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Download "1199. А.В. Исаев: Крах контрнаступления Вермахта под Киевом 1943-го и опыт Харькова"

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Конаныхин
Дмитрий Конаныхин
Радио России
Российский радиоуниверситет
История
Малоизвестная Великая Отечественная
Алексей Валерьевич Исаев
Контрудар немцев под Киевом 1943
Киевская оборонительная операция 1943
генерал Черняховский
генерал Ватутин
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00:00:00
Hello dear radio listener
00:00:02
This is the Russian radio university in the studio
00:00:03
Dmitry Kononykhin, we are going
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80 years ago in the area trapped in
00:00:10
Kiev when Soviet troops, having overlooked the
00:00:13
German defenses, took Kiev in November and
00:00:17
then the Germans began to counterattack and this
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counterattack led to the
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start of the defensive Kiev
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operation 1943, it is noteworthy in
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that the Germans wrote such reports about
00:00:32
such a defeat of the Soviet troops, but for
00:00:35
some reason everything turned out exactly the opposite
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what kind of defense it was In 1943
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Why did we take then left Zhitomir
00:00:43
then took again what happened in the
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trap of Kiev in November-December
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1943 years, we will deal with all this
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Today in our series, the
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little-known Great Patriotic War S E
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author, candidate of historical sciences ShIM,
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research fellow at the Institute of Military
00:01:00
History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian
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Federation, military historian Alexey
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Valerievich Isaev Hello
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Alexey Valerievich hello Alexey
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Valerievich after all, the Germans decided to
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counterattack Why with what forces that
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forced them to move towards Kiev
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After all, they left Kiev so as not to
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find themselves in a completely desperate
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situation. How events developed. At the
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end of November December 1943,
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the counterattack carried out by the Germans was
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based on two things;
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of course, from Kiev they had to withdraw from Kiev, the
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German troops specifically of the Fourth
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Tank Army Hermann Hoth in view of the
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threat of encirclement
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However, moving further to the west,
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Soviet troops stretched the
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flanks. In
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addition, moving forward there was such a defense
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as at Kursk, so the arc that
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ran from the Dnieper to the Zhitomir region was
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of course not as strong as the
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Kursk Bulge in July of the hundredth year, thereby
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creating the opportunity to
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go on
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a counter-offensive and
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ask the Soviet troops to
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inflict a heavy
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defeat to recapture Zhitomir, at a minimum, but in
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general,
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ideally, it was believed that it would be possible in this
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way, by defeating the
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Soviet corps and
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divisions that had rushed forward, to prevent further
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advance forward and maybe even
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restore the front
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along the Dnieper,
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of course this was already out of the realm of
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fantasy, but nevertheless, a strong
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counterattack could have been delivered. And for this, the
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Germans had the appropriate
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opportunities in the form of fresh reserves moving
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east from vacation
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from Western Europe. The
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first such
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reserve was the
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sska
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division standard, Adolf Hitler, this is the
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formation
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that was withdrawn after the Kursk arcs
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on vacation in Italy and now in November the juice of the
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third year having received new tanks
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having received a little quite a lot of almost 100 tanks
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Par 4 almost 100 panthers to be precise
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then 96 vehicles another 27 tigers the
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Lep Standard division arrived near Kiev the
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second formation is also Despite the fact
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that this it was not an SS division, but an
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army division, it
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was an elite first tank
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division, which at one time passed through
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France, the formation that went to the
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gates of Leningrad and then to Moscow,
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this was the first tank division after
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heavy losses suffered at Rzhe, it
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was also withdrawn from the front. True, back
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in At the end of the century, at the beginning of the year, and
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now, again, having received almost a hundred shells of
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4 76 Panthers, not counting other
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equipment, she arrived near Kiev
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and was also ready to go on a
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counteroffensive, accordingly,
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having these
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reserves, the German command did
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not consider it possible at the
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time when leaving Kiev In addition,
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one reserve that is worth
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mentioning was the fresh Twenty-Fifth
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Panzer Division, it was recently
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formed, it had about a hundred
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Panzer 4s and it was immediately thrown into a
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counterattack almost
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with lightning speed, one might say
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from the march shortly after unloading the railway
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since it had virtually no experience
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you can immediately
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say that they were
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defeated by unthought-out
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counterattacks.
