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Russian
00:00:00
[Music]00:00:14
Good evening. Intensive and intense negotiations between the00:00:18
Arab countries are taking place behind the scenes to restore00:00:21
relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.00:00:24
The negotiations are multi-track. The details are many00:00:27
because the Syrian file does not only concern the neighboring countries,00:00:31
but all the countries of the region, including the non-00:00:34
Arab countries, Turkey, Israel, and the00:00:38
biggest say is the United States. The European Union,00:00:41
Russia, China, etc. Therefore, we can discuss00:00:45
this issue from different angles in future episodes,00:00:48
but in this episode we seek to answer two00:00:51
questions in particular. The first question: Why is the00:00:56
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which hates Bashar00:00:59
al-Assad, leading the00:01:00
campaign for normalization with him? The second question: Why do00:01:04
Arab countries such as Qatar and Morocco oppose and make reservations?00:01:08
And Yemen is restoring relations00:01:12
with Bashar al-Assad until this moment. The00:01:15
third question is: What is the reality of the Egyptian position? Before00:01:18
trying to answer all these questions,00:01:22
I will remind you of the background of the events and how we got here.00:01:26
The issue began, of course, with the Arab Spring revolutions, whose00:01:30
demonstrations and protests moved from Tunisia00:01:33
to Egypt to other Arab countries. Among them is Syria.00:01:37
Beginning in March 2011, the protests expanded, and00:01:41
Bashar al-Assad faced these protests with00:01:45
extreme violence, accusing the protesters of being nothing but00:01:48
agents of external forces wishing to destroy the stability of the00:01:53
Syrian state and conspiring against the ruling regime.00:01:57
There, the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries,00:02:01
watched what was happening at first with cautious calm, and then00:02:05
quickly I moved to the camp of those who supported00:02:08
the opposition and wanted to overthrow the Bashar al-00:02:12
Assad regime, and this position was based on two00:02:16
basic considerations. The first consideration was the very severe violence00:02:19
used by Bashar al-Assad,00:02:39
but the most important reason was Bashar al-Assad’s relationship00:02:44
with the source of the primary threat to the Gulf states, which is00:02:47
Iran. Bashar al-Assad and before him his father, Hafez00:02:50
al-Assad. It was and still is a fundamental ally00:02:53
of Iran, which represented the greatest source of threat00:02:57
and danger to the stability of the Gulf states, at least00:02:59
at that time.00:03:01
Therefore, the Gulf states saw the development of00:03:05
events as an opportunity to reduce Iranian influence by overthrowing00:03:08
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The party would have been if00:03:13
we were able to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, who was in a00:03:16
very weak position. In the face of the widespread protests00:03:22
and getting rid of him, especially since getting rid of them is00:03:26
welcomed by the United States, European countries, and00:03:30
Israel, and therefore he has no allies who can00:03:35
save him, and if that happens, he will00:03:39
come to the rescue of the Bashar al-Assad regime, a00:03:44
Sunni regime that will naturally be an ally of the00:03:49
Gulf states and an opponent, or that is to say, hostile00:03:53
to Iran. Or at least not an ally of it.00:03:58
I also remind you that what happened in Syria had00:04:03
other dimensions. The Gulf states were watching what was happening in00:04:07
Syria in 2011 and they felt particularly distressed by the00:04:12
successive Iranian victories on the00:04:16
regional scene. I mean, these events were preceded by a00:04:22
defeat for the Arab countries in the Iraqi file. The00:04:26
Gulf countries in particular are that Iran00:04:29
defeated them by extending its influence over Iraq at the expense of00:04:33
Gulf interests when Nour al-Maliki, the00:04:37
Iranian ally par excellence, took over the reins of power00:04:41
there beginning in 2006 and continuing in 2014. The loss of00:04:45
Iraq was not an easy matter for the00:04:49
Gulf countries and for the Arab countries in general. The00:04:53
second matter is that the00:04:56
Iranian victory in The Iraqi arena was a victory, of course,00:05:00
in the Lebanese file, where Hezbollah, the00:05:04
Iranian side, had the first and last word on the00:05:07
Lebanese file, and therefore foreign interests00:05:10
were in danger. The two00:05:12
files were preceded by Iran’s success in strengthening and strengthening its00:05:18
relationship with the00:05:22
Palestinian resistance groups, especially Hamas and the Jihad group, and00:05:26
there were signs of unrest in Yemen that00:05:31
appeared to the decision-makers. In the Gulf states, the00:05:35
Houthi group and its allies, who were somewhat close to Iran at the time,00:05:39
began to appear in the picture, which was00:05:42
also seen as a threat to the Gulf states. For all these00:05:47
