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00:00:02
[Music]00:00:11
[Music]00:00:19
[Music]00:00:28
A00:00:30
[Music]00:00:40
[Music]00:00:41
In a small mobile headquarters hastily erected near the00:00:45
Iraqi-Kuwait border, a00:00:49
division commander in the Iraqi Republican Guard meets with Lieutenant General00:00:52
Raad Al-Hamdani, commander of the 17th Armored Brigade.00:00:57
On the meeting table is a Qur’an, Commander. Al-00:01:00
Hamdani Division is to swear on him to keep a00:01:05
big secret. Our force will invade00:01:08
Kuwait. A few days ago, Al-Hamdan received an order00:01:12
from the leadership of the Republican Guard to send his brigade to the00:01:15
southwest of Basra, near the Kuwaiti border.00:01:18
Another similar matter. It was a very ambiguous military order.00:01:23
Less than two years ago, the First Gulf War stopped, and00:01:26
Iraq cannot tolerate a war. Another, the most00:01:30
that the officers expected was a political maneuver that would put pressure00:01:34
on Kuwait in the context of a political and diplomatic conflict that00:01:38
has been going on for months, which is July 19,00:01:46
1990. After about two weeks, Raad00:01:50
Al-Hamdani will have no choice but to draw up a quick plan to invade his00:01:54
neighbors in Kuwait, suddenly in a war. The result of a series00:01:58
of crises that the region will pay the price for00:02:05
[music]00:02:10
[music]00:02:19
[applause]00:02:22
Today, the year preceding the invasion of Kuwait was crowded with00:02:26
fluctuations and mutual accusations. It all began00:02:30
with the end of the chapters of another00:02:34
violent conflict, in the summer of00:02:37
1988. The Western media celebrates the Iraqi army and00:02:40
its strength, as it has just emerged victorious from A bloody war00:02:44
with Iran. The Arabs flocked to congratulate them. As for00:02:48
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, despite his pride in this00:02:52
situation, he realizes the enormity of the loss and complains to00:02:55
well-wishers00:02:57
along a vast front. The war continued for eight00:03:01
years at a huge human and economic cost, and after00:03:06
Iraq was rich thanks to oil revenues, it became00:03:09
in debt for tens of billions of dollars on the00:03:13
side. The other was that Kuwait was living in a00:03:16
different atmosphere. Its leaders saw that they supported Saddam Hussein00:03:19
with everything they could and exposed their country’s security to danger00:03:23
at a time when the country was experiencing internal political crises.00:03:30
After the end of the war, more than a million Iraqi soldiers00:03:35
were discharged from service,00:03:38
and during these00:03:41
times there were many economic problems. You have a million00:03:45
soldiers. Those who fought00:03:50
and some of them were tortured a lot, and of course all of Iraq was00:03:55
suffering during this00:03:57
period. The economy was collapsing00:04:02
and oil prices were falling00:04:08
horribly. The internal political situation inside00:04:12
Kuwait was not in00:04:15
good condition. There was a political escalation by the00:04:23
internal political forces. The National Assembly resolved an unconstitutional solution in In the00:04:28
years 190000:04:30
and 1986, this matter contributed to raising the state of00:04:34
political tension inside Kuwait. Therefore, the00:04:38
political scene inside Kuwait actually00:04:42
encouraged the Iraqi side to enter and say that00:04:46
we entered in order to liberate the Kuwaitis00:04:50
from the political authority that was present in00:04:54
Kuwait, but this reading was certainly a00:04:57
reading. It is true that there was a political dispute, but it does00:05:00
not amount to replacing and changing the regime with00:05:08
another regime after the00:05:12
Iran-Iraq war, meaning the one that ended in 1988, and despite the fact00:05:16
that the war, which was eight years old, witnessed00:05:20
variations of ups and downs, meaning that sometimes the00:05:24
Iraqi army was exposed to shocks such as 82 in the battlefield or00:05:29
86. In Al-Fawl, but in the last year, I mean, after the00:05:34
liberation of00:05:35
Al-Fawul, it is clear that the Iranians’ acquiescence to the00:05:39
ceasefire seemed as if the war had ended with an00:05:52
Iraqi victory, inferior to most of the neighbors and allies.00:05:56
Congratulations to Kuwait were delayed for months after the war,00:05:59
during which the Iraqi leadership’s view00:06:02
of Kuwait became cloudy, and then the relationship oscillated between apprehension00:06:06
and relief in February. In00:06:10
1989, the Crown Prince of Kuwait, Sheikh Saad Al-00:06:14
Abdullah, decided to visit Iraq, but on the morning of the00:06:17
visit he was surprised by an offensive article in the Al-Qadisiyah newspaper,00:06:21
affiliated with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The00:06:24
article put Kuwait in the dock and revived a00:06:28
pending dispute over the borders of the two countries. Saddam claimed in00:06:32
the meeting that he did not know about the article, and the visit took place.00:06:36
Despite the Kuwaiti's reservations, the conversation was confusing. The00:06:40
Kuwaitis thought they had fulfilled their duty when00:06:43
they provided Iraq with billions of dollars during a mission00:06:47
known as guarding the eastern gate00:06:52
for the Arabs. Of course, during this phase, Kuwait opened00:06:57
its ports to all Iraqi goods and weapons00:07:01
that came to00:07:05
Iraq. I remember in a session one week in the00:07:09
1980s in the Council of 81. The Kuwaiti Mother Council00:07:14
approved the appropriation of 6 billion, meaning two billion, two00:07:18
billion, 6 billion dollars in support of brotherly Iraq00:07:22
in a war with Iran. Our work is impossible to support00:07:27
Iraq. A pristine document of a Kuwaiti decision to lend Iraq00:07:32
two billion dollars with a00:07:35
ten-00:07:36
year repayment plan. During the war, loans from the Arab Gulf states00:07:40
to Iraq continued, and were estimated at 49 billion at00:07:45
the end of which the Gulf people said that by supporting Iraq they00:07:48
had put their country’s security in danger, but it is a call for00:07:52
Arabism and the security of the00:07:56
nation. I think that the important factor in understanding the role00:08:00
that the Iraq-Iran war played on00:08:03