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However, it still retained
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its combat capability; it was also involved in the
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counterattack, having such reserves; in
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fact, by the standards of the forty-third
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year of the citadel,
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there were two fresh Divisions. This is a
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serious
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force, but it must be said that the Soviet
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command was already leading quite clearly and well
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intelligence here, of course, depends not only
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on the fact that it was November of forty-
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three, but
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also to some extent successful
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intelligence actions; it did not always act
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successfully, including there in forty,
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but in the specific case of the first
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Ukrainian front in November of forty-
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three years near
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Kiev, the enemy’s plans were revealed
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relatively in advance, and on November 12,
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1943, a directive from
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Vatutin’s headquarters, the commander of the first
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Ukrainian front, indicated that the rapid
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advance of the right wing and the center of the front
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to the west and the enemy’s persistence at the front
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under the fast concentration of a large
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group here indicates that the enemy is
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further as if a quote, giving
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us the opportunity to advance to the west, gathers forces to
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strike at the root in the direction of
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Fastov Kiev, in fact, this
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was a fairly accurate
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definition of the German plans and 3 days
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before the German tanks went on the
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offensive, the Soviet troops
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stopped and prepared
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to defend with one On the other hand, of course, the
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headquarters could not
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strengthen the first Ukrainian front with lightning speed
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and, as they say,
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miraculously transfer fresh
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reserves to it, but nevertheless,
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the First Guards Army of
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the Greek was transferred; it arrived closer to the end of
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November, so
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Vatutin had to fight back with the forces that
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he had Alexey Valerievich before
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than we move on to this story. A
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small question to catch up: did
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the lessons
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of Kharkov, when many times the Germans, like
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deep Moors,
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still pushed ours far, affected the work of this intelligence and such sensitivity and stakes in this direction?
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parts
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were taught very painfully by the experience of Kharkov, and I
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would even say both Kharkov and May
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forty-two, which I think we
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even talked about. And most importantly,
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February March forty-three,
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of course, the lesson was painful, but it was learned.
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In other words,
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you can get a counterattack from the enemy and
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generally speaking, Kiev November hundred and Kharkov
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February
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March forty-three, that is, the
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same year forty-three,
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they are similar, they are an example of how to
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do it and how not to do it, that is, you
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must do it absolutely Kiev
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November February March Kharkov this is an
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example when it’s really uncontrollable
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moved forward
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hoping to reach the Dnieper
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and without stopping in time received a
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counterattack which had very serious
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consequences, but there was one more difference
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that influenced the development of events in a
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key way, in my opinion, despite the fact
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that the enemy had heavy tanks
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because another separate battalion of
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heavy tiger tanks arrived 509 that is, straight from
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the formation of a fresh brand new And this
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was also a very serious
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force, these are 45
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tigers, but the Red Army
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had the know-how.
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I will be allowed to use
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such a foreign term. But this is what I would
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say, the calling card of even the Red
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Army of that period is artillery
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formations This was a breakthrough artillery corps