reasons, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were not satisfied with00:05:51
freezing Syria’s membership beginning on November 16,00:05:55
2011, nor with severing relations with Bashar al-Assad,00:05:59
but they sought Saudi Arabia and the countries00:06:03
Other Gulf countries, such as Qatar and the UAE in particular, sought to00:06:08
overthrow Bashar al-Assad using force, and00:06:12
of course, the details of these countries’ attempt00:06:17
to ally and coordinate with Turkey, with the00:06:22
United States, and with other countries have become known and are no00:06:27
longer a secret. In any case, far from00:06:29
the details and secrets, a single statement by the00:06:33
Saudi Foreign Minister in public can be revealed. It clarifies this00:06:36
fact without any meaning,00:06:40
without any ambiguity. On November 14, 2015, the00:06:47
Saudi Foreign Minister at the time, Adel al-Jubeir, said that if the00:06:51
political process fails to overthrow Assad,00:06:54
Riyadh will continue to support the opposition in order to00:06:57
remove him by force. The00:07:00
Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, continued to00:07:04
support armed groups against Bashar al-Assad.00:07:09
Other countries tried, the United States of America, Turkey, a story that became00:07:13
well-known, but Iran intervened, Russia intervened,00:07:18
after several years, the Russia-Iran00:07:23
Bashar al-Assad camp won, as it has become known now, and for reasons00:07:26
that mean we dealt with it a lot and others dealt with it, meaning00:07:30
the war ended with a winning camp and a losing camp, the00:07:33
winning camp, Bashar’s camp, Iran, Russia, the00:07:37
losing camp, the Gulf states. Most of the00:07:40
Arab countries, Turkey, the United States, the00:07:44
European Union, this is the losing camp.00:07:48
With the loss of the war in Syria, this means the00:07:51
evaporation of the idea of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad, who00:07:55
has become a reality and has survived the overthrow or00:08:01
collapse of the regime. He has survived and has also become able to00:08:05
control most of the Syrian lands, but not all of the00:08:08
Syrian lands. The camp has split. The defeated in00:08:12
Syria have two00:08:13
main trends: one that sees the necessity of recognizing the status00:08:18
quo and reconciling with Bashar al-Assad.00:08:20
This camp was led by the United Arab Emirates00:08:24
and Bahrain, and another camp that sees the necessity of continuing00:08:28
and putting pressure on Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and each of them has its own00:08:31
logic: the Emirati-Bahraini logic,00:08:35
which of course was supported by countries that from00:08:39
the beginning did not want to overthrow him. Bashar al-Assad00:08:41
is like Algeria, for example, and like Egypt, which00:08:46
wanted to reconcile with Bashar al-Assad and not put pressure00:08:49
on him from early 2014 and 2015. The logic of the00:08:56
Emirates and Bahrain was that since Bashar al-Assad had00:08:59
become a fait accompli and since we failed to00:09:03
overthrow him, it is better for us to restore relations00:09:06
with him. Three goals will be achieved for us. The00:09:10
first goal is if we maintain relations. This means00:09:14
that we will be able to00:09:18
protect our interests when the Syrian file is settled.00:09:21
How will we protect our interests00:09:24
if we are completely distant from the Syrian file?00:09:26
Secondly,00:09:29
if the problem is the problem of00:09:31
Iranian influence, then Iran has become influential. This influence has grown in00:09:34
Syria, and this influence will grow stronger until00:09:38
we continue our policy00:09:40
of isolating Syria, because Bashar al-Assad will00:09:43
have no choice but Iran and Russia.00:09:46
Naturally, Iran’s influence will increase, but if we open00:09:50
our doors to him, his need for Iran will decrease,00:09:53
and thus Iran’s influence will gradually decrease in Syria. The00:09:57
third reason is that it is Syria. In any case,00:10:01
its tragedies will end sooner or later, and there are00:10:05
economic benefits from opening up to it. It is the00:10:09
reconstruction file that many00:10:12
foreign and non-foreign companies are thirsting for. The00:10:16
tributary camp that was led by Saudi Arabia believes that it is00:10:18
true that Bashar al-Assad survived the process of overthrowing them00:10:22
and that he is now extending his control over... Most of the00:10:25
Syrian territories and that he won the war due to the support of00:10:29
his allies Iran and Russia,00:10:32
but neither he nor Iran nor Russia will be00:10:35
able to continue and enjoy this00:10:38
victory because of their very difficult economic conditions and00:10:41
that continued diplomatic, political00:10:45
and economic pressure will lead to the collapse of this00:10:48
regime that will not be able to continue in His position00:10:51
if the Syrians remained hungry. In any case,00:10:57
the split began to become clear and the disagreement over the00:11:01
Syrian file became clear. The UAE, in December 2018,00:11:04
announced the restoration of relations with Bashar al-Assad00:11:07