Saddam’s thinking is the economic field, statistics of00:08:07
Iraqi reserves and00:08:10
foreign reserves. When that war began, I remember that it00:08:14
was In the range of 30 to 35 billion dollars,00:08:18
and by the end of the war the number had decreased to two00:08:21
or three billion,00:08:25
all of which were spent trying to maintain the war effort.00:08:31
[Music]00:08:33
In00:08:35
1988, Iraq was in debt of more than 40 billion00:08:40
dollars, especially to all the Gulf states, but00:08:45
also to other countries. The other world, in the West, in the00:08:48
East, in South00:08:56
America, in September of the year, the00:09:00
Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, was invited00:09:03
to Baghdad. Saddam said that Prince Jaber is a00:09:07
brave and nationalist man, and that they are brothers, one family in two00:09:11
independent countries. He awarded him the Al-Rafidain Medal, the highest00:09:16
Iraqi decoration, while Saddam received the00:09:20
Mubarak Necklace. Intimacy prevailed in the meeting between them,00:09:24
but it was only the beginning00:09:28
of autumn.00:09:29
[Music] The00:09:33
Iraqi leadership’s policy in dealing00:09:36
with Kuwait was not settled until it tested00:09:39
Kuwait’s willingness to provide more aid and facilities.00:09:42
In February of the following year,00:09:46
Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, the then Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, went00:09:49
to Baghdad. There he met Saadoun Hammadi,00:09:54
Saddam Hussein's deputy for economic affairs.00:09:57
Hammadi was one of the most important Iraqi politicians and leaders of the Sa'ur00:10:00
delegation. Hammadi is, I00:10:05
mean, first, he is00:10:09
almost the only economist in the00:10:12
Iraqi leadership. Apart from his status, that is, within the00:10:17
Baath Party, he is almost the first Iraqi to belong00:10:20
to the Baath Party in the year 1949. He was a student at the00:10:24
American University in Beirut,00:10:28
that is, he managed the oil file for a long period. I mean,00:10:32
he was president of the National Oil Company, then Minister00:10:34
of Oil until the year 74, and during his reign nationalization took place,00:10:40
then he was Minister of Foreign Affairs for a very important period00:10:44
from 74 to 83. This period, I mean, witnessed Cam00:10:48
David. And the Islamic Revolution, which00:10:50
means many events in the region. That00:10:56
is, first of all, he has00:11:02
diplomatic ties to Kuwait,00:11:04
and according to Al-Ahmad’s knowledge, he is a friend, meaning that he was00:11:08
also the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time. I mean, and perhaps from among us is00:11:16
the relationship, the hope was pinned on that meeting to resolve a00:11:20
crisis that has been pending for decades related to the00:11:24
final demarcation of the borders between the two countries, but the Minister The00:11:27
Kuwaiti did not find Baghdad, which the Emir had visited a00:11:30
short time ago. Things turned around. The tone of both00:11:35
sides was not characterized by friendliness, but rather a cautious escalation, as00:11:39
Hammadi insisted on convincing Kuwait to sign a00:11:42
bilateral security agreement, which would lead to military facilities00:11:46
on the border, while the Kuwaiti position remained firm00:11:50
on its priorities, according to the minutes of their meeting in00:11:53
Al-Tham. From February00:11:57
1990, the Kuwaiti diplomat00:12:01
Abdullah Bishara said it in00:12:03
his testimony. What is the mistake that you said? The00:12:07
legislative authority in Iraq did not ratify the00:12:09
agreement. This is why we have a problem. We do not question00:12:14
the validity of your legislative authority, but the00:12:17
Iraqi Council of Ministers did not ratify it. What is strange is00:12:21
that you presented this00:12:23
agreement and not There is something indicating a signature00:12:27
or any official source familiar with it. We listened to00:12:32
your opinion and we will present to you00:12:36
our vision. I hope you present a comprehensive vision. It seems that00:12:40
you are not in a hurry and Iraq wants to solve the00:12:43
problem. Am I00:12:48
wrong? Yes, I am00:12:50
wrong. We also want to solve the problem, but according to00:12:55
our convictions represented in the necessity of demarcating the border.00:13:00
We know your opinion. We are bound with you in the joint00:13:04
Arab defense agreement.00:13:06
Why does this draft provide us with our security that does00:13:11
not require a bilateral agreement? This is something you want00:13:15
to impose00:13:18
on us. In my estimation, it is Saddam Hussein00:13:23
from the seventies. He was seeking to play a00:13:28
broader regional role than the borders of00:13:30
Iraq.00:13:32
In the same context, the post-war context. The00:13:35
Iran-Iraq war. I think he began00:13:39
trying to regain this role, which certainly00:13:41
weakened during the00:13:44
war. Saadoun Hammadi is described in Bishara’s testimony as a00:13:57
harsh nationalist and unionist, and he always stressed his pursuit of00:14:01
any form of Arab unity, even00:14:05
though he did not believe in the logic of force as an approach to achieving it.00:14:09
Between 8600:14:12
and 88, Hammadi was part of discussion sessions00:14:16
sponsored by Baath Party ideologue Michel Aflaq, which were included in the00:14:20
book The Papers of Saadoun Hammadi, issued by the00:14:23
Arab Center for Research and00:14:25
Policy Studies. In his interventions, Saadoun Hammadi presented a00:14:29
recommendation in which he stressed that relations00:14:33
between Arab regimes should not be based on force and the exclusion of00:14:36
military or intelligence influence. Or00:14:39
media violence to achieve any goal, no matter how00:14:43
lofty. They were completely convinced. Rather, they00:14:46
looked at the decision to invade from an ideological perspective.00:14:50
I mean, if you go back to what Dr. Saadoun00:14:54
Hammadi wrote in00:14:55
his memoirs, it was clear that he considered the invasion a form of00:14:59
unity, meaning he gives and puts the decision to00:15:03
invade in a context in An ideological context that believes in00:15:07
Arab unity, even if it is00:15:10
based on00:15:14
military power. In the month following the meeting between Hammadi00:15:17
and Al-Sabah, Kuwait confirmed its refusal to propose a00:15:20