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consisting of two artillery
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divisions which
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were a very serious trump card in the
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ensuing
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battle because having a
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variety of guns and capable of
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fighting tanks, most importantly, heavy
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artillery,
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two artillery divisions could get
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in the way of a counterattack and the most important thing is not
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to allow the Germans to win an
00:11:09
artillery duel than the Germans took it in the
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1990s, they won an
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artillery duel, suppressed the
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anti-tank defense system, and then
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terrible things happened, then the front fell and
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crumbled,
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including such events as encirclement, a
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retreat leaving
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equipment behind, and a generally catastrophic
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development of events, you spoke in a previous
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conversation about how concentrated
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artillery strikes literally swept away
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German fortifications, preventing the Germans from
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actually deploying defenses or
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reacting here, it’s the
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same story
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when,
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when attacking and maneuvering properly,
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you were also annihilated. Soviet
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artillery, I understand correctly Yes,
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absolutely artillery just reached a
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qualitatively new level, this is a
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qualitatively new level also concerned
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such a thing
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as artillery reconnaissance because
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what were the strengths of
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independent artillery
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formations, they were not just
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in the same hands, they supplemented it with the
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capabilities of Artillery
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reconnaissance to detect enemy batteries
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and this simply played a huge role in the
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battles that unfolded on November 15,
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since the Germans when they moved to
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the offensive, and these 3 days that
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reconnaissance gave, they were key from the point
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of view of
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advancing Ardisium to the direction of the
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enemy’s attack because, unfortunately, the
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Achilles heel of the Soviet
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artillery formations, which by the way, before I
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forget, I’ll say that they
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already managed to receive honorary
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names for Kiev, they became
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Kievsko And having already received these honorary
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names, they now had to
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defend the occupied
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positions that were occupied in battle
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near
00:13:32
Kiev and this time act on the
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defensive, and it was still autumn
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and bad weather, this meant cross roads and
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of course the supply of ammunition
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was also considerable difficulties,
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therefore, one should not think that it was a
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straight entertaining walk, it was very much the
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most important thing that the artillerymen could give was
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to stop the infantry advancing along with the
00:14:08
tanks. And since the Germans
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tried to ram
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the defense,
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they crush the machines with tigers and
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panthers
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again, a description
00:14:27
of the seventh artillery
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corps
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attack on
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November 15, this is a mass of tanks walking at very
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short intervals there are literally
00:14:42
a few tens of meters in front of the tigers, the
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panthers in the back are old. Well, let’s just say that
00:14:49
they were released, of course, in factories in the
00:14:52
same way, but the previous model 4 and
00:14:57
already further behind them are
00:15:00
motorized infantry, motorized infantry on foot,
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or like near Kursk. They wanted
00:15:05
an armored personnel carrier, yes. that is,
00:15:07
this Kursk idea is just being repeated. Yes, to
00:15:10
cross this valley of death under
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artillery high-explosive fragmentation
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shelling, I understand correctly, yes. They
00:15:18
tried to do this, but it actually turned out to be
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heavy losses for them in
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armored personnel carriers, because
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when, in the end, the Germans began to count what they were
00:15:28
losing then it was separately said
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that a significant number of
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armored personnel carriers
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were lost, including due to the accurate
00:15:42
fire of the Soviet artillery, which did not
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allow the implementation of this