and announced the reopening of its embassy in Damascus.00:11:10
One day later, Bahrain did the same thing,00:11:15
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remained demanding in00:11:18
its position, and this was Intransigence is one of the reasons for the failure of the00:11:22
call for the failure of the Algerian attempts to return00:11:26
Syria or to invite Syria to the Arab League conference00:11:30
last year, but the sudden change occurred,00:11:34
at least for non-observers, in00:11:39
February00:11:40
2023, when the Saudi Foreign Minister,00:11:44
Prince Faisal bin Farhan, said on February 18,00:11:48
2023, this year, I mean, during a00:11:54
dialogue session. At the Munich Security Conference, a00:11:58
consensus began to form in the Arab world that there is00:12:01
no point in isolating Syria and that dialogue with00:12:05
Damascus is required at some point in order to at least00:12:09
address humanitarian issues, including the return of00:12:12
refugees.00:12:15
Accordingly, signs are beginning to appear that00:12:20
there is a change in the Saudi position. Preliminary00:12:24
steps began to restore relations between00:12:29
Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The00:12:31
steps followed quickly, and the first of these00:12:35
signals and steps was an announcement on00:12:38
Saudi official television late on00:12:41
Thursday, March 22, meaning only 12 days after the00:12:46
restoration of Iranian-Saudi relations00:12:49
or the announcement of the restoration of00:12:52
Saudi relations. On March 10, the00:12:55
Saudi Al-Ikhbariya television channel00:12:58
announced this evening that there were talks to00:13:01
resume consular services between the two countries,00:13:04
and leaks from many newspapers began talking about the00:13:08
proximity of normalization between the two countries. Then00:13:13
visits began to take place at the level of security personnel00:13:16
and intelligence chiefs, delegations here and there, until00:13:19
we recently arrived. Last April, there were00:13:23
mutual visits between00:13:26
the two capitals. The Saudi Foreign Minister visited00:13:28
Damascus, the Syrian Foreign Minister visited Riyadh. The00:13:31
Saudi position means that it has become more developed and00:13:35
has moved from the desire for normalization to Hamas00:13:39
to convince other Arab countries to normalize. It is conducting00:13:43
marathon negotiations in various Arab capitals to00:13:46
convince the hesitant countries of the necessity of normalization with...00:13:50
Bashar al-Assad00:13:52
and unfreezing its membership in the League of Arab States00:13:55
before May 19, the day that will witness the00:13:59
holding of the Arab summit, which will be elaborated00:14:02
and hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.00:14:05
The question remains, why all this Saudi enthusiasm, why00:14:08
this sudden change in Saudi policy.00:14:11
The truth, in my estimation, is that there are three reasons, the00:14:15
first and least important. It is the desire of the Kingdom of00:14:18
Saudi Arabia that the Arab summit00:14:20
that will be held on May 19 on its territory be the00:14:24
most successful among all the Arab summits that preceded it.00:14:27
It wants to achieve in this summit what no00:14:30
other Arab country has succeeded in achieving. It can place this00:14:34
desire under a broader umbrella, which is to strengthen Its image00:14:38
as the most influential country among the00:14:41
Arab countries and the most important among all the countries in the00:14:44
Arab and non-Arab region. The Kingdom is00:14:48
enjoying these days in recent years00:14:52
an influence that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has00:14:56
never enjoyed before. This is because of its00:15:00
growing economic power on the one hand and its stability,00:15:03
of course, but also because of the decline in the influence of00:15:07
competing countries. It has the most prominent of these countries, of course, at00:15:10
all, and the country that has had this00:15:13
status for years,00:15:41
but for two reasons that are more important than the issue of influence, and the issue of00:15:45
influence is not a simple issue. It is two00:15:49
considerations, and both of them are linked to the other. The00:15:53
first consideration is the desire for prosperity, and the second issue00:15:56
is achieving security and stability. The Saudi state has00:16:01
always had a goal for many years. In the context of00:16:05
its desire to maintain its prosperity and00:16:09
its status as a rich country, this suggests that it diversify00:16:13
its sources of income away from oil. Most of the00:16:16
Saudi income still comes from oil, and oil00:16:19
will remain a good source of income for many years,00:16:23
but in the end it will disappear as a00:16:28
main source of income and its returns will decline. Accordingly,00:16:32
Saudi Arabia began to seriously seek to diversify its sources00:16:36
of income so that it would have prosperous tourism,00:16:39
be a center for aviation business, be a center for00:16:42
industry, and so on. But because it is diversifying its sources of00:16:47