bilateral security agreement with Iraq and called for a00:15:24
final demarcation of the borders agreed upon since the00:15:27
1960s to close its long-open file.00:15:31
There were introductions. There were issues. It is00:15:35
related to geography, and it is an old problem that00:15:39
still exists, which is the lack of a sea port00:15:42
commensurate with the size of Iraq. Therefore,00:15:48
this barrier was always present with the Iraqi political leadership00:15:53
during the time of Abdul Karim Qasim,00:15:57
and later in the time of Saddam Hussein, and also previously00:16:01
in the00:16:02
past. This is a fundamental issue, but it was not. The00:16:09
main reason is that00:16:11
the borders are a delayed00:16:14
and faltering issue that has kept some Iraqi leaders in limbo for00:16:18
decades. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Kuwait has been subjected to00:16:22
the protection of the British according to an agreement00:16:25
signed with them by Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah. Al-00:16:29
Sabah wanted to stop the tide of the Ottomans who took over the cities of00:16:33
Iraq from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north. He00:16:36
also sought through it to protect his back from Some00:16:40
rival tribes drew the Kuwaiti-00:16:43
Iraqi border for the first time in00:16:46
1913 as a result of an agreement between Britain and the00:16:51
Ottoman Empire. The agreement was not ratified as00:16:55
World War I occurred about a year later, and the00:16:59
Ottomans and the British were enemies00:17:02
during the era of the Hashemites, while Iraq sought00:17:06
to join the League of Nations in 1932. He sent his Prime Minister,00:17:10
Nour Al-Saeed. In a letter to the Emir of Kuwait,00:17:14
Al-Saeed reaffirmed in his letter that the00:17:18
islands of Warba, Bubiyan, Faylak, and other lands belong00:17:22
to Kuwait, and that Safwan, Jabal Sanam, and other00:17:26
lands belong to Iraq. The00:17:29
Emir of Kuwait responded to Al-Saeed’s letter, acknowledging00:17:32
this00:17:33
division. Caution remained in the relationship between the two parties, and the00:17:37
Iraqi leadership did not stop claiming that00:17:40
Kuwait belonged. Or at least part of it.00:17:44
Iraq, and after the00:17:48
1958 coup against the Hashemite monarchy, the coup leaders followed00:17:52
the same approach in demanding00:17:56
Kuwait’s accession. On June00:18:00
1961, Kuwait resigned from00:18:04
British protection, and less than a week later,00:18:07
Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim held a00:18:10
press conference announcing Kuwait was a district affiliated with00:18:13
Basra Governorate, and the Emir of Kuwait at that time,00:18:17
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem, was appointed to the position of00:18:21
governor with a salary of 8500:18:25
dinars. Kuwait joined the United Nations00:18:28
in00:18:30
1963. However, the border issue remained unresolved,00:18:35
passed on by one political generation to another. Until the year00:18:40
of the invasion, the Kuwait issue was always not a00:18:45
new issue in00:18:48
1961 The President of Iraq at the time, Leader Abdul00:18:51
Karim Qasim, also spoke00:18:55
about Kuwait being an integral part of Iraq,00:18:59
and they even began studying it in schools and telling00:19:04
them that Kuwait is an integral part of00:19:09
Iraq. This goes back even in the00:19:13
thirties, during the monarchy, there were00:19:18
talks about Kuwait being... Part of Iraq,00:19:21
but of course things changed in the sixties. At the00:19:25
beginning of the sixties, Kuwait was a00:19:29
country that had become an independent state, a member of the00:19:33
Arab League and a member of the United Nations. It is not possible to00:19:37
use00:19:40
historical things. April of the year 1990. Another month has passed since the00:19:45
meeting of the Foreign Minister of Kuwait with Saadoun00:19:48
Hammadi in Iraq. The latter returns. With a new message that is00:19:53
not linked to the borders or to the00:19:56
bilateral security agreement, this time, Hammadi requests00:20:00
support for Iraq’s budget worth billions of00:20:04
dollars. The Emir of Kuwait responds firmly. The amount is not00:20:08
available to us and even exceeds its00:20:18
annual budget. The story, basically, that sparked it is the00:20:22
oil story. The story of oil prices, specifically, that00:20:24
sparked it started from the peak. Baghdad in the month of 50000:20:29
and 90. I think that other factors mean00:20:33
sovereignty, some shared wells, some00:20:38
border disputes. I think these are all00:20:42
subsidiary issues that are not00:20:47
the basis. In Baghdad, Saddam Hussein’s feeling became increasingly00:20:51
bitter about what he considered to be the denial of his brothers. Or this is what00:20:55
he wanted to show to his Arab surroundings,00:20:58
a leader burdened by the war. He is anxious, and it is difficult for him00:21:03
to distinguish between an ally and an adversary. As for him, the00:21:07
blood of the Iraqis was shed in defense of the Arab fever.00:21:11
If it were not for him, the ambitions of Iran would have long been accused of the revolution, and the00:21:14
Gulf would no longer00:21:17
exist. But now the time has come to pay off their00:21:20
great debt to Iraq. For Iraq to pay off its00:21:24
accumulated debts, its doubts towards Kuwait have become00:21:28
more apparent, and not Kuwait alone. Rather, towards the00:21:31
Americans and their friends in the Arabian Gulf.00:21:35
Iraq is in the stage of invasion. After it decided00:21:38
to invade, it began to00:21:40
escalate and had a terrible media machine00:21:44
until that time. I have no doubt that this00:21:50
media machine was controlling some of the00:21:53
media inside00:21:55
Kuwait. America’s survival in the Gulf00:21:59
is because the Gulf has become under The development of00:22:03
international politics and the development of the possibilities of the oil market and the00:22:07
increasing need for it by the Americans,00:22:13
Europeans, Japan, Eastern European countries,00:22:17
and perhaps the Soviet Union is the most00:22:21
important spot in00:22:25
the region from the Arab Aoun Council conference in00:22:28
the Jordanian capital, Amman. The alliance, which was established in00:22:31
1989 on the initiative of Iraq as an outsider to the00:22:36
Gulf Cooperation Council, which established Eight00:22:39