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plan to break through the barrage
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Fire,
00:15:53
and the Germans were
00:15:57
shocked by the very dense artillery
00:16:00
Fire and they literally the next day
00:16:04
switched to night
00:16:06
attacks, that is, they attacked at night, and when approaching a
00:16:10
distance of 200-300 metro to the
00:16:13
Soviet
00:16:15
positions, even the tanks turned on their headlights. But this did
00:16:19
not help them; it
00:16:29
was difficult to equip extended rifle units,
00:16:32
and when a
00:16:36
large mass of armored vehicles immediately piled on, of course
00:16:39
causing
00:16:41
losses to them, then the Germans pushed through the defense
00:16:48
and
00:16:50
actually specifically the Senad Ardisia of the
00:16:54
artillery corps,
00:16:59
with rather weak assistance from the infantry,
00:17:03
fought independently on a front of 32 km;
00:17:08
this
00:17:10
actually turned inside out those
00:17:13
principles of defensive battles that the
00:17:16
Germans had in the forty-second year,
00:17:18
somewhere near Rzhev, when they
00:17:20
relied
00:17:22
on the support of artillery And
00:17:26
now the roles The
00:17:29
Soviet artillery has also changed, having a
00:17:33
fairly perfect Fire control system
00:17:35
and a sufficient amount of
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ammunition, just as well as
00:17:42
cementing what had to be Yes,
00:17:44
retreat under the pressure of the mass of tanks,
00:17:49
nevertheless maintain integrity, not allow a
00:17:53
deep breakthrough
00:17:55
[music]
00:17:57
into the positions of the artillerymen themselves and
00:18:01
destroy them.
00:18:04
Therefore, the German the offensive was
00:18:07
advancing, but it was moving quite
00:18:10
slowly,
00:18:11
and such was the blitz Cry that was
00:18:14
characteristic of the co-operation of the second year,
00:18:17
it was not implemented,
00:18:20
although it must be said
00:18:23
that the situation itself was
00:18:27
precisely near
00:18:30
Zhytomyr, although it was
00:18:34
not fresh reserves that were involved there, but simply
00:18:38
pulled up
00:18:40
from other sectors That is, the main
00:18:43
blow was in the direction of Brusilov under
00:18:46
fast, and near Zhytomyr
00:18:51
they used those forces that could
00:18:54
simply be collected
00:18:57
from
00:18:58
[music]
00:18:59
in other
00:19:00
directions, but also on the Soviet side in
00:19:05
Zhitomir there were more modest
00:19:08
forces. This was, first of all, the first
00:19:11
Guards cavalry
00:19:13
corps which,
00:19:16
of course, Simply by virtue of its purpose,
00:19:19
its capabilities, it was
00:19:28
so
00:19:29
when the pressure began on Zhitomir from several directions at once,
00:19:36
the cavalrymen
00:19:39
could not hold it for a long time
00:19:41
and the most
00:19:45
important problem was to leave not
00:19:48
to leave the city
00:19:50
and precisely the area under the fat for which the
00:19:55
Rdeysk carp
00:19:59
was responsible transferred in the
00:20:08
sixtieth Moskalenko took over,
00:20:11
then Chernyakhovsky was responsible for Zhitomir
00:20:14
And despite the fact that from the
00:20:17
front headquarters And this is not only Vatutino and
00:20:22
Zhukov, orders were sent to Chernyakhovsky to
00:20:26
hold on at all costs
00:20:31
Chernyakhovsky took upon himself
00:20:34
the responsibility not to bring the matter to the
00:20:38
closure of the encirclement because the
00:20:40
city was semi-
00:20:43
surrounded by a dense front, so
00:20:45
the Germans could maneuver to encircle and
00:20:49
Chernyakhovsky, having accepted
00:20:51
responsibility, says leave. I’ll
00:20:54
especially
00:20:57
emphasize
00:20:59
those railway facilities there, some
00:21:04
switches there, crossings that had to be
00:21:06
blown up so that the Germans would not immediately
00:21:08
use the railway in their own
00:21:10
interests because that in fact the
00:21:12
railway if you look at the map
00:21:14
It passes through Zhitomir Well, in the general
00:21:17
direction from west to east And
00:21:19
thus along this railway you can
00:21:22
drive trains and supply the main
00:21:25
strike force and Chernyakhovsky
00:21:28
said ahead of time Don’t blow up Let the
00:21:31
last ones who leave will blow up there are
00:21:35
some water towers there, some
00:21:38
arrows ahead of time, don’t let
00:21:41
the enemy know that you are leaving and this
00:21:45
allowed the corps to get out of the
00:21:50
semi-encirclement at that time, even in fact
00:21:54
the Germans already controlled the last bypass road with
00:21:56
fire, well, they managed to
00:21:58
escape from the city and thereby avoid
00:22:03
serious losses, but Zhitomer was
00:22:06
abandoned; this, of course, was extremely
00:22:08
unpleasant for everyone, since he had just been
00:22:11
liberated a week later; of
00:22:14
course, it was such an
00:22:17
unpleasant situation against the general background of the
00:22:21
successes of the Soviet offensive on the
00:22:23
right bank of Ukraine, but the military was healing,
00:22:28
but absolutely according to the same pattern, the Armed Forces
00:22:32
developed under
00:22:34
Brusilov
00:22:36
when
00:22:37
the movement began to close the
00:22:41
ring around the city of Brusilov, it very
00:22:44
quickly
00:22:45
stalled, nothing
00:22:49
from the original
00:22:51
plan was realized and the Germans
00:22:54
had to make
00:22:56
attempts to encircle Brusilov and
00:23:00
Zhitomir, that is, Zhitomir came out of it and
00:23:04
into the corps, respectively,
00:23:06
Soviet rifle divisions came out of the Brusilov area
00:23:09
And most importantly, this was
00:23:13
cemented as once the Artillery
00:23:16
Corps of the breakthrough Alexey Valerievich
00:23:18
Do I understand correctly that the Germans’ goal
00:23:20
was not their own cities, but precisely the
00:23:22
military formations of the Red Army, they had to be
00:23:24
destroyed, not so much to occupy
00:23:26
these nodes and these railway lines, not
00:23:29
so much to occupy these cities that
00:23:31
had just been lost to the Germans by them
00:23:33
it was necessary to destroy as much as possible the
00:23:37
manpower and equipment of the Red Army and
00:23:40
thereby prevent the further development of
00:23:44
offensive
00:23:45
operations here, in fact, the
00:23:49
points on the map themselves. They, of course,
00:23:51
certainly had significance in general. If we talk
00:23:54
about what mattered to the Germans
00:23:58
precisely as a
00:24:00
point
00:24:01
on the Working Map of the group army yuk
00:24:06
is an area
00:24:09
somewhat away
00:24:11
from Zhitomir, this is
00:24:15
Korosten Radomyshl and in that direction
00:24:19
there was a rockade. Well, that’s what they call a
00:24:28
communication line running parallel to the front, in this case a
00:24:30
railway that made it possible to maneuver
00:24:34
between the army groups center and south, and
00:24:39
Korosten was exactly that
00:24:43
point which had to be recaptured precisely
00:24:45
on the basis of the possibilities of
00:24:49
moving troops from army groups
00:24:56
and did
00:24:58
not specifically fight for it, that is, here
00:25:02
the Germans Well, without achieving the success
00:25:05
that they
00:25:07
were counting on with a breakthrough to the
00:25:10
rear of the Soviet troops in the Kiev
00:25:12
direction, that is,
00:25:14
actually limiting themselves to two such local
00:25:16
coverage they regrouped around Zhitomir Brusilov. Note
00:25:20
here Yagu,
00:25:26
remember
00:25:29
the counterattack, it was actually a
00:25:32
very successful attempt to show
00:25:35
how the
00:25:36
operation works, how reconnaissance works,
00:25:40
how the front headquarters works, and one of the
00:25:44
storylines there is precisely the
00:25:46
regrouping of the Germans in another
00:25:49
direction when
00:25:53
[music]
00:25:56
after the connection, that is, both
00:25:59
tigers and panthers dropped out there in significant numbers.