income, this requires stability and security for its borders00:16:51
and for all vital areas because it is the national00:16:55
waterway in the Red Sea. The waters of the00:16:58
Arabian Gulf have extended borders that border countries.00:17:02
Many and close to Syria, of course, which is00:17:05
the subject of our conversation today. This security guarantees two00:17:08
needs for it. The first is for its oil exports to flow00:17:14
to the outside world without being affected by00:17:17
any military operations or unrest, because00:17:22
if its exports are affected, its economic returns are affected,00:17:26
and if its economic returns00:17:29
from oil are affected, its plans are affected.00:17:32
To diversify the sources of its economies, because in the end00:17:36
it depends on oil sources to spend00:17:39
on its other projects far from oil.00:17:43
Achieving security and stability has been an urgent goal of the Kingdom of00:17:47
Saudi Arabia in recent years,00:17:51
especially after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions.00:17:54
Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has found00:17:57
its security, stability, plans, and hope in diversifying its00:18:02
sources. Its economy is threatened from several sources. The00:18:06
first source is, of course, the chaos that followed the00:18:09
Arab Spring revolutions, which could have affected the00:18:12
Saudi regime and00:18:14
Saudi stability. Two, the00:18:17
escalation of Iranian influence. Three, the00:18:22
American policies that did not00:18:25
mean reassuring the kingdom, the Americans’ desire to00:18:29
leave the region,00:18:32
and the00:18:34
lack of promises and treaties. Boycott by Washington to guarantee the00:18:40
protection of the Gulf states and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.00:18:44
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia began to face the dangers00:18:47
that could threaten its stability, and thus00:18:50
its hope to remain a country with rich prosperity. This00:18:55
means00:18:58
facing it as it went through two stages from 2011 and 12,00:19:03
which is the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions,00:19:05
until the end of 2020 in these years. It is time for the00:19:10
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront these00:19:12
dangers using harsh means and00:19:17
military force. We have talked about this a lot and we can00:19:20
talk about it later. Saudi Arabia. We saw it in00:19:23
a way that we had not seen before. We saw Saudi Arabia00:19:26
using force on its own and not through00:19:30
its allies, the United States or00:19:33
NATO, using force, for example. Restoring00:19:37
stability in Bahrain, which was threatened by00:19:41
protesters she considered to represent00:19:45
Iranian interests and threaten an allied Sunni regime. No, in00:19:49
Bahrain,00:19:50
we saw the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia intervening00:19:53
militarily in Yemen against the Houthis and against00:19:58
Iranian influence, from its point of view. Beginning in 2015,00:20:01
we saw the Kingdom intervening to support the00:20:05
vulnerable groups with money and weapons to overthrow them. Bashar al-Assad,00:20:08
and publicly we saw the kingdom trying to get rid of some00:20:15
opponents whom it thought represented agendas00:20:19
seeking00:20:21
[music]00:20:23
meaning to attack Saudi stability at home. The00:20:28
most prominent of these, of course, was the Saudi journalist00:20:32
Jamal Khashoggi, who was liquidated in its consulate00:20:36
in Istanbul.00:20:37
The detention of the Prime Minister of Lebanon, who was Saad00:20:41
Hariri. For more than ten days or00:20:46
two weeks,00:20:48
this detention was the Lebanese description of what happened when they00:20:51
invited Saad Hariri to Riyadh, and the same description00:20:55
was used by France and other countries, but Saudi Arabia00:20:59
denies that it was detention, and this is a long story00:21:03
to explain. The prominent example is also the boycott00:21:07
and isolation of what resembles a blockade of Qatar with other countries.00:21:10
These are Egypt, Bahrain, and the Emirates from 2017 until the00:21:13
end of 2020, and so on,00:21:17
and of course confronting Iran on different arenas00:21:20
with different means. Beginning at the end of 2020,00:21:26
Saudi Arabia began to change and began to think of other means00:21:30
to achieve the same goals. What are the same goals?00:21:33
I achieve stability and security that00:21:36
help me achieve my goals of00:21:40
prosperity, so that That my exports flow safely and that00:21:44
I can use oil revenues to diversify00:21:48
my economies, which means00:21:51
building other projects related to oil, and00:21:54
that they began to use oil. This period is witnessing a period of00:22:00
calm with the opponents. This became clear in the00:22:04
first days of the year 2021 with the00:22:06
almost surprising reconciliation with Qatar00:22:11
for non-observers. This is the story we talked about. There was a lot about it00:22:13
before. You can return to it in episodes. I will provide00:22:16
you with its links. Then the Kingdom of00:22:19
Saudi Arabia began to improve its relationship with Turkey after00:22:22