years before him, the Arab Cooperation Council included00:22:43
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. Saddam00:22:47
Hussein, in his speech, accused the United States of America of00:22:51
greed in the region’s capabilities and destiny after it00:22:55
had become one of the most important parts of the world thanks to00:23:00
its oil. This means that the Arabian Gulf region will be ruined00:23:04
if the people of the Gulf, and with them all, do not take heed. The Arabs00:23:11
will become governed by the00:23:15
American will. Saddam saw that the stated reason for which the00:23:18
American fleets gathered in the00:23:21
Arabian Gulf years ago was to protect the region from00:23:24
Iran during the war, and that its continued existence is00:23:28
no longer00:23:33
a justification. We must start with the Arab Cooperation Council,00:23:36
which was composed of Iraq, Jordan,00:23:40
and Egypt, and which Saddam defended. As a parallel force00:23:45
to the Gulf Cooperation Council, it included Iraq and Jordan,00:23:49
and Egypt participated in the beginning, beginning with the meeting in00:23:52
Amman, which began attacking the United States in00:23:56
harsh terms, which made American policy makers00:24:00
change their treatment of00:24:11
him. His00:24:12
speech card at the Arab Cooperation Council summit in00:24:16
Amman in February 1990, which spoke about the imperialism of the00:24:20
Americans. With imperialism00:24:28
and all the subsequent escalation, the execution of Bazoft, the00:24:31
British journalist. In this00:24:35
context, the United States threatened the00:24:38
Iraqi military industry up to the moment of the invasion.00:24:42
On the other hand,00:24:45
there was a growing snowball that began, in my estimation, from the00:24:55
88 words of Saddam that came in February of00:25:00
1990, a few days after... The troubled meeting00:25:04
between Saadoun Hammadi and Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad00:25:07
coincided with American media incitement against00:25:11
dictatorial regimes in the region, including00:25:14
Saddam’s regime, which was followed by a US State Department report00:25:17
criticizing the Iraqi government00:25:20
and its practice of torture. The American administration tried to00:25:24
contain the situation so as not to lose00:25:26
Iraq, and American officials and figures visited repeatedly to00:25:30
reassure Saddam Hussein. But it did not curb his00:25:35
doubts, so his speeches became threatening to betray00:25:40
and conspire against the Arab nation and the00:25:43
Palestinian cause. I mean,00:25:45
according to a review of the Iraqi documents for that00:25:48
period, yes, I think the United States00:25:51
was seeking to00:25:52
withdraw Iraq from the00:25:57
Turkish camp for many reasons, meaning this00:26:00
country’s oil situation means factors.00:26:03
The period of the seventies witnessed a group of00:26:06
American attempts. I mean, through00:26:09
documents, I know00:26:10
the, but nothing happened. I mean, there was no00:26:15
Iraqi response,00:26:17
also because of many factors, including the nature of00:26:21
the relationship with the Soviet Union, and so on. I00:26:23
mean, it was not easy for Iraq to move towards00:26:26
the camp.00:26:41
While we were in00:26:44
Baghdad, we met with Saddam Hussein, and this00:26:49
meeting was attended by John Kelly, April Glaspie, our00:26:53
American ambassador to Baghdad,00:26:56
and me. The first point that John Kelly made clear and00:27:02
emphasized more than once is that the president asked00:27:06
him to inform you00:27:08
directly of his desire to form the best00:27:13
possible relations with you and with him.00:27:16
Iraq Saddam leaned forward a little and said, “I don’t00:27:21
think I believe that this is00:27:24
true.” Then he looked over us from the window toward00:27:29
the south, as I remember, and began a self-dialogue in which he asked00:27:34
himself questions and answered them. He said, “What do I see00:27:39
when I look at the Gulf? Why do I see ships? What00:27:44
kind of ships are their warships? I wonder whose.”00:27:50
Are there American warships? Are there any American warships? I wonder00:27:55
why America has warships in the Gulf,00:27:59
with the war with Iran over for more than a year.00:28:04
Could it be00:28:06
because of me? He said, “If that’s not the case, they should00:28:11
take their warships and go00:28:15
home.” At that moment, I interrupted him and said, “Sir.”00:28:20
President, with all due respect to you, the00:28:24
American fleet has been in the Gulf since the end of00:28:28
World War II, and I am sarcastic in guessing that they00:28:33
will be there long after you and I leave, so they are under the illusion that they are00:28:50
providing cover00:28:54
for Israel until it comes and strikes some iron00:28:57
with the industry. You see, they are delusional. By God, we will not let the fire00:29:00
consume half of Israel, then.00:29:03
If00:29:05
you try, in this speech, the Iraqi president declared that00:29:08
he has possessed a dual chemical weapon for some time,00:29:12
a weapon that only the Americans00:29:15
and the Soviets possess, and that he is ready to use it against00:29:18
Israel if it targets Iraq’s military facilities with00:29:23
atomic weapons. In light of this escalation, George Bush00:29:26
Sr. sent a group of members of the American Congress to Iraq.00:29:29
At their head is Republican Senator00:29:31
Robert Dole. In the city of Mosul, a delegation met with the00:29:36
Iraqi president. During the session, Saddam00:29:39
reaffirmed that he had given instructions to his forces00:29:42
to prepare to launch chemical weapons toward00:29:45
Israel if it took the initiative to use its00:29:49
nuclear power against it. These threats terrified00:29:52
the Americans, Israel’s greatest supporter.00:29:56
Newsweek magazine published A picture of00:30:00
Saddam Hussein on the front page, and I think00:30:04
it published an elegy or something similar, or it mentioned00:30:08
that he was the worst dictator in the world. It was a00:30:11
very insulting remark. I know that when00:30:15
Saddam met with a congressional delegation during that spring, he00:30:19
showed them that picture, and when members of00:30:22
Congress tried to explain to him that the government00:30:25
America does not control Newsweek magazine or the00:30:29
newspapers. Saddam did not believe them. He did not know how00:30:34