00:26:02
That is, if we talk
00:26:05
about again, what did
00:26:08
even the beginning of the offensive cost, that
00:26:11
is, literally in a couple of days the Germans
00:26:13
lost seven tigers there, fifty
00:26:17
Panzer 4 These are the linden standards 16
00:26:23
Panther self-propelled guns, including howitzer
00:26:26
weight assault geu and, in principle, almost 85 days
00:26:32
from armored vehicles only tanks tanks and
00:26:34
self-propelled guns about 20% As I understand it,
00:26:37
approximately this is not
00:26:40
exactly the standard, that is, in fact,
00:26:45
this is knocking out a very significant
00:26:48
number of combat
00:26:50
vehicles that have reduced the strength of their strike, but
00:26:55
it is clear that not everyone understood the territory
00:26:58
through which they
00:27:00
were advancing. They could
00:27:02
have repaired and indeed
00:27:04
they did. But the fact that in the film
00:27:07
a counterattack was given is such a separate
00:27:09
storyline, this is how the
00:27:13
front headquarters tried to track where the Germans
00:27:17
would move at the next stage
00:27:21
since they did not having achieved a decisive
00:27:24
result, which they initially
00:27:26
counted on
00:27:28
under the bars, they began to group
00:27:32
just under
00:27:33
Korosten with the goal of also striking a
00:27:37
blow and inflicting losses on the
00:27:41
Soviet troops located there. And in such a
00:27:46
short-term perspective, the immediate task is
00:27:48
just to repel the
00:27:56
crayfish,
00:28:00
they hit here quickly like this a few
00:28:04
days before the
00:28:06
counterattack there was no intelligence data,
00:28:09
so they had to maneuver
00:28:14
on
00:28:16
the move and the Germans still managed to
00:28:22
repel this, of course, this was the
00:28:26
result that was
00:28:30
achieved as a result of this
00:28:32
counteroffensive in addition to Zhitomir, which
00:28:35
was soon lost
00:28:39
and in fact the German
00:28:42
counteroffensive, although led to the
00:28:46
fact that
00:28:49
Soviet troops were pushed back closer to Kiev.
00:28:52
That is, from where they were from Zhitomir, from in the
00:28:55
Nsky direction
00:28:57
there was another blow in the direction of Malina. That is,
00:29:00
if you look at the map, a fairly
00:29:04
large territory was abandoned; this
00:29:07
matter was not limited, unfortunately, only to
00:29:10
the loss of the city of Zhitomir itself precisely in
00:29:14
view of the fact that the Germans shifted the
00:29:17
direction of the attacks. They could, as it were,
00:29:20
shake the front. Although they could hold back
00:29:28
some kind of what are called
00:29:30
catastrophic consequences, including, again,
00:29:33
they held On to the
00:29:36
artillery, again, what interested me
00:29:40
in the reporting
00:29:43
documents was precisely the artillery
00:29:45
corps. They often practiced contra
00:29:50
training they identified the concentration of
00:29:53
German forces, that is, tanks and infantry, and
00:29:58
struck
00:30:00
at the places of probable concentration,
00:30:05
again incredibly, even the
00:30:09
concentration of motorized infantry tanks discovered by the scouts. And this
00:30:14
also thwarted the attacks and
00:30:18
reduced the opportunities for long-distance
00:30:21
advance. It
00:30:28
was possible to perform a miracle, and in
00:30:33
order to hold on, of course, density was needed
00:30:36
as on the Kursk Bulge
00:30:40
because, in addition to fresh tank formations,
00:30:44
the Germans also used infantry. And in general,
00:30:48
the concentration of forces near Zhytomyr
00:30:51
was more than
00:30:56
that,
00:30:57
in fact, the Germans made the Germans
00:31:01
such caliphs for an
00:31:03
hour. They
00:31:05
spent their resources and reserves.
00:31:08
While the Soviet side
00:31:12
first arrived, the buckwheat army first guards
00:31:15
and at the next stage the eighteenth army arrives at the front,
00:31:19
which was
00:31:26
released,
00:31:28
our generation will immediately say the
00:31:31
eighteenth army Leonid Ilch
00:31:34
Brezhnev Absolutely right Indeed,
00:31:37
this is the same army that participated in the
00:31:39
battles on Malaya Zemlya and at first they wanted to
00:31:45
use it in the
00:31:47
southwestern, respectively, the third
00:31:50
Ukrainian front at Malinovsky, but
00:31:53
in view of the crisis that arose near Kiev and
00:31:56
in general the
00:31:58
concentration of enemy forces near Kiev,
00:32:01
it was just transferred to Kiev and
00:32:05
then, as if looking ahead, and on
00:32:12
December 25, 1943, the
00:32:15
Eighteenth
00:32:16
Army, the first Katukov Tank Army
00:32:20
went on a
00:32:22
counteroffensive, this was already the
00:32:25
Zhitomir operation
00:32:27
which reduced
00:32:30
all the attempts of the Germans to stabilize
00:32:35
the situation near Zhytomyr to
00:32:38
zero, in fact, these are all the efforts that
00:32:44
were made by the Germans in order to
00:32:47
push the Red Army back to
00:32:50
[music]
00:32:56
Kiev
00:32:57
after a short break, to sort out the
00:32:59
level of proficiency, so to speak, in the
00:33:03
military
00:33:05
skill of both the Germans and our army
00:33:08
because what you are talking about in
00:33:10
large strokes is still impressive
00:33:13
because it is impossible to do such
00:33:16
artillery maneuvers and tank maneuvers without
00:33:19
good training. I think that after a
00:33:21
short break we will do this to
00:33:23
our viewers and our radio listeners.