years of tension. The Saudi Crown Prince visited00:22:25
Ankara in 2022. The00:22:29
biggest surprise was on March 10, 2023,00:22:33
with the announcement of the success of00:22:36
Chinese mediation in restoring relations between... The two countries00:22:41
are expected to return to full relations within the00:22:45
next few weeks. In this context, there will be a00:22:49
step toward normalization with Syria, that is, for the same reasons00:22:53
that called for it to restore relations with Iran. However, restoring00:22:56
relations with Syria is not a goal in00:22:59
itself. This means that merely restoring relations will not achieve the00:23:02
Saudi goals that desire to stabilize the00:23:06
situation. Thus, it enables it to preserve00:23:09
its vital interests on its territory or in00:23:13
areas vital to it in demands that it is capable of00:23:17
achieving by force in Syria, but it failed to00:23:20
achieve by force in Syria, and therefore it seeks to00:23:23
achieve them through diplomacy. Therefore, there is a set00:23:26
of demands that Saudi Arabia made from Bashar00:23:30
al-Assad00:23:31
and which other Arab countries are requesting. Riyadh was and is00:23:35
still participating, and it has the power to convince Riyadh00:23:38
that negotiation is the best solution to obtain these00:23:41
demands. Countries such as Riyadh are participating: Jordan,00:23:45
the Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and before them countries such as00:23:49
Algeria, Iraq. These countries all have00:23:53
clear demands from Bashar al-Assad, and these demands are considered00:23:56
clear conditions for moving forward in the normalization process.00:24:00
Which is being negotiated now. There are00:24:03
many leaks regarding the terms00:24:07
and the strategy leaked many of these demands00:24:10
and the terms. The Saudi magazine Al-Majalla conducted more than one00:24:14
good investigation into the leak of the Syrian-00:24:18
Arab negotiations, but the truth is, and with all due respect00:24:21
to all these respected platforms, the essence of what they leaked is00:24:25
nothing more than logical demands. We do not need00:24:29
leaks in order to understand them. What are the Arab demands?00:24:33
Of course, each country is different from the other country,00:24:36
but we can divide the Arab demands into a00:24:39
group of a group of simple categories, the most important00:24:43
and simplest of which is the security demand. All of these countries are00:24:47
asking Syria to control its borders and thus00:24:51
control any process of escape of00:24:54
terrorist groups, or it means criminal organizations, and the00:24:57
most important of these is The destabilizing activities of these00:25:01
countries are, of course, the drug trade, specifically the00:25:05
Captagon trade, this drug that is00:25:10
manufactured extensively on Syrian territory and generates00:25:13
tens of billions of dollars annually for those who manufacture it.00:25:16
Bashar al-Assad’s equation00:25:19
says that the government is involved. The Syrian government00:25:22
denies it. In any case, there are groups on00:25:25
Syrian territory that manufacture This drug is exported00:25:28
to all the countries of Jordan, Iraq, the Kingdom of00:25:30
Saudi Arabia and others. Consequently, this00:25:34
drug has become a headache in the minds of these countries. This is00:25:37
the first demand and the most prominent of the demands. It seems that they have come a long00:25:41
way in achieving it so far if the00:25:45
efforts succeeded in00:25:47
helping to normalize two humanitarian demands, but in00:25:51
essence it is in In fact, it is a political demand.00:25:54
This humanitarian demand is for Damascus to allow aid to flow to00:25:58
everyone who needs it in Syria, whether they live under00:26:02
the areas controlled by the regime or in00:26:05
the areas not controlled by the regime. This is a00:26:08
humanitarian demand in its form and this is important, but in00:26:13
its essence it is also a prelude to restoring a file paving the00:26:17
way for the return of refugees. Syrians in00:26:20
other countries, and this is the biggest issue that concerns all00:26:23
these countries. You want to move to the00:26:25
bigger issue, which is the return of millions of00:26:28
Syrian refugees who represent a burden on Jordan00:26:30
and Lebanon00:26:32
and create Iraq and of course worry non-00:26:35
Arab countries like Turkey. How do you00:26:40
move to this step, especially the people who00:26:44
live? In Syria, they live in extremely00:26:46
difficult conditions. The first thing must be to improve the conditions of the00:26:49
Syrians inside Syria before we move to the00:26:52
most important file, which is the file of returning refugees.00:26:57
This is also a basic demand of the Syrian regime that it00:27:01
begins to pave the way for the safe return of these00:27:05
millions of refugees,00:27:08
as I pave the way for them. There are many details, but00:27:11
the bottom line is that He makes pledges to provide a00:27:16
safe return for these refugees without00:27:19
security prosecution or retaliatory practices, or to punish them00:27:24