things were done in the West, because things were00:30:37
happening differently in Iraq, where00:30:41
the government controlled what was published in the newspapers,00:30:44
and therefore it was easy for him to conclude00:30:48
that the United States government was Involved in00:30:51
publishing that photo and story in00:30:54
Newsweek magazine. Another example of Saddam's mentality is what00:30:59
happened in December00:31:03
1989. Tariq Aziz, who is believed to have been00:31:06
Secretary of State00:31:08
at the time, came to Washington in December00:31:12
and met with Secretary of State Baker in his suite, and00:31:16
I was the note taker of that. At the meeting,00:31:20
Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly was00:31:23
also present, and as soon as Tariq sat down, he said to the Secretary00:31:27
of State, “My president wants to know why00:31:31
you are trying to assassinate him.” Baker said, “What did he say? My president00:31:35
wants to know why you are trying to assassinate him.”00:31:39
Baker was shocked and looked at John Kelly and looked at me and00:31:43
said, “What is happening?” He said this. What00:31:48
my boss asked me to ask you. He said to him: We are not trying to00:31:52
assassinate your president at all. Our policy is to00:31:56
try to build a good relationship. Then Tariq Aziz said to him:00:32:00
Perhaps you do not know everything that is going on in your government.00:32:05
Baker exploded in anger and said, “I know everything that is going on00:32:09
in my government, and I don’t need him to tell me.”00:32:14
We are not trying to assassinate anyone, and you can tell the president about00:32:23
that. [Music] A week before the Baghdad summit was held, in00:32:27
late May00:32:30
1990, the American administration sent a memorandum00:32:33
to the League of Arab States in which it asked the00:32:36
Arab leaders not to use excessively enthusiastic language. The00:32:41
memorandum provoked Saddam, so it became00:32:45
clearer that the summit was about... The challenges of00:32:49
Arab national security supported the Palestinians in00:32:51
their uprising and weakened the Yemenis in their unity.00:32:57
Saddam Hussein took a platform to attack the United States of00:33:00
America and its allies in the region. At this00:33:03
summit, Saddam described America for the first time as00:33:11
indifferent, even if in an00:33:17
equivocal manner. Since the year 1986, and we were in the war in 1986, a00:33:23
kind of confusion prevailed in the oil market, and00:33:27
this confusion The reason for the non-compliance of some of our00:33:31
Arab brothers00:33:33
in particular with the decisions of00:33:37
OPEC, which flooded the00:33:42
oil market with what was surplus to what was needed, and00:33:47
prices fell until they sometimes reached 700:33:52
dollars with regard to Iraq, which is not the largest00:33:57
in production and does not have the largest share in00:34:02
OPEC. Every decrease in one barrel is00:34:08
one dollar, according to what was said00:34:10
to me. It is Iraq's loss of a billion dollars a00:34:16
year, so I say to those who do not intend to wage00:34:20
war on Iraq, I say, you see, this is a kind of00:34:23
war on. The escalation began starting from the month of 2 in00:34:29
1990, and the escalation took a gradual form until the month of00:34:38
Before the Iraqi leadership over the00:34:41
Gulf states, including over Kuwait, and also in00:34:44
the famous statement of Saddam Hussein, which is to cut off00:34:47
necks and not cut off00:34:50
livelihoods. Of course, there is a kind of blame that also00:34:55
falls on the Kuwaiti side. The Kuwaiti side was00:34:58
somewhat hardened in its position towards Iraq because it was00:35:02
always demanding the demarcation of the borders, and it was In00:35:05
statements about this matter, Saddam Hussein said00:35:09
that the fair price was between 22 and 24 dollars,00:35:13
while at that time the price was 12 or00:35:17
1400:35:18
dollars,00:35:20
but he did not clarify that oil was a00:35:25
weapon that was used by the00:35:29
United States to break the economy of the Soviet Union. One of the00:35:32
most important00:35:38
oil exporters, Saddam appeared in his speech as if he assumed good00:35:43
intentions, but in the same speech he spoke about an00:35:46
American-Gulf oil conspiracy. It soon00:35:50
became clear that he meant Kuwait and the Emirates. In00:35:54
his opinion, the United States benefited from00:35:56
Kuwait and the Emirates’ increased oil production00:35:59
and reduced prices during the Iraq war with00:36:02
Iran. He necessarily made Washington the winner of the00:36:06
continuation of00:36:07
the war. The oil issue became a political card raised by00:36:11
Saddam to put more pressure on Kuwait,00:36:15
which had been rejecting his demands for00:36:18
months. All of this was coming in the context of a global oil crisis. A00:36:23
global oil crisis was not its00:36:27
primary cause, as he was directly accused at the00:36:31
Baghdad summit. In May 1990, as Kuwait00:36:35
and the Emirates were accused of flooding the oil market, it was caused,00:36:40
according to what studies and a group of00:36:42
key actors in the oil industry in the00:36:44
region and in the world in OPEC at the time write. It was00:36:48
caused by the rise in oil prices that occurred in the mid-00:36:50
eighties, and the decline occurred00:36:53
due to the attempts of countries OPEC is confronting the rise of00:36:57
northern oil, meaning that it was not Iraq, or00:37:02
targeting Iraq, it was not the main factor00:37:04
that00:37:05
moved some Gulf states, including Kuwait, to00:37:09
flood the oil market. This rise, this00:37:12
context, means an attempt to reform the00:37:16
Iraqi economy, an attempt to restore financial00:37:19
and military strength, so that Iraq can play, and Iraq regains00:37:23
influence. The regional one,00:37:27
that is, Saddam,00:37:30
understood the attempts to flood the oil market as a00:37:34
direct targeting00:37:38
[music]00:37:41
of Iraq. In mid-July of the year 1990, nothing could stop the00:37:46
escalating tension. A memorandum sent by the00:37:50
Iraqi Foreign Minister to the League of00:37:53
Arab States. Your Excellency, Brother Al-Shad Al-Leqli,00:37:57
Secretary General of the League of Arab States. A00:38:02
fraternal greeting. It is known that Since the era of colonialism00:38:06