00:33:26
I remind you that all the releases of the Russian
00:33:28
radio university you you can watch and
00:33:30
listen on the Media platform, watch the
00:33:32
VGTRK website smotrim.ru YouTube channel
00:33:35
Dmitry Kononykhin this is our special
00:33:37
project, a multi-year project, a little-known
00:33:39
Great Patriotic War and we will
00:33:42
be back now, don’t switch it will only be
00:33:45
more interesting This is the Russian
00:33:47
radio university in the studio Dmitry
00:33:48
Kononykhin we are visiting a wonderful
00:33:50
military historian Alexey Valerievich
00:33:52
Isaev, we analyze the consequences of
00:33:56
such a German counter-offensive near
00:33:58
Kiev in November-December
00:33:59
1943. Where the Germans burned the precious
00:34:02
reserve, where they tried to stabilize
00:34:04
the front with such a maneuverable defense,
00:34:07
a counterattack and at the same time, our troops
00:34:10
went on the defensive and, unfortunately,
00:34:13
perhaps losing again the newly
00:34:16
liberated Zhitomir and Brusilov, but
00:34:19
nevertheless they avoided disaster, avoided
00:34:22
defeat and
00:34:27
Christmas, that’s when the Germans received a blow in the
00:34:29
gut Alexei Valerievich When you talked about this,
00:34:31
what I said
00:34:33
before the break in large strokes does not
00:34:36
leave me with the feeling that if you read
00:34:40
Memoirs of German Military something there all
00:34:44
the time, some kind of two-layer cake like this, on the
00:34:46
one hand, everything is great. We are great. We are
00:34:49
simply crumbling the many times
00:34:53
superior Armadas of these red independent reconnaissance units on the
00:34:57
other hand. Upon a sound examination of
00:34:59
these same memoirs or documents of
00:35:03
military operations, the losses of the Germans are very
00:35:06
sensitive. What actually happened in
00:35:10
fact, Well, here we need to And again, understand
00:35:16
that Soviet
00:35:18
e and anti-tank artillery and
00:35:22
self-propelled guns have already learned to fight
00:35:25
new armored vehicles
00:35:27
and they tigers have ceased
00:35:31
to be the problem that they were,
00:35:34
for example, in the spring of forty-three. Of
00:35:37
course, they remained a very dangerous
00:35:39
adversary. But here I am I can’t help but
00:35:42
recommend reading the Memoirs of a rat self-propelled
00:35:46
gun, which just took part
00:35:49
in all these
00:35:52
soybeans
00:35:57
in the battle of such a small village, a
00:36:00
hawk, again, as we now
00:36:04
know, just near this village a
00:36:08
heavy tank battalion was used,
00:36:10
that is, these are the same stories
00:36:13
about
00:36:15
tigers that Maybe
00:36:18
now I would say so since the nineties
00:36:21
were perceived with a little doubt that
00:36:25
wow memoirs very often these
00:36:29
same tigers appear in this case, Lieutenant
00:36:32
Krysov speaks the absolute and pure
00:36:36
truth
00:36:38
and
00:36:39
indeed the regiment of self-propelled guns Krys at
00:36:43
that time he had vehicles 85
00:36:48
and came under quite a serious blow,
00:36:52
it was November 22
00:36:55
and
00:36:57
Krysov acted very competently. That is,
00:36:59
he took a good
00:37:01
position, shoots, sets fire to the
00:37:04
enemy tank and immediately leaves for another
00:37:06
position, and this, of course,
00:37:10
allowed him to avoid defeat
00:37:14
even by such a serious enemy
00:37:17
as a tiger. That is, when they tried
00:37:24
[ music]
00:37:25
his gun continued to operate. That
00:37:29
is, from a different position, another
00:37:31
shot again knocks out the
00:37:34
enemy tank, and if you look again
00:37:37
already there
00:37:38
And according to statistics,
00:37:41
at the number of Bogoto vehicles that were
00:37:45
available in the very 509th battalion
00:37:48
that was under the hawk, then we see
00:37:51
that as of November 20,
00:37:54
there were 14 tanks
00:37:58
on November 24, tanks in service and,
00:38:05
of course, a steady decrease in the number of
00:38:08
combat vehicles in service. Despite the fact that it was
00:38:11
constantly
00:38:13
being repaired, it did not allow the Germans
00:38:16
to achieve any more impressive
00:38:18
results precisely in
00:38:25
view of those who
00:38:27
tried to counterattack them and not
00:38:31
allow them immediately to close the encirclement of the
00:38:34
same beam
00:38:36
because here he was a very energetic person
00:38:40
and immediately tried to feel the enemy
00:38:45
to counterattack and that same
00:38:49
offensive to the
00:38:55
beam,
00:38:57
generally speaking, the first moment when they
00:39:01
started the motorcycle, they believed that
00:39:03
the Germans believed that they would cover 130 km and
00:39:06
reach
00:39:08
Kiev
00:39:10
in more than a week of fighting, even in 10 days,
00:39:14
they advanced only 40
00:39:16
km and this was, of course, not at all the
00:39:18
result that was expected, which was
00:39:22
in a situation similar to
00:39:25
in February March forty-three. That
00:39:30
is, the situation
00:39:33
has changed very much, it is clear that
00:39:35
but still the advance of the Soviet troops along
00:39:40
the left bank took place in conditions of
00:39:43
the destruction of railways, that is,
00:39:45
just like there were problems with transportation near Kharkov.