with imprisonment, for example, for failing to attend military service,00:27:27
which they were evading and objecting to.00:27:30
In any case, a ceasefire will take place00:27:33
in the future, as these countries plan, and therefore there will00:27:36
be no urgent need to force Some00:27:40
Syrians are willing to join the military service and00:27:43
consider the many detailed files,00:27:47
which means returning their property. I mean, in any00:27:51
case, in general, the file of returning refugees, because00:27:54
this is a thorny file and it cannot be as easy as it00:27:58
seems. I mean,00:28:00
then moving on to the political file, which is a00:28:04
very dangerous file whose bottom line is the start of a settlement. The ongoing00:28:08
Syrian crisis, which has now had repercussions00:28:12
or multiple impacts on all countries of the world.00:28:16
This political solution, in brief, means that Syria00:28:19
begins to negotiate with the00:28:22
opposition. It is not reasonable for things to stabilize in00:28:26
Syria while the regime is at odds with millions of Syrians.00:28:31
Negotiation means that we begin to meet with the00:28:36
opposition figures with an open chest. We look. In their demands,00:28:40
then begins a long journey to00:28:44
reorganize, write the constitution, organize elections,00:28:48
elections in which everyone competes, of course, this is in the00:28:52
long term, but in the meantime, and this is what matters to00:28:55
these countries, is agreeing on a ceasefire00:28:58
between the forces opposing the regime, then inviting the regime.00:29:02
They are calling on the regime to invite all00:29:06
foreign forces. Exiting Syria, of course, is00:29:09
not an easy story because it clashes with the interests of Turkey, the interests of the00:29:12
Russians, and the interests of the00:29:15
Americans with the interests of the Turks, but at least the00:29:18
Syrian regime begins to negotiate with all these00:29:21
countries to exit, and what specifically means the Arab countries,00:29:23
frankly, is the exit of the00:29:26
Iranians in the first degree and the exit of the Turks00:29:29
in the second degree. All these are demands. They are all difficult,00:29:34
but they are being negotiated. On the other hand, Bashar al-00:29:37
Assad, who demands all this long list00:29:41
of conditions, has very clear goals. I am in dire00:29:45
need of Arab support00:29:48
to provide economic aid as quickly as possible,00:29:52
not only for the reconstruction of Syria, which was00:29:57
almost completely demolished,00:29:59
but for the sake of00:30:02
saving needs.00:30:08
If these difficult conditions continue, it will be00:30:12
very difficult for the regime and for President Bashar al-00:30:15
Assad to enjoy stability. He can win00:30:18
wars, but he cannot be humble00:30:21
and remain at the helm of power in a country where most of the people are00:30:26
hungry,00:30:28
meaning poor and suffering. One of the problems in obtaining the00:30:32
most basic humanitarian services or humanitarian needs is00:30:36
that Arab support means support for00:30:40
its legitimacy directly and not indirectly, because all00:30:44
countries said that they agreed with them00:30:47
and declared their desire for normalization now, and then began00:30:50
normalization. This support comes successively to explain it00:30:53
and confirm that Bashar al-Assad He achieved a00:30:56
military victory and a diplomatic victory, and everyone who boycotted him00:30:59
returned to court him and negotiate with them. Three00:31:04
Arab support means that it implicitly carries an00:31:08
Arab pledge to negotiate with Western countries, Europe, and the00:31:12
United States to freeze the sanctions00:31:14
imposed on Bashar al-Assad, and thus begins to00:31:17
open the larger file, which is reconstruction in00:31:20
Syria.00:31:22
This is the kingdom’s plan. Saudi Arabia00:31:26
and the plan of the countries that support it, like other countries, are00:31:30
supported by other countries, such as Jordan, which has a00:31:33
step-by-step initiative, and this is a story that we will talk about00:31:36
later, and Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, etc., but00:31:40
this desire and enthusiasm for re-normalization with00:31:43
Bashar al-Assad collides with the reservations of a group of countries,00:31:47
each country has its own reasons. Very briefly,00:31:52
Morocco, for example, said that it cannot accept00:31:55
normalization and the restoration of relations with Syria unless it00:31:58
announces and pledges to sever its relationship with00:32:02
the police force and acknowledges Morocco’s sovereignty over the00:32:05
Moroccan Sahara. The Yemeni government, which is supported by the00:32:09
Gulf states, demands, in order to agree with Bashar al-Assad, that00:32:12
he stop his support for the00:32:14
Houthis and his allies in Yemen.00:32:17
Qatar is the highest. A voice in rejecting the return of relations00:32:21
with Syria00:32:22
and Qatar means that there are many reasons that every analyst is trying to00:32:27
strive to understand, but it seems that there is a personal dimension to the00:32:31
Qatari leaders, as someone told me. I mean, those00:32:34