and the divisions it imposed on the Arab nation,00:38:10
there has been an unresolved issue between Iraq and Kuwait00:38:14
regarding determining the borders. The governments of00:38:18
Kuwait and the Emirates participated in a planned operation to close the00:38:23
oil market with more production.00:38:26
Kuwait added to these deliberate abuses00:38:30
another abuse, which was installed since00:38:35
1980, especially in the circumstances of The war established oil facilities00:38:39
on the southern part of the Iraqi Al-Rami field00:38:43
and proceeded to withdraw oil from it. Kuwait responded with its letter00:38:48
dated the twelfth of July of the00:38:51
same month addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States,00:38:55
with His Excellency the respected brother Al-Shader Al-Qalibi,00:38:58
Secretary-General of the League of00:39:01
Arab States. Good greetings. This is considered a forgery.00:39:06
In reality, and as a presentation of the opposite facts, as Iraq has a00:39:11
long record of transgressions on00:39:14
Kuwaiti territory, anyone who follows the issue of oil prices00:39:18
realizes clearly that the deterioration in prices was the result of a00:39:21
global problem affecting several parties. While the00:39:26
Iraqi memorandum claimed that Kuwait would withdraw oil00:39:29
from the southern part of the Iraqi Rommel field,00:39:32
it must be confirmed. Here, this part00:39:36
of the field is located within Kuwaiti territory.00:39:40
Meanwhile, the Iraqi forces had00:39:42
already gathered on the southern border with Kuwait. The00:39:46
matter was not hidden from the Arab or American leaders,00:39:56
two weeks before the start of the invasion, when Saddam was00:40:00
threatening Kuwait and the00:40:03
United Arab Emirates. The United States continued. With these two00:40:07
governments to carry out some00:40:11
small joint military exercises to prove to Saddam that they have a00:40:15
friend in the United States, the00:40:19
United Arab Emirates agreed, and immediately00:40:23
simple exercises were carried out. We flew in command planes,00:40:27
and the Emirati fighter planes00:40:30
practiced refueling00:40:33
American planes. It was not an attack, but rather a00:40:37
very simple exercise. But it was symbolic. Kuwait00:40:41
immediately rejected our proposal that one of the00:40:45
American ships in the Gulf dock at the port, and that00:40:48
was only a visit. The response came00:40:52
directly with rejection and that it does not allow any00:40:56
foreign warships to be present on its territory under any00:41:06
circumstances. The most controversial meeting in the history of00:41:10
this crisis was received by the Ambassador. The American woman in00:41:13
Baghdad, April Glaspie, was instructed to discuss the crisis00:41:17
with Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials, and after a00:41:21
short meeting with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nizar Hamdoun,00:41:24
he invited her again for another important meeting. A car waited for her00:41:30
in front of the Ministry’s headquarters, and when she arrived at the00:41:33
desired place, she discovered that she was meeting with Saddam00:41:36
Hussein personally and held a spontaneous meeting with him that would last for two00:41:42
hours. Saddam did not usually meet with00:41:45
ambassadors, and this was perhaps the only time00:41:49
other than the congressional delegation. She was concerned about the escalation. She00:41:54
was planning to travel to London for medical reasons. She did not00:41:58
want to leave if a war was00:42:01
going to break out, so she put pressure on Saddam during that00:42:05
meeting and he assured her that nothing would happen while00:42:10
she was gone. According to the Iraqi minutes of the meeting,00:42:15
Saddam expresses to Aspirat the restoration of relations with00:42:18
the United States and carries a message to President00:42:22
George Bush Sr. Then he lists the reasons that call00:42:26
for a cautious stance towards Washington, sometimes amounting to00:42:30
a threat, stressing his belief in the existence of a00:42:33
Gulf oil conspiracy that America stands behind. Saddam says00:42:37
that he wants peace if he initiates it. Others, but he will00:42:41
not hesitate to avoid war00:42:45
if they want it. We are willing to have friendship without00:42:49
running after it. We do our duty. We reject harm00:42:54
from any side. If there is an insistence on harming him,00:42:57
we will resist. This is a human right, whether the harm comes from00:43:02
America, the Emirates, Kuwait, or Israel.00:43:06
Glaspie responds to it with the desire of the administration. The American woman00:43:09
in friendship understands Iraq's00:43:12
economic crisis and its need for money to cover what00:43:16
the war left behind. Then she asks her pivotal question about the mobilization of00:43:20
Iraqi forces on the border with00:43:23
Kuwait in the usual manner. This is not our concern,00:43:26
but when we see that this thing is happening in the context of the00:43:30
speech that was given on the anniversary of the revolution, then we00:43:34
read and see. On the details in my letter to the00:43:37
Foreign Minister, and then we look at the Iraqi point of view00:43:41
regarding the actions of the UAE and Kuwait. In the00:43:44
final analysis, they are parallel to a00:43:48
military aggression against Iraq. It seems that it is reasonable for me00:43:52
at least to be concerned. For this reason, I received00:43:56
a directive to address the question in a spirit of friendship00:44:00
and not in a spirit of confrontation.00:44:04
Your intentions match the details of the Iraqi report to a00:44:08
large extent with a letter revealed in 2011 among the00:44:12
WikiLeaks documents that Glaspie had sent to00:44:16
the American administration in which she said that Saddam was00:44:19
friendly, logical, and even warm throughout the two hours.00:44:24
On the border issue, Glaspie indicated that she assured00:44:27
Saddam that the United States had no position on00:44:31
Arab affairs.00:44:34
Like this,00:44:37
the response was from April Glaspie that the00:44:42
United States does not interfere in the disputes that occur00:44:45
between the00:44:47
Arabs. This word was understood as a green light00:44:53
from America for Saddam to enter00:44:59
Kuwait. During the meeting, the phone rang and00:45:04
