:59:51
preparation of civil defense emergency services01:59:53
for this type of event the amount of radiation01:59:56
all the people could be significantly01:59:59
lesser judge And why did you report to02:00:02
authorities have incorrect data because you02:00:04
several people for example Vorobyov02:00:06
you talked about high levels of radiation02:00:08
told them not to tell anyone about this02:00:10
Bryukhanov spoke only for the purpose of02:00:13
They only reported this to me02:00:15
an explanation from it took place at the trial02:00:17
it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the reality02:00:19
explained the situation so vaguely02:00:22
his behavior as the head of a nuclear power plant02:00:24
station on one side He seems to02:00:26
knew about high levels but on the other hand believed02:00:29
that you can only report02:00:35
to himDescription:
Это Сергей Исупов, и мы продолжаем обсуждать, что же на самом деле произошло в Чернобыле. Я расскажу правду о которой вы не знали. ? В этом ролике из серии видео про аварию на Чернобыльской АЭС рассказы очевидцев восстановить страшные события первых часов и дней после катастрофы. Истории храбрых людей, переживших ужасную аварию - в новом видео. Источники: В. Я. Возняк С. Н. Троицкий "Чернобыль. Так это было взгляд изнутри". Ю. Щербак "Чернобыль" Моя группа в вк https://vk.com/sergeyisupov93 Моя страница в вк https://vk.com/sergei_isupov Мой телеграм канал https://t.me/sergeyisupov Навигация: 00:00 Вступление 01:13 Анатолий Дятлов 03:33 Борис Рогожкин 06:32 Игорь Казачков 09:35 Юрий Трегуб 15:13 Другие очевидцы 16:18 Первые пострадавшие. 18:15 О взрывах. 20:46 Разрушенный реактор. 23:43 Реклама 25:15 Первая в миреа атомная электростанция 28:34 Строительство ЧАЭС 32:51 РБМК 1000 37:32 Легасов 42:14 Анатолий Александров 45:15 Застойное время 47:13 Стенограмма из зала суда 55:15 Почему произошла авария? 56:35. Программа испытаний 1:13:33 25 апреля 1:23:04 О работниках ЧАЭС 1:28:01 Авария
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