familiar with Qatari foreign policy do not00:32:39
like Bashar al-Assad. There is a lost friendship between the00:32:42
Qatari politicians and Bashar al-Assad.00:32:45
Their interests have not been achieved. Rather, it was damaged, and they invested00:32:49
a lot, meaning in supporting the opposition groups against00:32:53
Bashar al-Assad. They do not want all these00:32:55
investments to be lost for nothing, and for Bashar al-00:32:58
Assad to return as he was.00:33:00
This means something that will hurt them,00:33:04
but I believe that the most important reason for the00:33:07
Qatari position, which is an issue that needs a full circle, is the00:33:12
basic drivers. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or00:33:15
Qatari foreign policies, Qatar was and still is willing for00:33:19
the state to be independent from its neighbors,00:33:22
especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is something00:33:26
we talked about before, and I will put a link to the00:33:28
episode for you. What does Qatar want and we can talk about it00:33:32
later? Qatar does not want to be a state00:33:36
affiliated with the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia or00:33:38
any other,00:33:39
and its logic says that00:33:42
we cut off Bashar al-Assad together for understandable reasons,00:33:45
and we financed the opposition groups that wish to00:33:49
overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and it does not make sense that just because00:33:52
you changed your mind, O politicians in Riyadh, we should00:33:55
change our minds and change the course of things all for your00:33:59
sake, if you want to change without00:34:03
preconditions. We We want preconditions, and they believe that00:34:07
the preconditions are pledges from Bashar al-00:34:10
Assad to political reforms,00:34:12
taking into account, of course, the opposition, revealing the fate of00:34:16
missing persons and prisoners, etc. This is a matter of00:34:19
principle. Do00:34:21
not forget also that this position is in line with the00:34:26
American position, and Qatar is keen for its00:34:29
relationship with the United States to be stronger than any00:34:32
Gulf country. Another thing is that, even if it is aware of its00:34:36
foreign relationship, it remains, unlike, for example, the00:34:39
United States and the Emirates willing to never risk a00:34:43
shaky relationship with the United States00:34:47
and the West. This is a story subject to diligence. We interpret it, but00:34:50
we do not have it. I mean, of course,00:34:53
documents reveal to us precisely the truth of each country’s position.00:34:57
As for the Egyptian position, it is the truth. I mean, it appears00:35:01
to some people. A little confusing because it was expected that Egypt would00:35:06
have a very clear position in support of Syria’s return00:35:10
to the Arab League, but Egypt’s position seemed weak and hesitant,00:35:14
not that clear, at least00:35:18
in front of the cameras. My humble assessment is that the00:35:22
Egyptian position is similar to the Algerian position, the00:35:25
Saudi position, and the Emirati position, which is a desire, an00:35:30
Egyptian desire, for his return. Syria to the Arab League00:35:33
and normalization with the rest of the countries in the region,00:35:36
but it prefers to do that in a00:35:39
calm manner and without taking sharp positions.00:35:45
Egypt in general in recent years does not want00:35:49
to take sharp external positions except in00:35:53
very few exceptions.00:35:55
The interpretation is that it has many interests, whether with the00:35:59
Gulf states or With Europe or the United States00:36:02
and the other powers that are involved in the00:36:07
Syrian file, Turkey, Russia, and there are conflicting priorities00:36:11
for these countries. Egypt does not want to anger any of these00:36:15
countries by taking sharp positions so as not to lose the00:36:19
support and support of these countries in the00:36:22
most urgent Egyptian priorities, which are economic aid00:36:28
and support in the00:36:30
crisis. The biggest or biggest external threat00:36:33
is the Ethiopian threat to the Nile waters,00:36:36
and therefore it prefers to express its priorities in a00:36:40
calm manner, away from situations that are very00:36:44
heated and clear.00:36:48
This is the countries’ take, of course, with regard to Kuwait.00:36:52
Kuwait, I do not think it has a problem with the return of00:36:56
relations in the year with Bashar al-Assad, but it prefers to00:36:59
This is done through00:37:02
Kuwaiti consensus that a group of countries puts pressure and00:37:05
succeeds in returning Syria to the League of00:37:08
Arab States without a sufficient number of votes from the Arab countries, so00:37:14
these countries succeed in achieving their vision, but00:37:17
this leads to greater disagreements between the members of the League of00:37:22
Arab States and this applies to other issues.00:37:26
Our reconciliation remains a problem.00:37:28
Syria and we have made disagreements on other files. This is00:37:33
the position, I mean, within the limits, I mean, what you have shown me, and00:37:37
the negotiations are taking place on00:37:40