Saddam was summoned to answer. Then he returned and told Glaspie that00:45:07
Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was saying that a00:45:10
meeting would take place. Soon it will be arranged between the Iraqis00:45:15
and the Kuwaitis. During that meeting, Saddam left00:45:19
because one of his aides said that President Mubarak was00:45:23
talking on the phone and wanted to talk to him. Then he came back and00:45:27
said that President Mubarak was on the phone and he was00:45:31
asking me the same question that you just asked and I told00:45:35
him there is no need to worry, nothing will happen and we know that00:45:40
this The call only happened to be documented, because00:45:44
Mubarak called President Bush within an hour00:45:47
to tell him that I had just spoken with Saddam and he reassured me00:45:51
that there would be no invasion and he would not take any00:45:55
action.00:46:01
Glaspie began to feel comfortable with the move. The Iraqi president00:46:06
immediately congratulated Glass. She left the meeting after that and went on a00:46:11
private vacation while the region stood still. On the brink of00:46:21
another war, however, Saddam believed that he had done something that00:46:26
would pass because of the logic of the Cold War. What00:46:30
Saddam did not realize, and this is the basic killing, what he did not realize was that he made00:46:34
the decision to invade at the moment00:46:38
when the world of the Cold War had00:46:41
ended and Saddam had become the00:46:54
example00:47:04
in Washington and before... Four days after the invasion, the00:47:08
intelligence community presented an intelligence briefing00:47:14
[music],00:47:26
and at the conclusion of the briefing there was a text stating00:47:30
that Saddam would almost certainly present to the Kuwaitis a set of00:47:33
demands, including payment for the00:47:36
stolen Iraqi oil, and unless he received what00:47:39
he considered adequate payments, he would almost certainly00:47:42
resort to00:47:49
military action. The question on many people's minds was00:47:52
what was Saddam's intention. The majority of people00:47:57
in Washington believed that Iraq would not invade Kuwait and that his00:48:01
actions were to intimidate Kuwait. But about a00:48:05
week to ten days ago, the CIA changed00:48:10
its analysis and decided that there was in fact an00:48:14
intention to invade, and a week later they said that they He00:48:18
will invade, and this estimate was mostly due to the number of00:48:23
bases. We saw the movement of forces in Iraq towards00:48:27
the south, in addition to Saddam’s speech00:48:33
and his followers. Arab diplomacy was intensely00:48:37
active to contain the crisis. The Egyptian president00:48:40
at the time, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, was traveling on00:48:44
fleeting visits between Riyadh, Kuwait, and Baghdad in00:48:48
attempts to stop the media war between Iraq00:48:52
and Kuwait. Mubarak reassured those around him at the time that00:48:56
there was nothing to worry about, as the Iraqis would not00:49:00
take military action against their brothers in00:49:04
Kuwait. The same message was conveyed by the00:49:07
Jordanian monarch, King Hussein, after his visit to Iraq,00:49:10
according to the memoirs of the Jordanian prime minister at the time,00:49:13
Mudar Badran, but Saddam Hussein was on the verge00:49:17
of invasion, and he did not want to reassure him. Until the Kuwaitis00:49:21
made the concessions he wanted from00:49:24
the beginning,00:49:27
Saddam was giving guarantees to all the heads of00:49:32
Arab countries that Iraq would not enter, and this is available testimony that00:49:38
President Hosni Mubarak mentioned that he boarded00:49:41
the plane and it was okay to take the assurance that00:49:44
Kuwait would not be attacked by the Iraqi army.00:49:48
Of course, this contributed00:49:51
to the reassurance of the Kuwaiti political leadership. It00:49:55
also announced its decision not to postpone00:50:26
hours before the invasion of Kuwait. Two Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations met00:50:30
under Saudi sponsorship. Seven people from the00:50:34
two neighboring countries were at one table. The00:50:38
Kuwaiti delegation was headed by Crown Prince Sheikh Saad00:50:41
Al-Abdullah, and the Iraqi delegation was headed by Vice00:50:44
President Izzah Al-Douri. After 40 minutes of discussion, the00:50:49
two delegations left the hall to perform. Morocco prayed00:50:52
that negotiations would be completed after that, but the00:50:56
Iraqi delegation was no longer the role of second-in-command in00:51:00
Iraq for many years and did not see a reason to00:51:03
complete the dialogue as long as the Kuwaitis stuck to00:51:06
their position. Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah tried to00:51:10
convince him to issue a joint statement to meet again, but he00:51:15
refused to go to Medina00:51:18
for a visit. The Prophet’s Mosque. While the Kuwaitis returned00:51:21
at night on a plane to Kuwait, the possibility of00:51:26
invading their country remained ruled out. Despite all00:51:29
indications, the Kuwaitis saw no choice but00:51:32
political00:51:36
and diplomatic communication.00:51:38
According to the information I have, meeting with his grandfather00:51:42
means an agreement was reached at the end of it, after00:51:49
he or she was the Iraqi representative. The00:51:52
Iraqi representative asked Izza Ibrahim for 10 billion in00:51:57
support. Sheikh Saad Abdullah said, “I don’t have the circumstances.00:52:02
Circumstances do not00:52:03
help. Circumstances are not like when you asked me in00:52:06
1981 and I gave you 6 billion in a week.00:52:12
Circumstances do not help me if I give you 1000:52:17
billion.” Prince Abdullah was the Crown Prince at that00:52:20
time. He intervened, meaning pressure and pressure, until they reached 900:52:23
billion. Abdullah said, “And from me I am the00:52:27
tenth.” I mean, come on, Izzah Ibrahim, get rid of00:52:29
this issue. Izzah Ibrahim got up and grew up and00:52:33
prayed, according to the narration of Sheikh Sa’ad. I mean, he didn’t even00:52:38
want to listen to the agreement. He was done with us. I mean, he said, so00:52:42
when he finished. From the prayer, he said to him, “We have agreed on it.” He00:52:44
said, “Okay, we will meet, God willing.” He said, “00:52:48
We will continue the dialogue on Saturday in Baghdad.”00:52:50