00:39:48
But
00:39:50
they were solved one way or another and had
00:39:55
ammunition and fuel and stood shoulder
00:39:59
to shoulder in defense quite tightly, which
00:40:02
forced the enemy to push out.
00:40:05
That is near Kiev there was no encirclement of
00:40:09
more than some populated area of
00:40:13
Zhitomir or Brusilov, it was not
00:40:16
encircled, for example, even a corps,
00:40:19
let alone for example an
00:40:21
army, if the sixth army was surrounded near Kharkov,
00:40:27
or for example the third tank in the army, then there was
00:40:29
nothing
00:40:31
similar
00:40:32
near Kiev in November there was, and
00:40:36
of course, such great resistance,
00:40:38
including from attacks from fresh
00:40:42
enemy formations, it
00:40:44
of course
00:40:46
made it possible to grind down those very reserves and
00:40:49
make moves on the trail that were quick with
00:40:55
SNTP
00:40:57
what is known as Berdichev’s Zhytomyrsk
00:41:00
if you look over the shoulder straps of our
00:41:03
officers or look over the shoulders of the
00:41:05
Germans as parties to this time in
00:41:07
dynamics they assessed each other's actions and
00:41:10
their actions to what extent those reports of the
00:41:12
victorious report that the
00:41:14
Germans first struck were replaced by slightly different
00:41:17
impressions from this blow when
00:41:20
they ran into a competently operating
00:41:24
Red Army, in general, this is what happened
00:41:26
from the point of view of this mutual
00:41:30
impression, a feeling of Déjà vu arises
00:41:34
when You consider the actions of the
00:41:38
Germans It was then in November of the
00:41:40
year forty-three and you involuntarily compare with the
00:41:44
Soviet reports of some
00:41:47
year forty-two when the tanks
00:41:50
were returning for their mission, firstly, the
00:41:53
training of the
00:41:55
German infantry, also despite
00:41:58
retraining in Western Europe, the training
00:42:02
was certainly worse than those who walked through
00:42:05
France in the 1940s or across the USSR from the pen and
00:42:09
these here The return of tanks for their
00:42:11
infantry
00:42:12
is just a feeling of Déjà vu, which is usually
00:42:16
what you read in our documents on
00:42:19
some kind of positional battles And so the
00:42:21
German infantry is pressed to the ground by
00:42:24
artillery strikes, the
00:42:26
tanks go
00:42:28
forward but they themselves They can’t do anything
00:42:32
But like it was in
00:42:36
1941, when they really could
00:42:39
rush out to the artillery positions and
00:42:41
kill everyone And
00:42:44
thereby open the way for their infantry, this
00:42:47
was no longer the case, it didn’t
00:42:50
work,
00:42:52
so this movement of the
00:42:55
airborne forces is much slower, much And let’s
00:43:00
say it’s more expensive cost than the same
00:43:03
actions, essentially according to the scheme that
00:43:06
were implemented in some June of the
00:43:09
forty-second year at the beginning of Operation
00:43:11
Blau, these were the same SS men, in
00:43:14
fact, they were often at the forefront of the attacks,
00:43:17
but they were ready for the fact that
00:43:19
they were on they are ready for such a beating,
00:43:22
but in fact, of course, Le Standard
00:43:27
still had such a very
00:43:30
versatile experience on the Kursk
00:43:33
Bulge when they made their way through a fairly
00:43:36
strong defense. But
00:43:40
they did not
00:43:42
succeed in such a breakthrough,
00:43:44
and I will say
00:43:47
that the same people were on the other side, that
00:43:50
is it was the same
00:43:55
Tutin,
00:43:56
but the maneuver, primarily
00:44:00
with artillery, gave a greater
00:44:03
result, that is,
00:44:06
Vatutin in July forty-three, the
00:44:10
same blow
00:44:11
sculpted standards.