this issue through different points of view.00:37:43
I presented it to you, but if it succeeds, if the00:37:48
enthusiastic and closest countries succeed, they will00:37:51
succeed, I mean, until this moment, in convincing the00:37:55
reserved countries to open doors. Negotiating with Syria, if00:37:59
that happens, will mean that Syria will return to the League of00:38:03
Arab States00:38:04
and its normalization with some countries is the first step00:38:08
in a very, very long journey, because there are many00:38:13
mines and hot files that00:38:17
Syria must resolve with all these countries, and the solution is not00:38:21
entirely in the hands of President Bashar al-Assad, because There are a00:38:25
number of poles of his regime that must be convinced first. There are00:38:30
conflicting interests of countries that have very large interests and influence00:38:34
on Syrian lands. In fact, they are almost00:38:37
occupying Syria like Turkey, like Iran, like the00:38:40
United States, like Russia. Let us follow the00:38:44
developments in the Syrian file, and God willing, we will have00:38:46
other episodes with it, God willing. I thank you. And00:38:50
byeDescription:
لماذا عارضت قطر والمغرب واليمن والكويت عودة سوريا للجامعة العربية ؟ وما حقيقة الموقف المصرى؟ ماذا يريد العرب من بشار الأسد وماذا يريد الأسد منهم؟ مصادر ومراجع وحلقات سابقة: الاسباب الثلاث التى دفعت السعودية للتطبيع مع ايران الآن؟ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sejzxwt2bac لماذا تتسابق الدول العربية الآن للتودد لبشار الأسد؟ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2gU0oIHuzY لماذا تتمنى السعودية إتمام المصالحة مع قطر فى اسرع وقت ممكن؟ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfm6tb2G-9Q ماذا تريد قطر؟ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IAq3AjmnlM 1-Arab Nations Seek to Bring Syria In From the Cold Amid Broad Middle East Realignment https://www.wsj.com/articles/arab-nations-seek-to-bring-syria-in-from-the-cold-amid-broad-middle-east-realignment-32858d55 2- After Iran, Saudi Arabia to re-establish ties with Syria, sources say https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/after-iran-saudi-arabia-re-establish-ties-with-syria-sources-say-2023-03-23/ 3- Gulf Calculations in the Syrian Conflict https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/gulf-calculations-in-syrian-conflict-pub-55865 4- The Gulf States and Syria https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20116.pdf 5-U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html 6- Saudi Arabia to continue support Syrian rebels if Assad does not leave https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-mideast-crisis-syria-saudi-idCAKCN0T31A320151114 7- Saudi Arabia is reconciling with regimes it once tried to topple https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/02/23/saudi-arabia-is-reconciling-with-regimes-it-once-tried-to-topple 8-Opinion | Former Mossad Chief: After Iran-Saudi Deal, Should Israel Also Send Out Feelers to Tehran? https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-03-13/ty-article-opinion/.premium/former-mossad-chief-after-iran-saudi-deal-should-israel-also-send-out-feelers-to-tehran/00000186-dbe9-d6b2-adff-fbfd0bc30000 9- Unless engaging in political transition, no normalization with regime: EU Spokesperson https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2023/03/unless-engaging-in-political-transition-no-normalization-with-regime-eu-spokesperson/ 10- Syria Refugee Crisis – Globally, in Europe and in Cyprus https://www.unhcr.org/cy/2021/03/18/syria-refugee-crisis-globally-in-europe-and-in-cyprus-meet-some-syrian-refugees-in-cyprus/ 11- Captagon: The one drug turning war-torn Syria into a narco state https://www.wionews.com/middle-east/captagon-the-one-drug-turning-war-torn-syria-into-a-narco-state-542324 12- On Syria’s Ruins, a Drug Empire Flourishes https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/world/middleeast/syria-drugs-captagon-assad.html 13- Department Press Briefing – February 15, 2023 https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-15-2023/ 14- Qatar emir suggests sending Arab troops to Syria https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-qatar/qatar-emir-suggests-sending-arab-troops-to-syria-idUKTRE80D0G420120114 15- وزير خارجية السعودية: لا جدوى من عزل سوريا https://www.independentarabia.com/node/423426/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7 16- "المجلة" تنشر مسودة قرار عودة سوريا للجامعة ... "خطوة مقابل خطوة" وفق 2254 https://www.majalla.com/node/290826/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%82-2254 17- "وثائق سرية" تمهيداً لعودة سوريا إلى الجامعة العربية https://www.majalla.com/node/290791/%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9 18- الخارجية السعودية: محادثات مع سوريا لاستئناف الخدمات القنصلية بين البلدين https://www.alarabiya.net/saudi-today/2023/03/24/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A6%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86 تابعونا على : FACEBOOK : Sayed Goubeyal سيد جبيل TIKTOK : https://www.tiktok.com/explore INSTAGRAM : https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser
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