The agreement was reached. It was a Tuesday that00:52:54
the dialogue would be completed on Saturday in00:52:58
Baghdad. Sheikh Saad, when he flew and went to medicine in Kuwait on00:53:01
Tuesday night at the airport, stated, “We agreed.” He said, “We00:53:05
agreed.” On the resumption of00:53:08
meetings in Baghdad on Saturday,00:53:13
Prince Abdullah made the same00:53:14
statement. People were relieved that the crisis had subsided a little. By that00:53:24
same night, the Iraqi forces moved and began00:53:33
[music].00:53:36
I mean, on the second of August 1990, the00:53:40
Iraqi vehicles belonging to the Republican Guard made00:53:43
their way towards Kuwait, one step at a time.00:53:47
Its details were not known to the military leaders and politicians closest00:53:50
to00:53:51
Saddam. Within hours, the forces will arrive in the00:53:55
capital, and since the love of the leaders of Kuwait towards Saudi Arabia, to00:53:58
escape the danger of capture or00:54:00
assassination, the Iraqi leadership will claim its entry to00:54:04
liberate the Kuwaitis from their regime, at the request of the00:54:08
rebels, and Saddam will say that the time has00:54:11
come for the branch to return. Going back to Kuwait,00:54:16
going to the land of Iraq, Saddam will declare Kuwait as the00:54:20
19th governorate00:54:23
of Iraq and six birds. This story was00:54:30
written in the official Iraqi speech and in writings that the Minister of Defense himself00:54:33
did not know, considering that he and the00:54:36
Republican Guard were the ones who carried out the invasion, but without a doubt there were00:54:41
reservations and objections to the decision to invade, meaning...00:54:45
At least we know the position of Tariq Aziz as it appeared in a00:54:50
press interview. We know the position of Lieutenant General Nizar Al-Khazraj,00:54:55
who was the Chief of Staff of the Army, as he wrote in00:54:58
his memoirs. We deviate from some sources that00:55:02
circulated the position of the head of the intelligence service. I am that00:55:04
Fadel00:55:06
Barak, who it seems to me was executed in the year 9200:55:10
because of... This was due to his position, due to his vocal00:55:14
rejection of the decision to invade00:55:20
Kuwait. There was more than one scenario. There was a00:55:23
scenario of border skirmishes, a scenario of00:55:28
occupying some border sites, a scenario of00:55:33
occupying part of the lands in northern Kuwait without00:55:37
completely occupying Kuwait. There was no scenario of00:55:42
occupying the entire country, so it was. The surprise00:55:46
of the occupation is an unexpected surprise on the part of the00:55:51
political leadership of Kuwait towards the00:55:55
Iraqi political leadership.00:55:57
Today, the great people of Iraq have fled00:56:03
from the mountain, from the land where Zakho is to the00:56:08
sea where Kuwait00:56:12
and the Ahmadi are. Many officers did not00:56:16
know that there was a big difference between the decision to invade00:56:20
Kuwait and the decision to start the war with Iran. The war with00:56:24
Iran began after many negotiations within00:56:28
the party with the leadership of the Iraqi army. This is true00:56:33
to a00:56:38
large degree. I mean, the decision to invade00:56:42
directly meant those who led the00:56:46
Oso Treaty in00:56:48
1993. The decision to invade. The invasion of Kuwait led directly00:56:52
to settling the situation. The civil war in Lebanon00:56:55
meant the collapse.00:56:57
Aoun,00:56:59
etc. I believe it was an earthquake no less than00:57:05
the 67th setback, or other00:57:10
major events that witnessed the region, but its greatest impact,00:57:13
in my estimation, is greater than its impact on00:57:16
the region and its impact in Iraq, so in00:57:19
my estimation, when we go back, we will solve the matters that happened after the00:57:22
American invasion. After 2003, there are a00:57:25
number of factors in order to understand why00:57:28
Iraqi society went in this direction or chose these00:57:33
options. My basic assessment is that it is all the result of00:57:37
what happened at the moment of 9091. I mean, Iraq is00:57:41
still paying the price for that decision that was taken in00:57:50
April. The invasion of Kuwait continued for seven months, leaving00:57:54
hundreds behind. The loss of prisoners and prisoners and losses estimated at billions of00:57:58
dollars did not end except with Arab00:58:02
and foreign military intervention that forced the Iraqi forces to00:58:07
withdraw. The invasion was Saddam's tragic sin, the00:58:12
price of which was paid by Iraq, a siege and sovereignty, and the Arabs were00:58:15
divided and dispersed from the summer of 1990 until the fall of00:58:21
Saddam00:58:23
and his regime00:58:27
[music]Description:
يبحث برنامج كواليس في هذه الحلقة عن خفايا قرار الرئيس العراقي الراحل صدّام حسين بغزو الكويت عام 1990، ويعود الفيلم إلى الحيثيات التي سبقت الغزو وما رافقها من تصعيد سياسي وعسكري، ويسلط الضوء على تفاصيل مسار الدبلوماسية العربية الطويل لاحتواء الأزمة، والدور الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في الصراع الذي بدأ كامتداد للصراع على النفط والحدود وصولاً إلى حرب ضربت وحدة العرب في صميمها. 00:00 - مقدمة 2:14 -البلدان بعد حرب الخليج الأولى 5:45 - الحاجة الاقتصادية هي المدخل 8:51 - تصاعد اللقاءات الثنائية المباشرة 15:11 - طرح أزمة الحدود في اللقاءات الكويتية العراقية 19:38 - تصعيد صدام حسين تجاه الكويت 23:30 - تصعيد غربي تجاه صدام حسين 29:05 - تواصل مباشر بين صدام وأميركا 32:18 - الذهاب إلى جامعة الدول العربية 39:50 - عرض أميركي لمساعدة عسكرية للكويت والإمارات 41:01 - لقاء صدام حسين مع السفيرة الأميركية آبريل غلاسبي 46:55 - تقديرات استخبارية أميركية 48:32 - تحرّكات الدبلوماسية العربية لاحتواء الأزمة 50:12 - اجتماع جدّة واللقاء الأخير بين العراق والكويت قبل الغزو 53:27 - هل قرر صدّام حسين غزو الكويت وحيداً؟ 56:35 - تأثير غزو الكويت تابعوا أبرز الأخبار، وآخر مستجدات الأحداث العربية والعالمية، عبر البث المباشر للتلفزيون العربي على يوتيوب 👇👇 Live▶ https://www.youtube.com/c/AlarabyTv_News/live لا تنسوا الاشتراك في قناتنا وتفعيل زر الجرس 🔔 ▼ موقع التلفزيون العربي ⟵ http://www.alaraby.com/ ▼ تابع التلفزيون العربي على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي فيسبوك ⟵ https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser انستغرام ⟵ https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser تويتر ⟵ https://twitter.com/alarabytv
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