00:44:13
He created a worse situation than
00:44:19
in November forty-three, despite the fact that
00:44:23
in November he had to leave Zhitomir
00:44:26
Brusilov But here from the point
00:44:29
of view of the fact that a breakthrough is underway and a
00:44:34
strong defense is overcome there in 17 hours, but
00:44:37
here there is no strong defense here, it’s
00:44:42
much
00:44:43
thinner here they just sat down, they just
00:44:46
dug up some
00:44:49
[music]
00:44:51
sufficient
00:44:56
awnings of messages, I would even say so
00:44:58
special They didn’t have time to throw mint, but
00:45:02
nevertheless they thought out artillery
00:45:04
counteraction and, again, comparing
00:45:07
with
00:45:08
Kursk what the situation was there, this is
00:45:12
actually connected with the situation in
00:45:14
the air. The
00:45:17
Soviet artillery regiment heavy artillery l20
00:45:21
152 howitzer guns were not
00:45:24
working yet The Germans were advancing very poorly
00:45:29
as soon as They ran out of ammunition
00:45:31
and there was no supply because
00:45:34
Vyka’s aviation, all that was moving along the roads in the
00:45:39
near rear was the
00:45:42
Kursk regiment, the Kursk regiment fell silent and the Germans were
00:45:46
advancing more vigorously and more cheerfully. And
00:45:53
[music] that’s why our
00:45:59
supplies are being cut off by blows to communications. No, there are no complaints, but it’s
00:46:01
hard for us to transport on the muddy roads there are
00:46:07
few roads there, they are clogged with equipment, there are
00:46:10
these complaints, but the fact is that the aviation
00:46:13
there washes everything away. In the rear, this is not there, you know,
00:46:16
when you read later the complaints
00:46:18
of the Germans, it makes an impression
00:46:22
because in fact, what we
00:46:24
talked about today is a combined experience and the experience of
00:46:28
the defense of Kursk and the experience of the two Kharkov He
00:46:31
gave his combined cumulative
00:46:35
training of troops such that the Germans, repeating the
00:46:39
same techniques both on a strategic
00:46:41
scale and on such a tactical
00:46:44
scale, they could not really
00:46:46
do anything. Yes, they advanced, but
00:46:48
they did not accomplish the tasks of defeating the group were able to
00:46:50
achieve And after that we received a brutal
00:46:54
counterattack, we will talk about it,
00:46:56
including in our future programs and
00:46:59
Dear viewers Dear
00:47:00
radio listeners, I draw your attention to the fact that
00:47:03
Alexey Valery Chisa runs his own Telegram
00:47:05
channel Iron Wind, here is his address Be
00:47:07
sure to subscribe there is invaluable
00:47:09
information on how to in fact,
00:47:13
our grandfathers and
00:47:15
great-grandfathers achieved the result
00:47:18
that we know and in the little-known
00:47:20
circumstances of the Great Patriotic
00:47:21
War you will learn a lot of new things I
00:47:23
thank you for your attention Alexey
00:47:25
Valevich Thank you for this conversation
00:47:27
all the best, goodbye All the best

Description:

Выпуск 1199. 06.12.2023. "Крах контрнаступления Вермахта под Киевом 1943-го и опыт Харькова". Почему и какими силами Вермахт решился контратаковать в ноябре 1943 года западнее Киева, куда отошла 4-я танковая армия Гота, как наступающие советские войска растянули боевые порядки, какой была стратегическая задача немецкого контрнаступления, какие резервы СС и Вермахта подошли на киевское направление, об удачных действиях советской разведки на направлении Фастов-Киев, как Ставка указала на необходимость перейти к обороне, как сказался тяжёлый опыт наступления под Харьковом в феврале 1943 года, о качественно новом уровне советского артиллерийского корпуса прорыва, почему немцы не смогли больше выигрывать артиллерийскую дуэль на фронте, о роли артиллерийской разведки и целеуказания, как эсэсовцы перешли в атаку 15 ноября, почему немцы пытались использовать тактику прорыва на Курской дуге, почему немцы были вынуждены атаковать ночью, как советская артиллерия цементировала оборону и жгла танки противника, о тяжёлой обстановке под Житомиром, почему Черняховский дал команду кавалерийскому корпусу на оставление Житомира, как и почему был оставлен Брусилов, почему немцам было важно не занять города, а уничтожить наступавшие части Красной Армии, о фильме «Контрудар», о немецком ударе в районе Малина, о прибытии 18 армии для стабилизации обстановки под Киевом, какими были реальные потери немцев, почему у немцев перестали получаться танковые удары даже с новейшими танками, почему под Киевом не работал эффект немецкой авиации — смотрите и слушайте продолжение нашего специального проекта «Малоизвестная Великая Отечественная». В гостях у Российского радиоуниверситета Алексей Валерьевич Исаев, кандидат исторических наук, старший научный сотрудник Института военной истории Министерства обороны России. Премьера выпуска состоялась 06.12.2023.

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